



A Texas Ranger Hall of Fame E-Book™

TEXAS, 1791- 1835

A STUDY IN MANIFEST DESTINY

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By

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Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
East Texas State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

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ABSTRACT

TEXAS, 1791-1835
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East Texas State University, 1969

Adviser: Ralph W. Goodwin

TEXAS, 1791-1835

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ABSTRACT

TEXAS, 1791-1835 A STUDY IN MANIFEST DESTINY

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Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this study is to understand the events leading to the Texas Revolution as a revealing example of the process of Manifest Destiny. Stress will be placed upon the significance of events prior to 1821, upon later occurrences, and upon economic and cultural motivations after 1821.

Procedure: Initially, a study of biographical information of Texas colonists was conducted to determine distinctive traits of men of different political persuasions. Following the formation of preliminary conclusions from this information, contemporary documents, correspondence, and newspapers were studied in order to evaluate the motivations behind the colonization of Texas. The conclusions in this thesis were formed by evaluating this contemporary material in light of nineteenth century American attitudes and institutions.

Findings: Events in Texas prior to 1821 exerted significant influence upon affairs in the province after that date. Filibusters of this period, including Philip Nolan, Augustus Magee, Samuel Kemper, Henry Perry, and James Long, caused Latin-American officials to regard Anglo-Americans with lasting suspicion and hostility. These filibusters made it clear to Latin-American officials that Texas had to be colonized and prosperously developed in order to save it from Anglo-American aggrandizement. Ironically, however, the only effective colonists

proved to be Anglo-American frontiersmen. Anglo-Americans therefore were admitted to Texas during the 1820s in the hope that they would develop the province, remain loyal to Mexico, and thereby protect Texas from less orderly Anglo-Americans". The most important leader of the Anglo-American colonists was Stephen F. Austin, who long remained a bulwark of support for loyalty to Mexico. With his tremendous influence over the majority of Texas settlers, he was able to effectively discourage separatist agitators.

But lingering Mexican suspicions were aggravated by occasional incidents like the Fredonian Rebellion, and by 1830 they passed legislation prohibiting further Anglo-American immigration. But Anglo-Americans continued to pour into Texas, and new immigrants like William B. Travis and Sam Houston were increasingly separatist in nature. Within five years separatist influence and adverse Mexican policy was sufficient to stimulate a general rebellion, and the "anglicization" of Texas reached its culmination.

Conclusions: The filibustering tradition established in Texas prior to 1821, while causing lasting Latin-American resentment and while enduring in Texas through a few aggressive individuals, was not the primary cause of the Texas Revolution. The methodical Anglo-American settlement of Texas was the ultimate reason for the Mexican loss of the region. During the 1820s Mexican control of Texas was still sufficiently strong to develop a policy which might have saved the province. But Mexican policy was adversely influenced by traditional suspicions of Anglo-Americans, and by the 1830s Mexican officials had lost the initiative of originating policy to the increasing American population. Once the majority of Anglo-American settlers became convinced that their interests would best be served by separation from Mexico, the process of Manifest Destiny in Texas was completed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Expressions of gratitude for aid in preparing this paper must first be extended to Dr. Ralph W. Goodwin both for his detailed supervision as director of this thesis, and for general instruction on the theories and techniques of writing history. Similar assistance was given by the members of my advisory committee: Dr. Paul W. Barrus, Dr. Robin Rudoff, and Dr. Frank H. Smyrl.

Dr. Michael E. Thurman directed an honors thesis by the writer, entitled "William Barret Travis—Agitator for Texas Independence," which was presented at East Texas State College in 1964, and which involved related aspects of Manifest Destiny in Texas. Continuing interest in this subject led to several trips to the Texas State Library and the research facilities of the University of Texas at Austin. Useful suggestions were obtained through a series of conversations and letters with Robert E. Davis, publisher of the Texian Press, Waco.

Aside from a day spent at the excellent Texas Collection of the Dallas Public Library, the bulk of recent research for this study was done in the East Texas State University Library. Of particular assistance in locating documents there was Mrs. Evelyn George.

INTRODUCTION

There is no better example of the process Manifest Destiny than the pattern of events in Texas from 1791 to 1835. During that period, Americans penetrated Texas, settled and began to develop it and finally seized political control of the region for themselves. These occurrences exemplify an aggressive procedure which, allowing for differences in time and place, was fulfilled in the settlement of perhaps all of the continental United States, and which by the 1840s was known as “Manifest Destiny.”

“Manifest Destiny” was a phrase coined by John L. O’Sullivan in 1845, and was a journalistic attempt to describe the acquisitive activities increasingly practiced by Americans as their nation expanded. Manifest Destiny never denied that others—Spaniards, Mexicans, Englishmen, Indians—might have prior claims to regions coveted by Americans, but if those claims could not be held secure, then plainly it was the natural course of events for enterprising Americans to seize and exploit these areas. Not only would Americans benefit, but the land itself would be improved, and native inhabitants would be the recipients of the blessings of liberty inherent in American culture.

In simplest essence, therefore, Manifest Destiny was the “anglicization” of an area which belonged to previous—comparatively inefficient—occupants. “Anglicization” consisted of peopling an area with Anglo-Americans, and firmly establishing Anglo-American economic, political, and social institutions within that area. Prior owners even were displaced or absorbed as anglicization accelerated to the point of American domination.

The first Anglo-American frontiersmen to penetrate a region were traders, and in Texas, as in many other areas, some of these men—led chiefly by Philip Nolan—displayed acquisitive ambitions. During the first two decades of the 1800s, these filibustering tendencies were

manifested in Texas by Americans like Augustus Magee, Samuel Kemper, Henry Perry, and James Long. By 1821, when Texas came under the political control of Mexico, filibustering was replaced by colonization as the major Anglo-American influence in Texas. Anglo-American infiltration progressed methodically but rapidly under the peaceful leadership of Stephen F. Austin. Within fifteen years the anglicization of Texas had reached a sufficient level of development for colonists to respond to the exhortations of agitators like William B. Travis and Sam Houston. Texans rebelled successfully against Mexican authority, and the process of Manifest Destiny in Texas was completed.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the events and forces which led to the Texas Revolution. Even a superficial consideration of these events and forces shows a pattern of Manifest Destiny; therefore a study offers a penetrating investigation of Manifest Destiny. When dealt with at all, the subject of Manifest Destiny in Texas previously has been treated only in the period of Anglo-American colonization, 1821-1835; and events in Texas during the late 1700s. My purpose has been essentially to consider Anglo-American activities in Texas, from the 1790s until the outbreak of the Revolution, as a comprehensive example of Manifest Destiny.

In my study of this problem, I have found no evidence of systematic Spanish or Mexican oppression of Anglo-American colonists which provoked a revolt against tyranny. Texas simply was in the path of Anglo-American frontiersmen, and it was inevitable and natural that they would be attracted to this promising region. Since Latin-Americans could not adequately develop and hold Texas, it was further inevitable that Anglo-Americans would. This inexorable Anglo-American opportunism was the process of Manifest Destiny. Although few direct references to Manifest Destiny will be made in the body of this paper, it is hoped that the evidence and

conclusions which are presented will be interpreted. as a study of Destiny, as exercised in Texas from 1791 to 1835.

CHAPTER I

PRELUDE TO THE ANGLICIZATION OF TEXAS: 1791-1821

The last three decades of Spanish control in Texas were marked with ominous activities which set the pattern for and opened Texas to Anglo-American domination. Beginning in the 1790s, *norteamericanos* increasingly participated in attempts to loosen Spanish power over Texas, and by 1821, when Spaniards were expelled from the province, Anglo-Americans had infiltrated Texas and had played significant roles in revolts against Spanish authority. During this period, moreover, Anglo-American acquisitiveness was fully revealed by aggressive filibusters, and Latin-American officials recognized and reacted with hostility to these same tendencies after 1821.

During this period, however, the conduct of Anglos in regions other than Texas also caused Spanish officials concern and even alarm. Since these activities affected Spanish policy in Texas, attention should briefly be focused upon the course and results of these events. It should be remembered, moreover, that most of these events took shape because Spain was too weak to properly protect isolated frontier regions. At this time Spain was wracked by revolutions in her sprawling colonies, and her resources were stretched in a vain attempt to maintain her crumbling empire. In Texas only three thinly populated settlements existed—San Antonio, La Bahia, and Nacogdoches. More distant areas like Florida suffered even greater neglect. It was inevitable that as soon as Spain became unable to safeguard such promising territories, nearby Americans would take advantage of every weakness.

Throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Spain's relationship with Anglo-Americans was continually marred by unpleasant incidents with misguided or—far more often—greedy individuals. One of the more prominent and active of these men was James

Wilkinson, General of the United States Army from 1797 until 1815. Wilkinson was an arch-conspirator who had numerous dealings with Spanish officials and who schemed persistently to exploit some sort of profit from Spanish territories. In the late 1780s, for example, he was a leading figure in the infamous Spanish Conspiracy, an attempt to foment a revolution in Kentucky with the aid of Spain. Toward this end he admitted that “I have sacrificed voluntarily my domestic felicities, my fortunes, my comfort, and what is more important I abandoned, to do so, my personal fame and political character. . . .”¹ He also flatly stated that he was “*un buen Espanol*”² [a good Spaniard], but this commitment did not stop him from accepting a commission in the United States Army two years later in 1791, nor did his subsequent oath to the government prevent him from continuing to engage in various intrigues with the Spanish. By 1796 he had received some \$32,000 from Spanish authorities for services and advice, at best a questionable practice for a ranking United States military officer. Throughout this period Wilkinson encouraged and aided Philip Nolan with his activities in Texas, which will be related later.³

As a result of these activities, Spanish officials became increasingly wary and hostile toward acquisitive Americans on every frontier. Early in 1802 it became generally known that the ambitious Napoleon Bonaparte had acquired title to Louisiana, which had been ceded to Spain in 1763 as part of the settlement of the Seven Years’ War. Spanish officials heard many

1 James Wilkinson to Diego de Gardoqui, Spanish Charge de Affairs to the United States, January 1, 1789, Alcee Fortier, *A History of Louisiana*, vol. II: *The Spanish Conquest and the Cession to the United States, 1769-1803* (New York: Manzi, Joyant, and Co., 1904), pp, 141-42.

2 Wilkinson to Estevan Miro, Governor of Louisiana, February 14, 1789, *ibid.*, p. 142.

3 James Ripley Jacobs, *Tarnished Warrior* (New York; The Macmillan Company, 1938), pp. 128, 133-34, 152, 160, 179, 271-73.

rumors of American frontiersmen seizing the area by force to save it, and thus Latin-Americans became more accustomed to Anglo-American aggressiveness.⁴

Of course, less than two years later Louisiana changed hands again, much to the discomfiture of the Spanish. President Thomas Jefferson, theoretical advocate of an agrarian republic of contented farmers, pushed aside his worries over constitutionality and purchased the vast territory from Bonaparte. This action doubled the size of the United States and made available twice as much farmland for Jefferson's dream, but it understandably alarmed Spanish frontier officials. James Monroe admitted that

For the dissatisfaction of the Spanish government there were obvious reasons. While France retained the province, the power of that great nation formed a barrier against the United States in favor of all Spanish provinces to the south of it. By the cession that barrier was removed and the people approaching and having intercourse with each other, and the spirit of liberty extending, it was probable that the power of Spain would be immediately shaken and the whole territory be soon wrested from her by the people themselves.⁵

The recent events concerning Philip Nolan had revealed many of these points to Latin-Americans with far greater emphasis than might otherwise have been the case. Certainly few border officials could have been surprised at American claims that Texas was part of the Louisiana Purchase,⁶ claims that were officially relinquished only with the Adams-Onis Treaty

⁴ Carlos E. Castaneda, *Our Catholic Heritage in Texas, 1519-1936: The Mission Era*, Vol. V: The End of the Spanish Regime, 1780-1810 (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones Company, Publishers, 1942), pp. 246-47.

⁵ James Monroe, *The Autobiography of James Monroe*, edited by Stuart Gerry Brown (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1959), p. 191.

⁶ For example, on July 10, 1818, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams and a Spanish intermediary discussed "for more than an hour" the possibilities of a Louisiana border settlement. The Spanish were willing to make large concessions if the Americans would accept the Sabine River as the western boundary, but Adams insisted that such a

of 1819. In fact, thirty years later one Mexican official wrote the following complaint on this subject:

Jefferson, the embodiment of the most exaggerated democratic principles, the philosopher who exercised the greatest influence upon the government and laws of his country, the statesman who stamped upon it its singular and national character, who voiced the aspirations of its thousands of settlers and adventurers. The atheist of Monticello thoroughly understood the desires and ambitions of his countrymen. In order to win universal popularity, he used to encourage their ambitious dreams of expansion, founded on no other right than the ominous one of might. . . .⁷

This angry diatribe, written after San Jacinto by veteran government official Jose Maria Tornel y Mendivil, accurately reflects Latin-American resentment of “their ambitious dreams of expansion”—a resentment that clearly began to focus in the earliest years of the nineteenth century.

One American of “ambitious dreams”—James Wilkinson—to be watched with wary suspicion by Spanish authorities in Texas and elsewhere. His earlier dealings with the Spanish had been of such a nature as to permanently cast doubt on his actions. Many of his activities, of

solution was “impossible.” This meeting was merely one of an almost numberless series in which Spanish officials became convinced that land-hungry frontiersmen were not the only Americans who wanted possession of Spanish Texas. Allan Nevins, ed., *The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), p. 198.

⁷ Jose Maria Tornel y Mendivil, Secretary of War, “Relations Between Texas, the United States of America, and the Mexican Republic” Mexico 1837), General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, *et al.*, *The Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution, by the Chief Mexican Participants*, translated with notes by Carlos E. Castaneda, (Dallas: P. L. Turner Company, 1928), p. 287.

course, had been in league with Spanish interests, but Wilkinson had switched loyalties so often that he was regarded with extreme distrust, even by the Spanish.⁸

If Spanish authorities considered Wilkinson a dangerous schemer, subsequent actions by the general would vindicate their suspicions. For years he schemed with Philip Nolan, an adventurer whose activities in Texas will be examined shortly. Nolan's career in Texas—and his usefulness to Wilkinson—was abruptly ended in 1801, when he was killed by Spanish soldiers. Although Wilkinson lamented the fate of “my Unfortunate protégé Nolan. . . ,”⁹ he wasted little time in finding another adventurous young man to do field work in Spanish territory. The first exploratory journey of Lieutenant Zebulon M. Pike into Spanish regions in 1806-1807 was at Wilkinson's instigation. Spanish troops were dispatched to intercept Pike and his small party, and the Americans were taken into custody and expelled by indignant Latin-American officials.¹⁰ A few days -prior to Pike's departure, Wilkinson had remarked to an acquaintance that Pike “was as yet ignorant of his journey. . . . “ When asked “if Mr. Pike was sent by the Government of the United States he replied NO: that it was his own. . . plan. . .”¹¹

This plan was almost certainly connected with Aaron Burr's schemes to establish an empire in Mexico and western America, in which Wilkinson was deeply immersed by 1805. Burr considered Wilkinson to be “ardent in the cause,” and intended the general's regular force of about six hundred men to serve as a “nucleus” with which he could invade Mexico “whenever it

⁸ One of Wilkinson's biographers has suggested that the general's presidential superiors, aware of his duplicity, tolerated him only because they felt he would not resort to open treachery, and considered his main value to be as a useful contact with the Spanish. Jacobs, *Tarnished Warrior*, pp. 182-83.

⁹ Wilkinson to President Jefferson, December 23, 1805, Clarence Edwin Carter, ed., *The Territorial Papers of the United States*, Vol. XIV: *The Territory of Louisiana-Missouri 1806-1814*, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949) pp. 316-18.

¹⁰ The best account of Pike's journey may be found in W. Eugene Hollon, *The Lost Pathfinder: Zebulon Montgomery Pike* (Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1949).

¹¹ Statement and Affidavit of Timothy Kibby, July 6, 1807, Carter, ed., *Territorial Papers*, Vol. XIV, pp. 133-35.

should be deemed expedient.”¹² But when expected British naval support did not materialize, “Wilkinson became alarmed, and resolved on an abandonment of the enterprise at the sacrifice of his associates.”¹³

It was entirely in character that Wilkinson should desert the project at the first sign of trouble, as was his subsequent attempt to salvage some personal gain from the situation. He wrote to the Viceroy of Mexico, issuing the following warning:

The gospel of revolution is to be spread. . . , and scenes of violence and pillage must ensue. To ward off these calamities . . . I will hurl myself like a Leonidas into the breach, defending it or perishing in the attempt. . . .

I am risking my life, my good name and my property; my life by the change I have made in the military arrangements, without the knowledge of my government; my good name by offering without orders this communication to a foreign power; and my fortune . . . by draining my purse . . . in order to elude, frustrate, and if possible destroy the nefarious schemes of the revolutionists.

Having “drained” his purse, he asked to “be reimbursed” at least 111,000 pesos, neglecting to mention his own involvement in these “nefarious schemes.”¹⁴ Considering their

¹² Matthew L. Davis, *Memoirs of Aaron Burr*, Vol. II (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1837), p. 1 381 For the complete testimony of Burr’s hearing, which clearly places Wilkinson in a bad light, see: “Burr’s Conspiracy,” Communicated to Congress, January 22, 1807, *American State Papers, 1780-1838, Miscellaneous*, Vol. I (Microfilm deposited at East Texas State University Library, Commerce), Serial No. .037, PP. 468-645.

¹³ Davis, *Memoirs of Burr*, vol. II, pp. 381-82; and statement from General John Adair, 1807, Henry Stuart Foote, *Texas and the Texans*, vol. I (Philadelphia: Thomas, Cowperthwait and Co., 1841 a facsimile reproduction of the original by The Steck Company, Austin, 1935), p. 157.

past experiences with Wilkinson, the Spanish should have suspected his involvement in the project. At any rate, so far as is known, the Viceroy did not pay Wilkinson. The general also revealed Burr's plot to the United States government, but after being forced to defend himself of complicity in the affair he would remain comparatively inactive in Texas and other Spanish territories for a time.

Spanish officials had learned yet another lesson about American acquisitiveness, however, and it could have been of little surprise to them when American encroachments were aimed at isolated Florida. Nearby American settlers began moving into Florida and in 1810 staged a semblance of a revolution which separated the western tip as far east as the Pearl River. This region was promptly annexed by the United States and became a part of the state of Louisiana. Just three years later the adjacent section, extending to the Perdido River and including parts of present day Mississippi and Alabama, was also eagerly annexed by the administration of President James Madison.

Too weak to prevent these arbitrary activities, Spain was unable to control the Indians of the region. As early as 1814 Andrew Jackson was convinced that "I could reach the walls of Pensacola in two months." Jackson felt that without such bold measures "we will never have peace with the Indians. Nay more to render the southern frontier safe . . . we must possess the sea coast [sic] . . ." ¹⁵ A more public and equally ominous reflection of this aggressive attitude is the following statement from a national publication of the day:

¹⁴ Wilkinson to Don Jose Yturriagay, Viceroy of Mexico, November 17, 1806, cited in Royal Orman Shreve, *The Finished Scoundrel* (Indianapolis The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1933), pp. 224-25.

¹⁵ Andrew Jackson to John Armstrong, December 16, 1813, John Spencer Bassett, ed., *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson*,

We have several reports that Ferdinand and his monks are outrageously offended with the United States, for taking possession of their own property in what has recently been called Florida. Certainly, we have no wish for war—but if any war can be politic, a dust with his donship might be so. It would give us life, activity and business, and plenty of specie; and redeem the new world from the holy inquisition.¹⁶

The foregoing demonstrates the prejudiced and callous attitude of many Americans of this period toward the boring Spanish.¹⁷ Jackson and the national administration furnished a practical exhibition of this attitude in 1817.

“Jackson was authorized to cross the Spanish line in pursuit of the Indian enemy. . . ,”¹⁸ and he went on to seize control of the entire area. Instead of censuring Jackson, the administration implied to Spanish officials that it might be wise to cede the region to a nation which had the necessary strength to control it. Powerless to oppose this none-too-policy, Spain transferred Florida to the United States under the terms of the Adams-Onis Treaty. But Americans, particularly those living in Louisiana, were disappointed that this treaty had not included Texas as well as Florida, and certain belligerent factions began organizing themselves to remedy this oversight.

¹⁶ Niles’ *Weekly Register* (Baltimore), July 20, 1816. p 352. Not even the Spanish Minister in Washington, Luis de Onis, was spared from a practical demonstration of these bellicose sentiments. One night early in 1818 the windows and porch-lamps of Onis’ official residence were broken, and a dead chicken was tied to the bell rope of his front door. John Quincy Adams confided to his diary that even though “Spain was weak, it was ungenerous to insult her weakness. . . . Nevins ed. , *The Diary of John Quincy Adams*, p. 192.

¹⁷ Andrew Jackson undoubtedly reflected the pugnacious opinion of many of his fellow frontiersmen when, in 1806 he stated flatly “I hate the Dons.” Jackson to William C. C. Claiborne, Territorial Governor of Louisiana, November 12, 1806, Bassett, ed., *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson*, vol. I, pp. 52-53.

¹⁸ Nevins, ed., *The Diary of John Quincy Adams*, p. 199.

While Spanish authorities endured these lessons in American voracity, officials in Texas dealt with norteamericano intruders on the local level. one of the first Anglo-Americans to attempt in exploitation of Texas was Philip Nolan. Nolan was typical of American adventurers who crossed into the Spanish province late in the eighteenth century to gather wild horses and cattle and trade with the Indians.¹⁹ Orders were issued against such intrusions as early as 1784,²⁰ but the activities of Nolan prove the laxity of enforcement.

During the 1790s Nolan made a number of trips to Texas. He was usually accompanied by several men, and although he traded with local Indian tribes, the chief purpose of these trips was to collect herds of wild mustangs for sale in Louisiana. After several years of travel in Texas and surrounding areas, Nolan had become an expert on this obscure region. Not only was he “well known for his . . . dexterity in taking wild horses. but; he knew “several” Indian languages, and he had even collected “fossil bones of great magnitude”²¹ in 1798 Thomas Jefferson wrote to Nolan seeking information about Texas,²² and two years later James Wilkinson recommended Nolan to Jefferson as a source of details on “the soil, clime, population, improvements, and productions . . . “ of Texas.²³

Nolan’s connection with Wilkinson deserves a closer look. Nolan had been a companion to Wilkinson’s young son in the early 1780s in Philadelphia. In 1789 Nolan traveled to New Orleans with Wilkinson, and aided him in such business enterprises as the bribery of Spanish

19 Castaneda, *Our Catholic Heritage in Texas*, vol. V, pp. 205-7; and Mattie Austin Hatcher, *The Opening of Texas to Foreign Settlement 1801-1821* (Austin. University of Texas Bulletin, 1927), pp. 50-5.

20 Phelipe de Neve, Commandant-General, “Exclusion of Foreigners from the Spanish Dominions of America,” May 14, 1784, Hatcher, *The Opening of Texas* pp. 295-96.

21 Andrew Ellicott, *The Journal of Andrew Ellicott* (Philadelphia, 1803, a facsimile reproduction of the original by Quadrangle Books, Inc., Chicago, 1962), p. 29; and William Dunbar to Thomas Jefferson, August 22, 1801, [Eugene C. Barker, ed.], “Concerning Philip Nolan,” *The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association*, VII (April, 1904), 314-17.

22 Thomas Jefferson to Philip Nolan, June 24, 1798, [Barker, ed.], “Concerning Philip Nolan,” 308-9.

officials in a crooked tobacco deal.²⁴ When Wilkinson rejoined the United States Army in 1791, Nolan remained in Spanish Territory. It was probably at this point that he began his trips to Texas, and his eventual familiarity with that territory led to various well-paid assignments for Spanish officials.²⁵ He gained the confidence of the Baron de Carondelet Governor of Louisiana, who allowed him to gather horses in Texas and sell them in New Orleans, and in return Nolan supplied the Governor with maps and other information. In order to maintain Carondelet's good will, Nolan assured him that he would take the Spanish side against American troublemakers.²⁶

It appears, however, that Nolan was devious in his supposed allegiance to the Spanish government. He was still connected with Wilkinson, who spent a great deal of time in or near Spanish territory in his military capacity. We have seen that Wilkinson constantly kept an eye cut for future speculative possibilities in Texas and appeared to anticipate hostilities which would lead to military seizure of the province by the United States.

Philip Nolan was aware of such schemes, and as early as 1797 he commented that "I expect my friend and patron the General will, in such event, give me conspicuous command." Nolan's travels and long association with his "patron" made such expectations reasonable, particularly since he had dutifully supplied Wilkinson with maps, information about mines, and other useful knowledge regarding the general region.²⁷ Nolan continued his services to the general, and in 1800 Wilkinson sent him with a letter to Thomas Jefferson praising Nolan's

23 James 'Wilkinson to Thomas Jefferson, May 22, 1800, *ibid.*, 314

24 Jacobs, *Tarnished Warrior*, pp. 67, 95, 106.

25 Ellicott, *Journal of Andrew Ellicott*, pp. 67-68, 87-89; and Jacobs, *Tarnished Warrior*, pp. 151-52, 184.

26 Ellicott, *Journal of Andrew Ellicott*, p. 85.

27 John Rydjord, *Foreign Interest in the Independence of New Spain* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1935), pp. 172-73.

“subsequent excursions which have been more extensive, and his observations which have been more accurate. . . .”²⁸

In 1797, however, veteran territorial official Manuel Gayoso de Lemos replaced the trusting Baron de Carondelet as Governor of Louisiana. “The Baron was . . . much less acquainted. with the political sentiments and prejudices . . . of the inhabitants” than Governor Gayoso.²⁹ Moreover, Gayoso, aware of Nolan’s connection with the scheming Wilkinson, disliked and distrusted the American horse dealer, When Gayoso assumed the governorship, Nolan was again in Texas on a passport issued by Carondelet. Gayoso wrote the Governor of Texas, Manuel Munoz, urging the arrest of Nolan as a potential threat to the province. Governor Munoz had recently become an invalid, however, and his temporary replacement left his mail unopened until the Viceroy named a permanent successor. Therefore Nolan, “unconscious of the machinations of’ his Enemies[,] passed thro’ the Province, was treated. as usual with the utmost attention,” and returned to New Orleans with 1,300 head of horses.³⁰

After reporting to Wilkinson, Nolan began planning yet another trip to Texas. Orders had been issued for his arrest, should he ever return to Texas, and he failed to obtain permission to return to the province. But with characteristic boldness (a friend termed it a need “of a little more prudence”) he went ahead with plans for his largest expedition to date.³¹ It would appear that Nolan was willing to risk official opposition in Texas because of the profits of horse trading. But

28 James Wilkinson to Thomas Jefferson, May 22, 1800, [Barker, ed.] J, “Concerning Philip Nolan,” 314.

29 Ellicott, *Journal of Andrew Ellicott*, p. 96.

30 Daniel Clark, Jr. , to Thomas Jefferson, February 12, 1789, [Barker, ed.], “Concerning Philip Nolan,” 311-13; and J. A. Quintero “Philip Nolan and His Companions,” *Texas Almanac for 1868* (Microfilm deposited. In East Texas State University Library, Commerce), 60.

31 William Dunbar to Thomas Jefferson, August 22, 1801, [Barker, ed.], “Concerning Philip Nolan,” 314-17.


he almost certainly relied upon a continuance of his friendly receptions in Texas, and it is quite possible that Wilkinson desired further information and was willing to pay for it.

At any rate, late in 1800 Nolan's party of almost thirty men crossed the Mississippi. They soon "met about fifty Spaniards," who apparently did not feel strong enough to challenge the Americans. Nolan was allowed to press on into the interior and, living off the country, the party eventually crossed "a river called the Brasos." A camp was fashioned near present day Waco and about three hundred horses were captured. It was decided to let the herd rest and graze a few days before commencing the return journey, and a log pen was erected, ostensibly "to prevent the Indians from stealing from us."³²

Nolan, however, had earlier indicated another purpose for this wooden structure. Just after crossing the Mississippi, a member of the party named Mordecai Richards asked Nolan why the Spanish authorities had attempted to block their path. Nolan confidentially replied:

You are a man on whom I rely to carry out my plans, and for that reason I have appointed you third in command. If we succeed, you will make your fortune. My plan is to travel northwest, and . . . build a fort, to protect us from any attack. Then we will sally forth to explore the country and its mines, and, after obtaining a sufficient number of horses, we

³² Henderson Yoakum, ed., "Memoir of Colonel Ellis P. Bean," in Appendix II of Yoakum's *History of Texas*, vol. I (New York: Redfield, 1855, a facsimile reproduction of the original by The Steck Company, Austin, 1935), pp. 403-5. Bean was a seventeen-year-old adventurer who had run away from his Tennessee home and who had been personally recruited by Nolan.



will proceed to . . . Kentucky. . . . There we will find many friends awaiting our arrival, and by that time I will receive authority to conquer the province of Texas. I will be the general, Mr. [David] Fero the second, and yourself the third in command.³³

Nolan thus revealed the true scope of his schemes. If the filibuster could be accomplished, Nolan would attain a fortune in land, mines, and horses.

But Richards lacked his leader's daring. The party, returned to Natchez, and related "the foregoing conversation to Spanish authorities. Nolan was already under considerable suspicion from officials who had come to share Governor Gayoso's distrust. A month before Nolan reentered Texas, orders were issued for his apprehension, although we have seen how ineffectually they were executed. Following, Mordecai Richards' statement, however, Lieutenant Miguel Musquiz commandant at Nacogdoches, asked permission to pursue Nolan, and new Governor Juan Bautista Elguezabal authorized Musquiz's request.³⁴

Musquiz mustered sixty-eight regulars and thirty-two volunteers (including William Barr, an American citizen of Nacogdoches), and the party set out early in March 1801. Within a fortnight Musquiz had located Nolan's camp. On March 21 interpreter Barr urged the Americans to surrender, but was informed "that Nolan and his men were determined to fight. Musquiz's men opened fire on the log redoubt, and within "about ten minutes" Nolan was shot; and killed. The Americans were driven from their roofless "wooden intrenchment," but managed to hold off Musquiz's force. Finally Barr came forward under a flag of truce with assurances that the Spanish only wanted the survivors to leave Texas. "We quickly agreed to go as companions with them but not give up our guns," related Ellis P. Bean, the youngest member of the party.

³³ Quintero "Nolan and, His Companions," 61.

³⁴ The most comprehensive and scholarly account of the Spanish activities relating to Nolan and other Anglo-American threats to royalist authority in Texas may be found in Castaneda, *Our Catholic Heritage in Texas*, vol. V.

Musquiz had Nolan's ears cut off to be sent to Governor Elguezabal, then commenced the return journey.³⁵

Nolan's followers had an excellent opportunity to escape when separated from their "companions" by the swollen Trinity River, and Bean urged them to do so. But he was voted down by his older comrades, who had come to trust the Spanish. Fifteen years later Bean expressed a typical attitude of his contemporaries toward Latin-Americans by bitterly reflecting:

"These are a people in whom you should put no trust or confidence whatever."³⁶ In this particular case it would seem that Bean was correct, for once in Nacogdoches the Americans were seized, disarmed, and sent into the interior in irons. They were finally tried, sentenced to lengthy imprisonments, and one was executed..

Punishment of the principals involved, however, was not the only action taken by Spanish authorities. For several months every garrison on the entire northern frontier of Mexico had been alerted for possible action against Nolan and whatever other threats might come from the United States. For the first time all Spanish officials became alarmed at the aggressive nature of citizens of the nearby United States, and subsequent affairs were conducted with this attitude in mind. On the frontier, all settlers east of the Sabine River were ordered to Nacogdoches for closer supervision, and in general there was greater wariness against alien intrusions.³⁷

For the next decade Anglo-Americans caused no disturbances in Texas. A few uninvited settlers managed to filter in, as they had done since the 1790s. Most of these Americans settled in

³⁵ Quintero "Nolan and His Companions," 60.

³⁶ Yoakum, ed., "Memoir of Colonel Ellis P. Bean," pp. 407-8; and "Diary of Manuel Musquiz," in Quintero, "Nolan and His Companions," pp. 62-63.

Nacogdoches; the census of 1804 shows that sixteen Americans already had established residency there.³⁸ These individuals engaged in farming, trading and carpentry, caused little trouble, and thus were allowed to stay. Some of these settlers, moreover, had previously lived in Louisiana and sworn the Spanish oath of allegiance, and a few—like William Barr—demonstrated their loyalty to the royal government.

During the first decade of the nineteenth century Texas remained sparsely settled and weakly garrisoned. Including soldiers, “in the entire province there are four thousand people of all ages and sexes. Despite the fact that the “lands are fertile beyond all others in America, . . . there is absolutely no commerce or industry,” only the simplest forms of agriculture were practiced, and there was frequently a shortage of food.³⁹ At first the chief problem caused by *norteamericanos* was that of contraband trade, but the Nolan incident and other evidences of Anglo-American expansionism inspired a definite plan to erect Texas as a buffer against the United States. Local garrisons were to be strengthened there, colonial expansion was outlined, and military forces were to be increased in proportion to the population.⁴⁰

But Americans still came to Texas in growing numbers. Some, like Daniel Boone, nephew of the legendary frontiersman, even went through official channels. Boone confidently moved his family to Texas in 1806, informed the Governor of this fact, and asked him to “order

³⁷ Castaneda, *Our Catholic Heritage in Texas*, vol. V, pp. 224, 244-47; and. Rydjord, *Foreign Interest in New Spain*, pp. 173, 185-86.

³⁸ Jose Joaquin Ugarte, Nacogdoches-Commandant, “Pueblo of Nacogdoches, List of the Foreigners in the Pueblo and in its Entire Jurisdiction, with a Statement of Names, Nationalities Conditions, Ages Time of Residence, and Occupations,” January 1, 1804 Hatcher, *The Opening of Texas*, pp. 297-300.

³⁹ Don Juan Bautista Eiguezabal, Governor of Texas, “Condition of Texas at the Beginning of the General Immigration Movement 1803, *ibid.*, pp. 33-5.

⁴⁰ Miguel Cayetano Soler, Viceroy of New Spain, “Royal Order Dividing the Interior Provinces into Two Commandancies,” May 30, 1804, *ibid.*, pp. 312.14.

set apart for me a town lot and lands for farming. . . .”⁴¹ Many local authorities came to realize the importance of immigration—even of Americans—for the prosperity of the province, and urged the encouragement of orderly colonization.⁴² Nevertheless, concerned officials periodically attempted to stiffen regulations against Anglo-American immigrants. But the following excerpt from a “Pardon for Contraband “Traders” in 1810 illustrated the general acknowledgement of the inevitability of American presence.

Calm the foreigners, then. Their permanent establishment in the province, in accordance with our laws, is assured, even though certain of them have no right to enjoy this blessing Make advantage of the paternal aid of the best and wisest. of governments; and all of you realize fully that in return for this favor, you must live as faithful, submissive and obedient vassals to superior authorities and to your respective judges.⁴³

With this gradual acceptance of American penetration into Texas, we see the emergence of a conception that eventually led to the admission of Stephen F. Austin’s colonists and thus to the completion of the anglicization of Texas. Since Spain lacked the strength to exclude American settlers, it was only common sense to allow them in. The next step was likewise an attempt to make the best of an undesirable situation. Texas officials tried to induce American settlers to submit to Spanish authority, hoping—vainly and, paradoxically—that in so doing they would help bolster the province against the encroachment of other Americans.

There were, however, many individuals in Texas—native Mexicans as well as American newcomers—who had no wish to be “faithful, submissive, and obedient vassals.” By 1810 all of

⁴¹ “Petition of Daniel Boone,” June 11, 1806, *ibid.*, pp. 322-23.

⁴² General Bernardo Bonavia, “Immigration Regulations,” 1809, *ibid.*, pp. 329-30.

Mexico was restive under Spanish rule, and in the fall of that year Father Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla led a revolt against Spain that was to last for more than a decade before achieving final success. Hidalgo sent agents throughout Mexico to solicit popular support, and he found favorable reaction in Texas.

The Governor of Texas, Manuel de Salcedo, noted the local revolutionary stirrings, and on January 9, 1811, he issued a proclamation to the citizens of San Antonio to remain loyal to the royalist government. But Juan Bautista de las Casas, a retired militia captain, was already plotting against Salcedo. On January 22, having won over the local troops, he captured Governor Salcedo, sent him south in chains, and assumed control of Texas. But Casas placed his friends in important positions, persecuted his personal enemies, and otherwise behaved in a despotic manner. By March Don Juan Manuel Zambrano, a middle-aged Church official, managed to unite enough opponents of Casas to seize the government from him. Zambrano restored Salcedo to the Governor's Palace and Casas was sent to Monclova for trial, where he was executed and his head sent to Salcedo in a box.⁴⁴

Salcedo's authority clearly rested on a shaky basis, and the next challenge to it was larger, better organized—and supported by Americans and the United States Government. Jose Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara, a prosperous Mexican tradesman who had involved himself in the revolutionary cause, traveled to the United States late in 1811 to seek American aid for a revolt in Texas. After a difficult trip overland, Gutierrez reached Natchitoches, where he began to formulate more definite plans. A companion was to remain in Natchitoches and organize the “goodly number of volunteers” who had already gathered, while Gutierrez journeyed to

⁴³ “Pardon for Contraband Traders,” July 29, 1810, *ibid.*, pp. 332-33.

Washington.⁴⁵ Along the way he met “with the governors and various generals,” who “made me many offers,” and were in general “attentive to our just cause.” Moreover, a number of impulsive citizens of Kentucky and Tennessee tried to persuade Gutierrez to stop and lead “a considerable army of volunteers” to Texas.⁴⁶

Arriving in Washington in December, he had a number of conferences with the Secretary of War, William Eustis. Eustis asked Gutierrez “whether, if he should send an army to take possession of Nacogdoches, bad results would ensue. . . .” Gutierrez felt that unfavorable consequences would result from such action, but Eustis pressed the point. “He told me that it would be easy to send an army to the banks of the Rio Grande under the pretext that they were going to take possession of the lands which France had sold to them, and that being there the army could help the [revolution].” Gutierrez also considered this action too extreme, even though Eustis warned that so long as the United States remained at peace there was “no other way” they could help the Mexicans openly. A few days later, however, Eustis informed Gutierrez that should war break out with Great Britain, the United States “will immediately place an army of 50,000 men in our country to aid our independence movement and make common cause with us.” Gutierrez immediately asked to have this commitment in writing, but the Secretary declined. Nevertheless, Gutierrez was generously supplied with government expense money, which, along with other cooperation, caused him to exclaim: “All have been amazed at the very great favors this government has done for me. . . .”⁴⁷

44 J. Villasana Haggard, “The Counter-Revolution of Bexar, 1811,” *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, XLIII (October, 1939), 222-35.

45 Gutierrez to the Mexican Congress, “Account of Progress of Revolution from Beginning,” Charles Adams Gulick Jr., ed., *The Papers of Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar*, vol. I (Austin: A. C. Baldwin and Sons, n.d.), pp. 4-29.

46 *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

47 “Diary of Jose Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara,” contributed by Elizabeth H. West, *SWHQ*, XXXIV (October, 1928), 55-77, and (January, 1929), 281-94.

At this same time similar “favors” were being performed for Jose Alvarez de Toledo. Toledo, an insurgent from Cuba, wrote to Secretary of State James Monroe in Philadelphia, informing him that he had “important information to communicate,” but lacked the necessary funds to travel to Washington.⁴⁸ Upon further inquiry Monroe approved the request, and on December 27 Gutierrez welcomed Toledo to Washington. At this point Gutierrez considered Toledo “a man of great talents, and passionately devoted to the cause of the liberty of Mexico. . . ,”⁴⁹ and the two men began working toward a common purpose for their respective homelands.

Gutierrez journeyed by sea to New Orleans and late in April, 1812, he returned to Natchitoches.⁵⁰ He was assisted in preparing his forces by Augustus W. Magee. Magee, a native of Massachusetts, had graduated third in the Class of 1808 from West Point,⁵¹ and was stationed in Louisiana where he was, of course, under the command of James Wilkinson. Magee was sent to Natchitoches “to aid. the civil authorities in arresting a band of robbers,” who had gathered in the so-called “Neutral Ground.”⁵² This area, between the Sabine River and the Arroyo Hondo, had been established in 1806 by Generals Symon de Herrera, commander of the Spanish forces in Texas, and James Wilkinson, both of whom agreed to keep their troops in “Nacogdoches and

48 Monroe to Alexander J. Dallas and to Toledo, November 25, 1817, “James Monroe Papers,” *Presidential Papers Microfilm* (Washington: The Library of Congress, 1960), Series 1, Reel 4.

49 “Diary of Gutierrez,” (October, 1928), 76.

50 *Ibid.*, (January, 1929), 282-92.

51 Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and of the United States Army*, vol. I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903, a facsimile reproduction of the original by University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1965), p. 683.

52 “Revolution in Texas in 1812,” from notes furnished by Colonel W. D. C. Hall, *The Texas Almanac for 1861*, 71. Hall joined the filibusters on August 20, 1812 and served exactly one year, “until the retreat of the Republican Army near San Antonio de Bexar” “Certificate of D. C. Hall’s Service in Republican Army,” Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, p. 4.

Natchitoches respectively.”⁵³ Consequently this lawless region became a haven for deserters and criminals, many of whom had offered their services to Gutierrez the previous year.

It was this rowdy element with which Magee was forced, to deal in 1811. Three years of such thankless assignments had produced no promotions for the ambitious young officer⁵⁴ and thus he was attracted by the prospect of military glory in Texas. He resigned his commission on June 22, 1812⁵⁵ and fell in with Gutierrez. Magee became second in command of the growing force and until his death was the actual leader of the army.

Early in August, 1812, Magee crossed the Sabine at the head of well over a hundred men, many of whom were “the very outlaws” he had so recently chastised. The filibusters reached Nacogdoches on August 12 and encountered almost no resistance from the 150-man Spanish garrison, who either fled or deserted to the invaders. Gutierrez had flooded Nacogdoches with revolutionary propaganda, and his army was welcomed with cheers.⁵⁶

Now that Nacogdoches was no longer under Spanish control, Natchitoches merchants were eager to engage in trade that had previously been prohibited. Men as well as supplies arrived from east of the Sabine as adventurers flocked to this promising venture. While Magee busily attended to his expanding army, Gutierrez issued several proclamations one of which guaranteed his “fellow-soldiers” free land and title to any gold or silver mines they might find. In

⁵³ James Wilkinson to Antonio Cordero y Bustamente, October 29, 1806, and General Symon de Herrera to Wilkinson November 4, 1806, Ernest Wallace, ed., *Documents of Texas History* (Lubbock: The Texas Tech Press, 1960), pp. 37-38. It should be noted that this agreement was to the definite advantage of Spain. It would be years before the Adams-Onis Treaty fixed the boundary of Texas, but by confirming the neutral ground. agreement Wilkinson in effect established an unofficial border line.

⁵⁴ Heitman, *Historical Register*, vol. I, p. 683.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Gutierrez to the Mexican Congress, “Account of” *Progress*,” Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, p 12; and “Revolution in Texas in 1812,” ‘70. The best narrative account of the Gutierrez-Magee Expedition is contained in Harris Warren’s well-documented *The Sword Was Their Passport* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943), 99. 1-95.

addition, they were to be of taming and disposing of . . . wild mules and horses,” a share in whatever “confiscated” property was taken, and cash rewards “from the public treasury of that government which you will have aided so materially in erecting.”⁵⁷

Attracted by such lucrative promises, recruits continued to volunteer. By September, when the invasion of the interior began, there were close to five hundred Americans, Louisiana Frenchmen, Mexicans, Indians, and Spanish deserters under the command of “Colonel” Magee. The majority of the force were Americans, and although “several gentlemen of respectability” were present,⁵⁸ it should be remembered that most of them were bandits and other riffraff of the wild Louisiana frontier.⁵⁹ There were, in fact, so many of these adventurers that Magee halted the expedition at the Trinity River to allow additional recruits to catch up. It was not until “some time in October” that the march was resumed--with an army now nearly a thousand strong.⁶⁰

Now that Nacogdoches had been captured, only two sizeable settlements remained in Spanish hands—La Bahia and the capital, San Antonio. After discovering that Governor Alcedo and General Herrera “were at San Antonio with all their forces,” the Americans seized the vacated fortifications at La Bahia. A few days later, November 7, 1812, Salcedo and Herrera arrived to lay siege to the insurgents.⁶¹ For four months there were almost daily skirmishes and bombardments, punctuated by a few large scale but inconclusive engagements. During the siege Magee died, and military leadership of the filibusters thus fell to Magee’s second-in-command, Samuel Kemper. In February the royalists lifted their unsuccessful siege and the fillibusters soon

⁵⁷ Niles’ *Register*, October 17, 1812, p. 104.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, November 14, 1812, p. 76.

⁵⁹ “Revolution in Texas in 1812,” 70.

⁶⁰ Niles’ *Register* December 26, 1812, p. 272.

⁶¹ “Revolution in Texas in 1812,” 70; and Gutierrez to the Mexican Congress, “Account of Progress,” Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, Vol. I, p. 12.

pursued them toward San Antonio.⁶² After Herrera's army was routed outside San Antonio, Governor Salcedo surrendered the city, and "the complete prostration of the papal authority in [Texas]" was presumably completed.⁶³

At this point Gutierrez managed to regain control of the operation. He placed Governor Salcedo, General Herrera, and a dozen other Spanish officers in the hands of Juan Delgado. Delgado's father, a Hidalgo revolutionary, had been beheaded in front of his wife by order of Salcedo. Delgado therefore led his fourteen prisoners out of the city and "had heir throats cut in the most horrible manner." This gris y spectacle served the double purpose of increasing Gutierrez's popularity among the Mexicans while alientating the Americans. Disgusted by this atrocity and, more importantant, faced with a unified and growing Mexican contingent of soldiers and civilians, many Americans now returned," to Louisiana.⁶⁴ Supported by his fellow Mexicans, Gutierrez consolidated political control, and on April 6, 1812, "the independence of the State of Texas was solemnly declared."⁶⁵ Eleven days later a Constitution was published, which gave almost dictatorial powers to Gutierrez, along with the title "Commander-in-Chief, Governor-elect" of Texas,⁶⁶

But the actual influence of Gutierrez was already being undermined by the intrigues of the Americans who had stayed, particularly "doctors and lawyers gifted in all matters, especially

⁶² "Revolution in Texas in 1812," 71-72; Gutierrez to the Mexican Congress, "Account of Progress," Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, pp. 12-13; "The Origin of the Revolt In Texas, 1812," Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, pp. 285-87 and *Niles' Register*, April 17, 1813, p. 120.

⁶³ "Revolution in Texas in 1812," 72-73; Gutierrez to the Mexican Congress, "Account of Progress," Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, p. 151 and *Niles' Register*, June 12, 1813, p. 248.

⁶⁴ "Revolution in Texas in 1812," 73; Gutierrez to the Mexican Congress "Account of Progress," Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. 1, p. 15; *Niles' Register*, June 26, 1813, p. 280 and "Information Obtained in 1835 From Capt. James Gaines," Gulick ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, pp. 280-81.

⁶⁵ Gutierrez to the Mexican Congress, "Account of Progress," Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, p. 15.

⁶⁶ Copies of both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution may be found in Wallace, ed., *Documents of Texas History*, pp. 39-41.

in the matter of rascality.”⁶⁷ At this point Colonel Ignacio Elisando led seven hundred Spanish troops from the Rio Grande, appearing at San Antonio in June. Over three hundred Mexican soldiers deserted to this formidable force, thus stripping Gutierrez of much of his power. Henry Perry, a quartermaster during the War of 1812,⁶⁸ now assumed command of the army, and he marched out to meet Elisando. The Spanish were defeated in the subsequent battle, and a number of prisoners, weapons, and munitions were captured.⁶⁹

The last remnants of Gutierrez’s shaky influence were destroyed when Jose Alvarez de Toledo arrived on August 1, 1813. Noting Gutierrez’s initial success in 1812, Alvarez had not gone to Cuba but to Natchitoches, preferring to be associated with a revolutionary movement that was already in progress. Toledo treacherously sent propaganda of his own into Texas, accusing Gutierrez of being a Spanish agent and otherwise trying to sabotage the Mexican leader. Accompanied by Joseph Wilkinson, son of the general,⁷⁰ Alvarez advanced to Nacogdoches and installed a printing press. He published a newspaper promoting his own interests, and “offered his services” as a general to Gutierrez. Gutierrez responded by ordering him out of Texas. Toledo retired to Natchitoches with his press, and continued to publish “innumerable calumnies” about Gutierrez. Toledo managed to gain considerable backing from the Americans of Natchitoches and Nacogdoches, and as his propaganda reached San Antonio the American filibusters also began to support him. Because of the influence of the Americans and the unfavorable image of Gutierrez spread by Toledo, the constitutional council finally

⁶⁷ Gutierrez to the Mexican Congress, “Account of Progress,” Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, p. 16.

⁶⁸ Heitman, *Historical Register*, vol. I, p. 785.

⁶⁹ “Information. . . From Capt. Gaines,” Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. 1, p. 282; and Niles’ *Register*, August 21, 1813, p. 40.

⁷⁰ “Joaquin de Arredondo’s Report of the Battle of the Media River, August 18, 1813,” translated by Mattie Austin Hatcher, *QTSHA*, XI (January, 1908), 225-26.

turned on Gutierrez and “secretly sent for Toledo. . . .” Recognizing his tenuous position and not wishing to further split the “Republic,” Gutierrez left Texas in August and returned to the United States.

Immediately upon taking command of the army, Toledo began preparing to face General Joaquin de Arredondo. Arredondo, a veteran royalist general, had united with Elisando’s retreating army and, with a combined force of over two thousand men, advanced toward San Antonio for a climactic struggle.⁷¹ Toledo was hampered from the first by dissension from Henry Perry, Samuel Kemper, and other disgruntled Americans, as well as from Mexicans still loyal to Gutierrez. The new general finally managed to lead a disorganized force of three thousand Americans, Mexicans, Indians, and Spanish deserters out of San Antonio on August 15, 1813. Three days later the two armies met at the Medina River.⁷²

Arredondo had cleverly deployed his troops so that a concealed crossfire could be poured upon the advancing force. Toledo recognized the trap and ordered a withdrawal, but his factious army did not respond. Instead, Kemper led a headlong charge, the royalists “opened a most dreadful and destructive fire,” and the filibusters were routed.⁷³

Arredondo now purged Texas of all insurgents, particularly Anglo-Americans. For weeks hundreds of Americans—and Mexicans, including many women and children, streamed across the Sabine, “escaping from the bloody vengeance of Arredondo. . . . Gutierrez, Toledo, and others plotted to return to Texas, but for the next several years Texas remained nearly barren of

71 Gutierrez to the Mexican Congress, “Account of Progress,” Gulick ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, pp. 17-20; “Information . . . From Capt. Gaines,” Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, p. 282; Kathryn Garrett, “The First Newspaper in Texas Gaceta de Texas,” *SWHQ*, XL (January, 1937), 208-15; “Arredondo’s Report,” 220-21 and William Shaler to James Monroe, August 24, 1813, *Monroe Papers*, Series 1, Reel 5.

72 Shaler to Monroe, *ibid.*; and “Information. . . From Capt. Gaines,” Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, p. 283

73 Information . . . From Capt. Gaines,”“ *ibid.*, p. 282; Niles’ *Register*, October 16, 1813, pp. 87-88; and “Arredondo’s Report,” 222-28.

Americans and other troublemakers.⁷⁴ Arredondo urged that there be no further participation in “the clandestine foreign trade which certain evil doers of the province itself have carried on with foreigners through the post of Nacogdoches. . . .” He considered this illegal trade to have “contributed in no small degree” to the revolution, and insisted upon its destruction.⁷⁵ Moreover, while offering “a general amnesty” to most Mexican insurgents, Arredondo desired the extermination of the leaders of the expedition. He announced that “any citizen may kill them with impunity,” and would receive cash and land rewards.⁷⁶ There was, therefore, little American activity in Texas until 1819.

Spanish officials were understandably indignant over this affair. In letter after letter they angrily condemned the traitors, insurgents, incendiaries. . . , namely Gutierrez, Toledo, and many others whom the American Government protects, and maintains, in committing hostilities, in fomenting revolution, and in lighting up the flames of discord in the internal provinces of the Kingdom of Mexico.⁷⁷

This subject was brought up on the slightest excuse by Spanish authorities, and colored subsequent relations between Spain and the United States with anger and hostility. The Spanish were particularly aggravated over “the horrible assassinations committed in San Antonio de Bexar” There were also many complaints that the United States had not halted the

74 Information . . . From Capt. Gaines,” Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, pp. 283-84; and Niles’ *Register*, October 16 and 23, 1813, pp. 104 and 152.

75 “Arredondo to the People of Texas,” September 30, 1813, Hatcher, *The Opening of Texas*, pp. 340-42

76 “General Amnesty,” October 10, 1813, *ibid.*, pp. 342-43

77 Mateo Gonzalez Manrique, Commandant at Pensacola, to Andrew Jackson, July 26, 1814, Bassett, ed., *Correspondence of Jackson*, vol. II, pp. 20-21.

filibusters at the border, and demands that “these seditious persons,” this “gang of perfidious traitors” be delivered to Spanish custody.⁷⁸

American officials answered just as angrily, perhaps because they knew that they were on the defensive, that in much of this matter the Spanish were right. True, the government never gave outright military aid to the filibusters. But, as we have seen, Secretary of War Eustis was quite encouraging to Gutierrez, and it is obvious that he was considering direct military intervention. Moreover, Gutierrez and Toledo were given government funds and transportation, and were welcomed and encouraged by numerous political figures. The government also did little to stop a flagrant and widely-announced violation of international borders: filibusters were on the Louisiana frontier for months, and Gutierrez, leader of the enterprise, traveled at will. United States agents lurked on the border throughout the expedition, feeding information to Washington and sometimes taking a hand in planning the enterprise. William Shaler was foremost among these men. He accompanied Gutierrez from New Orleans to Natchitoches, supplied Washington authorities with information on the campaign, and was instrumental in boosting Alvarez de Toledo to the leadership of Gutierrez’s expedition.⁷⁹ Various government officials, moreover, encouraged the administration to intervene against Spain. For example, Governor William Claiborne of Louisiana, in a report to President Madison following Arredondo’s victory, flatly admitted:

⁷⁸ See correspondence between Jackson and Manrique, August 24 and 30, September 9, November 6 and 7, 1814, *ibid.*, pp. 28, 37, 44, 92, 93, and 94; and Luis de Onis Spanish Minister to the United States, to Secretary of State James Monroe, December 30, 1815, January 2 and February 22, 1816, William R. Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations*, vol. III (New York: Oxford University Press, 1925), pp. 1891-1904.

For myself, Sir, I should rejoice, at the success of any Revolution in Spanish America, which could better the conditions of its wretched inhabitants, and secure to them a free and friendly intercourse with the United States I repeat my solicitude to see accomplished such a Revolution in Spanish America, as [it] would better the condition of the inhabitants, and I will add Sir, as would render the whole continent of America independent of European influence. If the Government of the United States thought proper to favor & support such a revolution, it could doubtless be effected;—but of the policy of doing so, it does not become me to give an opinion.⁸⁰

Despite such entreaties, however, the administration refrained from committing itself to open aid, and finally denounced such endeavors as “repugnant to the views of the Government, and contrary to law. . . .”⁸¹ But official discouragement was not urged until the filibusters had been defeated, and it also should be recalled that the United States was involved in a near-disastrous war with Britain at this time. It is not unfair to speculate that had the international situation been favorable and United States military power not been so hard-pressed, the government might well have intervened.

Public opinion in the United States must be considered along with official attitudes. Niles’ *Weekly Register* catered to public interest in the Texas filibuster by regularly reporting “good news from the patriots in *Mexico*.” The *Register* happily announced Spanish misfortunes and published the propaganda of Gutierrez, and gloomily offered excuses when faced with “*Bad*

79 Gutierrez to the Mexican Congress, “Account of Progress,” Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, pp. 17-20; Shaler to Secretary of State James Monroe, *Monroe Papers*, Series 1, Reel 4; and “Information. . . From Capt. Gaines,” Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, p. 282.

80 Claiborne to Madison, November 29, 1813, *Madison Papers*, Series 1, Reel 15.

news from Mexico."⁸² The ease with which the invading army gained recruits is also of significance. There was an abundance of volunteers, and the unpleasant character of most of these men worsened an already bad situation. Even Governor Claiborne, in his previously cited report to the President, deplored the "Individuals, from whom everything may be expected, but obedience to our Laws & respect for the Constitutional authorities."⁸³ Spanish officials, of course, were vehement in their denunciation of these "highway robbers,"⁸⁴ and such men hardly enhanced Mexican opinion of *norteamericanos*. Also, Mexicans later resented the introduction "Into Texas of 700 Anglo-Americans with the pretext of supporting our independence."⁸⁵ All in all, the Gutierrez-Magee expedition served to endorse the Latin-American impression of *norteamericanos* as grasping militarists who coveted Spanish-Mexican territory and apparently would stop at nothing to get it.

Following the Gutierrez-Magee expedition, Spain attempted to strengthen Texas by introducing more Mexican colonists. But all trade with Louisiana was halted and Nacogdoches was vacated. With no trade from the outside, few Mexicans wished to live in Texas, and San Antonio and La Bahia languished desultorily as the only settlements in the province. By 1817 Governor Antonio Martinez complained to his superiors that Texas was "in the saddest and most deplorable state it is possible to conceive." His three hundred troops possessed just one hundred old and broken muskets. The gunpowder was spoiled and there were no mounts or supplies. No

81 Circular from James Monroe to Claiborne, February 14, 1814, Monroe Papers, Series 1, Reel 4.

82 Niles' *Register*, November 14 and December 26, 1812, January 23 and 30, April 17, May 1 and 8, June 12 and 26, July 17, August 21, September 18, October 2, 16, and 23, 1813, PP. 76 and 272, 336 and 352, 120, 152 and 168, 248 and 280, 313, 408 48, 87-88, 104, and 152.

83 Claiborne to Madison, November 29, 1813, *Madison Papers*, Series 1, Reel 15.

84 Luis de Onis to James Monroe, February 22, 1816, Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence*, vol. III, pp. 1897-1904.

85 Mendivil, "Relations between Texas, the United States of America, and the Mexican Republic," Santa Anna, *et al.*, *The Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution*, p, 324.

money was available to pay the soldiers or the citizens to whom the government was indebted. Because of the ineffectiveness of the troops, Indians insolently entered the settlements and killed settlers on their very doorsteps. The Indian threat made agriculture and stock-raising so difficult that on one occasion every animal in San Antonio was slaughtered to “make them up into rations” for civilians and soldiers alike. Fearing an Indian raid the Governor wrote for help, pointing out that the savages “would be able to harm the people alone since there is not a single cow or horse left.”⁸⁶

Such a weak province was an open temptation to Americans, and there were constant attempts to organize new filibustering efforts. Gutierrez and Toledo, of course, were prominent among these activities, but so were such Anglo-Americans as Henry Perry, Samuel Davenport, and other veterans of previous expeditions. In 1817 Perry managed to execute a minor filibuster in connection with Xavier Mina. Mina was attempting a revolutionary effort in Mexico, and in conjunction with these plans Perry and a small party of American followers landed at Matagorda Bay early in the summer of 1817. Governor Antonio Martinez could not advance against Perry, for there were only thirty-five ill and unarmed soldiers presently in the capital.

By the middle of June Martinez was able to march with 116 poorly-mounted and -armed men recently returned from the field. He discovered that Perry’s men had looted a mission, seized La Bahia, then learned of Martinez’s approach and left for Nacogdoches. Martinez sent

⁸⁶ Martinez to Viceroy Apodaca, May 30, June 7, 13, 23, and July 12, 1817, and Martinez to Commandant-General Arredondo, May 30, June 4, 11, 17, 22, and 28, 1817, Mattie Austin Hatcher, ed., “Letters of Antonio Martinez, the Last Spanish Governor of Texas, 1817-1822,” SWHQ, XXXIX (July, 1935), 66-72; (October, 1935), 139-47; (January, 1936), 228-38; and (April, 1936), 327-32.

two detachments in pursuit, and they shortly caught up with the forty-four Americans. A battle broke out, and all but four of the filibusters were either killed or captured.⁸⁷

This small-scale enterprise was of little consequence, except to reinforce the opinions of Texas officials about Americans. Of greater significance was the previously described American conquest of Spanish Florida. Until the Adams-Onís Treaty, American officials had pressed what John Quincy Adams aptly termed “our shadow of a claim”⁸⁸ to Texas as a part of the Louisiana Purchase. When it was agreed to fix the boundary at the Sabine River, a land-hungry West exploded with indignation. Political leaders such as Kentucky’s Henry Clay “denounced the Florida Treaty,”⁸⁹ and a Missouri lawyer and editor named Thomas Hart Benton angrily reflected that

. . . In acquiring Florida, [we] gave away Texas. I was shocked at it. . . . The acquisition of Florida was a desirable object, long sought, and sure to be obtained in the progress of events. As I was not then in politics, and had nothing to do with political affairs; but I saw at once the whole evil of this great sacrifice and instantly raised my voice against it in articles published in the St. Louis newspapers. . . . I denounced the treaty, and attacked its authors and their motives, and imprecated a woe on the heads of those who should continue to favor it.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Martínez to Arredondo, June 4 and 22, 1817 and to Apodaca, June 13 and 23, 1817, *ibid.* (October, 1935), 140-42, and (January, 1936), 228-30, 231-34 and 235-38.

⁸⁸ Nevins, ed., *The Diary of John Quincy Adams*, p. 547.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*

⁹⁰ Thomas Hart Benton, *Thirty Years View; from 1820 to 1850*, vol. I (New York: D, Appleton and Company, 1854), p. 15.

In Benton's certainty that Florida "was sure to be obtained in the course of events," we see a typical example of the expansionist attitude, and his statements indicate a similar disposition toward Texas. Nearer to that province feelings ran even higher, and the result was still another filibustering effort.

There were movements throughout Louisiana to seize Texas in defiance of the Adams-Onis Treaty. In New Orleans, for example, the "Mexican Association" was formed for the announced purpose of freeing Texas from royal tyranny. It is noteworthy, however, that a group of businessmen backed this organization.⁹¹ They were uninterested in the revolutionary abstractions of idealists, or in the craving for adventure and booty of unruly frontiersmen. These businessmen stood to profit from munitions sales in the event of hostilities and from trade should Texas be opened. Such crass implications appear even more sinister with the vague connection of James Wilkinson to the Mexican Association.⁹²

In Natchez a similar movement fostered a public meeting to organize an invasion of liberation, and Dr. James Long was selected to head the expedition. Long had earlier been an unsuccessful frontier merchant, then served as an army surgeon during the War of 1812. He married Jane Wilkinson, niece of the notorious general, resigned from the army, and eventually became a merchant in Natchez. At this point he assumed leadership of the Texas expedition, subscribing "the whole of his private fortune" to the enterprise.⁹³

⁹¹ Businessmen were always interested in these enterprises, of course, hoping to profit from munitions sales and trade with Mexico. For example, in 1815 Alvarez de Toledo was attempting to organize another expedition into Texas. He was backed by eleven New Orleans businessmen who hoped to sell 29,000 muskets and other items to Mexican insurgents. Among these men were John Randolph Grymes, a former federal district attorney, Daniel T. Patterson, "The Commodore or Marine Commandant of New Orleans," and Edward Livingston, previously a congressman. Antonio de Sedella to Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, November 28, 1815, Harris Gaylord Warren, "Documents Relating to Pierre Lafitte's Entrance into the Service of Spain," *SWHQ*, XLIV (July, 1940), 80-87.

⁹² Jacobs, *Tarnished Warrior*, p. 324.

⁹³ Mirabeau B. Lamar, "Life of James Long," Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. II, pp. 53, 56-57.

Considering this total investment, it is ridiculous to think that Long's sole motivation was the humanitarian purpose of freeing a near vacant Texas from Spanish tyranny. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Long "had a branch of his mercantile establishment" in Natchitoches.⁹⁴ He thus stood to profit directly from trade with Texas, as did other backers of the expedition. Another lure of this enterprise—aside, of course, from a selfless desire to spread freedom to a couple of thousand Mexicans—was the rich Texas land. One recruit pointed out

. . . that when I entered the service I had every reason to believe that our expedition and settlement in Texas would be prosperous, as something like five hundred thousand dollars had been subscribed for the purpose of making plantations to be settled by the men who would venture their lives in the pursuit of landed wealth[.]⁹⁵

Even eastern journalists were aware of the "temptation of getting vast tracts of the finest land in the world. . . ."⁹⁶

This temptation was obvious to Long's recruits, who were, for the most part, the same adventure-seeking, land-hungry young frontiersmen who had always joined such enterprises. In fact, Bernardo Gutierrez was along, as well as Samuel Davenport and other experienced filibusters. Of course, there were probably a few idealists present who were sincerely motivated by the high-flown rhetoric⁹⁷ that characterized this and other such expeditions, but the majority

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁹⁵ Eli Harris to M. B. Lamar, President of Texas, January 18, 1841, *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 483-85.

⁹⁶ Niles' *Register*, July 179 18199 p. 313.

⁹⁷ Eli Harris, for example, admitted that "I did not enter the Service of Texas for Mexicans But he did claim his purpose was to help create "a settlement that should be an asylum for many thousand[s] of poor persons, who though poor in purse, might be worthy. . . . " And twenty years later Harris wanted Texas land in repayment for these services. Harris to Lamar January 18, 1841, Gulick, ed. *Lamar Papers*, vol. III, pp. 483-85.

of the participants merely used it to justify their actions. These justifications may have been sincere, as justifications often are, but that there were other, far less laudable motivations is obvious beyond doubt.

The United States government was less co-operative than it had been on similar occasions. There had been unflinching support of Andrew Jackson's illegal action against weak Spanish Florida in 1817, and prior to the War of 1812 It had been expedient to encourage Bernardo Gutierrez in his efforts against Spain. In fact, a decade earlier, certain irresponsible government agents—most prominently General James Wilkinson—had given support to men like Philip Nolan. But on this occasion it was inexpedient to become involved in a filibuster against Spanish authority. Despite the protests of westerners, the administration was eager to secure ratification of the Adams-Onis Treaty, and did not wish to further alienate Spain.

Qqq If there was no open collaboration, however, certainly little was done to prevent this widely-publicized effort. Shortly after Long's departure from Natchez, an attempt was made to arrest him. But since the officers were not "over active and vigilant, their efforts were easily eluded. . . ."98 Later, a barge loaded with munitions, supplies, and clothing was apprehended at Donaldsonville, Louisiana, by government officials. The contents of the vessel were auctioned, thus depriving Long of needed provisions.99 Such action, though, would have enjoyed more preventive results had they been applied before Long invaded Texas. Moreover, because of past experiences, Spanish officials were justifiably convinced that Long's men would receive from

98 Lamar, "Life of James Long," *ibid.*, vol. II, P. 57.

99 Harris to Lamar, January 18, 1841, *ibid.*, vol. III, p. 483.

the United States government “that aid which she has ever given to this turbulent rabble, in violation of law & good faith, when ever it has been suitable to her egotism and private ends.”¹⁰⁰

Long and seventy-five followers crossed the Mississippi in June, 1819. As they traveled toward Natchitoches additional recruits swelled the ranks to “about three hundred.” Long attended to his Natchitoches business establishment, then continued toward Nacogdoches. At Nacogdoches a “Republic” was formed, Long was “chosen” President, and on June 23, 1819, Texas was declared independent.¹⁰¹

Significantly, the first order of business was to organize a system of land survey and sales. Details were advertised through a Nacogdoches newspaper, the *Texas Republican*.¹⁰² More pressing difficulties, however, soon occupied Long and his party. As previously mentioned, supplies intended for Long were seized by United States authorities. Thus deprived of expected provisions, “we distributed ourselves out by tens and twenties, and hunted game for a living.”¹⁰³ in order to strengthen his position, Long now traveled to Galveston to solicit the aid of Jean and Pierre Lafitte. ¹⁰⁴

These former “Pirates and Smugglers of Barataria” had based at Galveston intermittently since 1812, and had preyed mercilessly upon Spanish shipping.¹⁰⁵ The Lafittes added to Spanish resentment of the United States, for royalist officials felt that the “Pirates are sheltered and protected” by the American government.¹⁰⁶ But eventually the Lafittes were bribed by the

100 Felipe Fatio, Spanish Consul in New Orleans, to Viceroy Apodaca, July 16, 1819, *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 33-34.

101 Lamar, “Life of James Long,” *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 57-59.

102 Nashville *Clarion*, October 5 and 12, 1819, from the *Texas Republican* cited in Douglas C., McMurtrie, “The First Texas Newspaper,” *SWHQ*, XXXVI (July, 1932), 41-46.

103 Harris to Lamar, January 18, 1841, Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. III, p. 483.

104 Lamar “Life of James Long,” *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 65

105 Governor Claiborne to President Madison, February 10, 1814, *Madison Papers*, Series 1, Reel 16.

106 Gonzalez Manrique, Governor of Florida, to General Andrew Jackson, July 26, 1814, Bassett, ed., *Correspondence of Jackson*, vol. II, pp. 20-21.

Spanish to betray American filibusters who sought their aid,¹⁰⁷ and such was their status when James Long arrived at their island headquarters in September, 1819.

Not suspecting Jean Lafitte's duplicity,¹⁰⁸ Long was still in Galveston when he heard that royalist troops were attacking his scattered army. As we have seen, Governor Antonio Martinez lacked the forces to expel Long. But about five hundred poorly mounted and inadequately supplied troops, commanded by Colonel Ignacio Perez, were sent to San Antonio. Moving eastward, Perez swept the disorganized filibusters before him. He reached Nacogdoches on October 28, scoured the region for several more weeks, then returned to San Antonio with his "bare-foot[,] naked and starved" army early in 1820.¹⁰⁹

Long had returned to the interior to try to rally his forces against Perez, but such action was impossible and with his men he retreated across the Sabine. Attempting to reinstate his "Republic," Long returned to Galveston in April, 1820; his small band of followers included W. D. C. Hall, a veteran of the Gutierrez expedition. At this point Jean Lafitte was preparing to abandon Galveston; Long established his party there, then returned to Louisiana to gather further support.¹¹⁰

Because of his earlier lack of success and the absence of government approval, Long found it difficult to obtain backing. He managed to enlist a few recruits, but almost fifty of them were arrested by United States authorities. With less than a hundred men he returned to

¹⁰⁷ Antonio de Sedella to Viceroy Apodaca, November 23, 1815, Harris, "Documents Relating to Pierre Lafitte's Entrance into the Service of Spain," *SWHQ*, XLIV (July, 1940), 81.

¹⁰⁸ See Lafitte to Long, July 7, 1819, Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. II, pp. 30-32.

¹⁰⁹ Report from Ignacio Perez to Governor Martinez, December 3, 1819, *ibid.*, vol. I. Pp. 34-44; and Lamar, "Life of James Long," *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 64-70.

¹¹⁰ Lamar, *ibid.*, pp. 72-77.

Galveston in July. Plagued by desertions and inadequate supplies, Long made another fruitless trip to New Orleans.¹¹¹

On his return he determined to attack La Bahia, in an effort to gain support from Agustin Iturbide. Iturbide was leading a vigorous revolution in the heart of Mexico, and¹¹² Long sent Benjamin Milam and Jose Felix Trespalacios to tell the insurgents of his diversionary effort in the north. In September, 1820, Long and fifty-two companions took control of lightly-garrisoned La Bahia.¹¹³ But Governor Martinez sent troops under Ignacio Perez to deal with Long, and after sporadic skirmishing the filibusters surrendered and were taken into custody as prisoners of war.¹¹⁴

On September 27, 1821, Mexican independence was finally established under Agustin Iturbide. But Mexican officials revealed much the same attitude toward Americans as had their Spanish predecessors. Long and his men, who had ostensibly come to Texas in support of the Mexican Revolution, were imprisoned at Monterey for “several months.” Early in 1822 Long wrote to authorities in the capital asking to defend himself before the Mexican Congress, confident of proving that his only purpose had been “to serve the country of my adoption.”¹¹⁵ Long was finally sent to Mexico City, but on July 8, 1822, he was shot to death by a Mexican

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 85-88.

¹¹² Trespalacios was “a Mexican General” who had just concluded “a long Imprisonment” by the Spanish. Milam, along with John Austin and other members of the expedition, would continue to incite trouble in Texas long after the present enterprise was concluded. *ibid.*, p. 93.

¹¹³ “Long’s Declaration,” c. October 10, 1821, Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, pp. 47-48; T[omas] Buentello, second alcalde of La Bahia, “Report upon J. Long’s Occupation of La Bahia,” October 11, 1821, *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 49-51; and Lamar, “Life of James Long,” *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 71-72. Also see Long to “the Commanding officer at San Antonio,” October 4, 1821, *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 46-47.

¹¹⁴ Buentello, “Report upon Long’s Occupation,” *Ibid.* pp. 50-51.

¹¹⁵ Long to the Mexican Congress, February 8, 1822, *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 118.

soldier. This soldier subsequently was tried, acquitted, and promoted—a clear indication of the Mexican attitude toward Anglo-American intruders.¹¹⁶

Further proof that Mexican officials shared Spanish suspicions toward *norteamericanos* may be gained by a brief look at future developments, and by an examination of Mexican leaders. Numerous Mexican authorities received early training under Spanish officials. For example, Iturbide and Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, two men who later led the Mexican nation, served in the royal army during their youth. As we have seen, Iturbide was unsympathetic toward James Long and his men, and Santa Anna's hostile activities against Anglo-Americans in Texas are a matter of record. Lucas Alaman and Manuel Mier y Teran, both of whom did much to shape Mexican policy toward Texas, and Coahuila-Texas Governors Rafael Gonzalez and Juan Jose Elguezabal are but a few of the Mexicans who were exposed to Spanish attitudes through education or early governmental or military experience. These men, and a number of minor officials, shared the Spanish conception of land-hungry, aggressive Anglo-Americans, and these attitudes were reflected in later matters of policy. General Mier y Teran, for example, inspected Texas in the late 1820's and came to the following conclusions:

The department of Texas is contiguous to the most avid nation in the world. The North Americans have conquered whatever territory adjoins them. In less than half a century, they have become masters of extensive colonies which formerly belonged to Spain and

¹¹⁶ Extract [of a] letter from Abil Terrill to [Mrs. Long], July 8, 1822, extract of a letter to Mrs. Long, n.d., and extract of a letter from [Ben "Milam and others"] to [Iturbide], n.d., *ibid.*, pp. 120-22.

France, and of even more spacious territories from which have disappeared the former owners, the Indian tribes.¹¹⁷

Following the Texas Revolution, Jose Maria Tornel y Mendivil, Santa Anna's Secretary of War, angrily stated that Americans "*recognize no other right than their own desire and no other justice save their own convenience.*"¹¹⁸ This conception was phrased more elaborately by Alaman in 1830. The Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs studied Mier y Teran's inspection report and made the following classic statement on American aggrandizement:

They commence by introducing themselves into the territory which they covet, upon pretence of commercial negotiations, or of the establishment of colonies, with or without the assent of the Government to which it belongs. These colonies grow, multiply, become the predominant party in the population; and as soon as a support is found in this manner, they begin to set up rights These pioneers excite, by degrees, movements which disturb the political state of the country . . . and then follow discontents and dissatisfaction, calculated to fatigue the patience of the legitimate owner, and to diminish the usefulness of the administration and of the exercise of authority. When things come to this pass, which is precisely the present state of things in Texas, the diplomatic management commences; the inquietude they have excited in the territory, . . . the interests of the colonists. The insurrections of adventurers, and savages instigated by them, and the pertinacity with which the opinion is set up as to their right of possession,

¹¹⁷ Cited in Ohland Morton, *Teran and Texas* (Austin: The Texas State Historical Association, 1948), p. 99.

become the subject of notes, full of expressions of justice and moderation, until, with the aid of other incidents, . . . the desired end is attained of concluding an arrangement as onerous for one party as it is advantageous for the other. Sometimes more direct means are resorted to; and taking advantage of the enfeebled state, or domestic difficulties, of the possessor of the soil, they proceed, upon the most extraordinary pretexts, to make themselves masters of the country, as was the case in the Florida's; leaving the question to be decided afterwards as to the legality of the possession, which force alone could take from them.¹¹⁹

John L. O'Sullivan would not coin the phrase for another fifteen years, but Alaman needed no labels to thus describe the pattern of Manifest Destiny in practice. This passage also illustrates conclusively that Mexicans, like the Spanish, understood from the keen viewpoint of the victim the acquisitive impetus of the United States.

Mexican authorities inherited another conception from the Spanish—the necessity of colonizing Texas as a buffer to insulate the rest of Mexico from Anglo-American aggrandizement. And, again like the Spanish, they were faced with a painful paradox: the only persons willing and capable of colonizing Texas were Anglo-Americans. Mexican colonization had failed miserably, and although European colonization would be encouraged, the results were inadequate to the needs of a buffer colony. Therefore, the only means of insulating Mexico (and, hopefully, Texas) from Anglo-Americans was by allowing these efficient but acquisitive

¹¹⁸ Mendivil, "Relations between Texas, the United States of America, and the Mexican Republic," Santa Anna, *et al.*, *The Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution*, p. 304.

¹¹⁹ Lucas Alaman, "Report of the Secretary of State to the Congress of Mexico," House Documents, 25th Congress, 2nd Session, Document 351 (Microfilm deposited in East Texas State University Library, Commerce), pp. 313-14.

individuals to settle and develop the province. On September 28, 1820, a decree from Madrid opened all Spanish colonies—including Texas—as “an inviolable asylum for foreigners. . . . so long as they respect the political monarchy and the laws which govern her subjects.”¹²⁰ The next year Moses Austin was permitted by Spanish authorities to introduce American settlers to Texas, partially because he had been an industrious Spanish subject since 1797. Two years later the new Mexican government endorsed this decision for the same reasons. Stephen F. Austin soon developed his deceased father’s colony, and within fifteen years the goal that had been sporadically attempted by filibusters and insurgents was completed.

Considerable significance has rightfully been attributed to the activities of Anglo-Americans in Texas from 1821 to 1836. These people settled Texas, “anglicized” it, and finally seized it for themselves. But the role of Americans in Texas prior to 1821 must not be overlooked. As we have seen, these men in large measure prompted the legalization of Anglo-American settlement of the province. Their persistent, violent activities—as filibusters, smugglers, revolutionaries, and land-grabbers—emphasized the necessity for settling Texas, even, as a last resort, with Anglo-Americans themselves. And their unpleasant image was stamped upon their Anglo-American followers, for we have seen that Mexican officials judged American settlers by criteria formed in the turbulent days of Spanish rule.

This image, moreover, cannot be termed unjust. The period from 1791 to 1821 was filled with the kind of filibustering activities which gave Mexicans good cause for apprehension about the future of Texas. Instead of an era of scattered, insignificant filibusters, we see that a pattern of conquest—of Manifest Destiny—was previewed and advanced. Many of the events after 1821 that led to the Texas Revolution were shaped by events prior to 1821. By 1821 the acquisitive

¹²⁰ Decree to Foreigners, September 28, 1820, Hatcher, *The Opening of Texas*, pp. 353-354.

process so accurately outlined by Lucas Alaman had been under way for three decades, and within fifteen years the predicted outcome was concluded.

CHAPTER II

THE SHAPING OF MEXICAN POLICY: 1821-1830

During the 1820's, while Anglo-Americans legally began to settle and therefore to anglicize Texas, policy-makers of the young Mexican Republic were still capable of exerting authority over the comparatively few and compliant colonists of the province. But Mexican policy, largely shaped by previous Spanish policy and by favorable and unfavorable Anglo-American influence, ranged indecisively during these crucial years between guarded welcome of *norteamericanos* to alarmed restrictions. When the decade ended, instead of establishing a tactful control over the growing population of Texas, Mexican officials decided to attempt harsh repression. But without realizing it, in so doing they lost the initiative of originating policy to the Anglo-American settlers. *Norteamericanos* in Texas reacted resentfully to this treatment, and after 1830 Mexican policy became only a frustrated and ineffective response to the increasingly separatist activities of Anglo-Americans.

As we have noted, in 1821 Spanish officials granted Moses Austin permission to colonize three hundred families in Texas. Austin had settled in Missouri in 1797 to exploit lead deposits, and he subsequently became a Spanish citizen to facilitate his dealings with officials of the region. Eventually Austin abandoned the enterprise, but he remained in the territory and pursued other interests after it became a possession of the United States. The depression that began in

1819 severely damaged his business efforts, and by 1820 he was determined to inspect Texas and- attempt to revive his fortunes with a colonization venture there.¹

Austin traveled to the province, reaching San Antonio in December, 1820. Governor Martinez, recalling numerous unpleasant incidents with *norteamericanos*, ordered Austin to leave Texas “instantly.”² However, Austin encountered a friend, Felipe Enrique Neri, Baron de Bastrop,³ who persuaded Martinez to conduct a more open-minded interview with the American. Martinez, impressed with Austin’s former status as “a vassal of “His Catholic Majesty. . . ,”⁴ endorsed the colonization plan and forwarded it to “the Supreme Authorities of New Spain” for final approval.⁵

The decision by Spanish authorities to open Texas to “foreigners” has already been noted, as well as the painful necessity to allow *norteamericanos* to develop the province and hopefully to protect it. All immigrants were “to bring credentials and testimonials proving their good character and conduct.”⁶ By this means it was thought that settlers would be selected who would successfully colonize the province and who at the same time would be submissive to the national government, thereby strengthening and securing Texas from less controllable individuals. Colonists were even expected to swear “to take up their arms in defense of the Spanish government either against the Indians filibusters, or any other enemy that may plan hostilities. . .

1 Record of Moses Austin and Family, Eugene C. Barker, ed., *The Austin Papers*, vol. I, pp. 1-6. (For the rather complex publication information of *The Austin Papers*, see the bibliography.) Also see Barker, *The Life of Stephen F. Austin* (Dallas: Cokesbury Press, 1925), pp. 2-23.

2 Stephen F. Austin to the Settlers in what is called “Austin’s Colony,” in Texas, November 1, 1829, H. P. N. Gammel, ed., *The Laws of Texas, 1822-1897*, vol. I (Austin The Gammel Book Company, 1898), p. 4.

3 Baron de Bastrop had long advocated ed colonization by citizens of Spanish Louisiana, by Indians, or by Anglo-Americans themselves as a barrier to Anglo-American encroachments. He had met Moses Austin in 1797 in connection with an early, unsuccessful enterprise of this nature. *ibid.*, and Hatcher, *The Opening of ‘Texas, 1801-1821*, pp. 31-32, 95-98.

4 Petition from Moses Austin to Governor, Martinez, December 26, 1820, Hatcher, *The Opening of Texas, 1801-1821*, pp. 354-55.

.”⁷ Hoping that Stephen F. Austin, son of the now deceased Moses Austin, would be the right man to execute these measures, authorities granted permission to implement his plans on January 17, 1821.⁸

Austin clearly had presented his application at just the right time, but the rigorous winter journey to and from Texas severely “impaired” his health.⁹ He died in June, 1821, and on his deathbed he requested that his older son, Stephen Fuller Austin, “take his place” in the colonization “in the same way he would have done.”¹⁰ Stephen F. Austin, well-educated for his day,¹¹ had entered upon a legal and journalistic career in bustling New Orleans and was not elated over the prospect of pioneering the wilderness of Texas.¹² However, influenced by the interest already expressed in the project¹³ and by his father’s dying wishes, Austin decided to fulfill the colonization.

Austin traveled to San Antonio, explored the most favorable town sites, and presented detailed plans to Governor Martinez which were “immediately” approved.¹⁴ Although Austin “found the country so much more valuable than I expected. . . ,” it remained a “wild, howling” wilderness. The only settlements were the “isolated military posts” of San Antonio and La Bahia,

5 Record of Noses Austin and Family, Barker ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. I, p. 4.

6 Petition from Austin to Martinez, December 26, 1820, Hatcher, *The Opening of Texas, 1801-1821*, pp. 354-55.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 355.

8 Antonio Martinez to Moses Austin, February 8, 1821, Gammel, ed., *Laws of Texas*, pp. 25-27.

9 Record of Moses Austin and Family, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. I, p. 3.

10 Maria Austin to Stephen F. Austin, June 8 and August 25, 1821, *ibid.*, pp. 394-95 and 408-10.

11 See Barker, *Life of Austin*, pp. 18-20.

12 Austin to James Bryan, April 30, 1820, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. I, pp. 358-59

13 Sufficient applications to fill Moses Austin’s quota had been received by the time of his death. Moses Austin to J. E. B. Austin, March 28 and April 8, 1821, *ibid.*, pp. 384-87.

14 Record of Moses Austin and Family, *ibid.*, p. 3.

and the combined population was little more than three thousand.¹⁵ But Martinez provided him with every possible aid, and the potential value of the land “filled my soul with enthusiasm.”¹⁶

In the succeeding months Austin made detailed boundary arrangements, contracted for supplies, and corresponded with prospective colonists. By December, 1821, the first few settlers were present, and within the next three months a hundred and fifty pioneers arrived and began working lands along the lower Brazos and Colorado Rivers.¹⁷

In March, however, Austin discovered that there were official complications concerning his substitution as *Empresario* for his deceased father. By this time, of course, Spanish control in Mexico had been overthrown. As we have seen, many Mexican officials had received training from the Spanish.¹⁸ It is not surprising, therefore, that the new government was aware of the need to colonize Texas and that the most practicable means to accomplish this was to admit Anglo-Americans. Numerous opportunists were already in Mexico City, petitioning for the chance to Empresarios. Furthermore, various officials, who had never heard of Stephen F. Austin, had conceived their own schemes for populating Texas. In light of these considerations and of the possibility that Moses Austin’s contract might be nullified because of a technicality, Martinez advised Austin to travel to the capital, protect his interests, “and lay his business before

15 Juan Antonio Padilla, “Texas in 1820,” translated by Mattie Austin Hatcher, *SWHQ*, XXIII (July, 1919), 47-68.

16 Austin to Mary Austin Holley, November 17, 1831, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 704-6.

17 Austin to the Settlers in Texas, November 1, 1829, Gammel, ed., *Laws of Texas*, PP- 5-7.

18 An example of a Spanish official who retained his position after Spanish control was overthrown is provided by Antonio Martinez. Martinez was a native Spaniard who had taken office as Governor of Texas in 1817. During the initial months of Mexican Independence, Martinez continued to execute his duties until he was replaced in April, 1812. Part of the explanation for his continuance in office must lie in the confusion of the early government and in the remoteness of Texas. But Mexicans held few suspicions of the well-meaning Martinez, as evidenced by the fact that he resided until his death in Mexico City.

Congress.”¹⁹ Austin by now had labored for several months and had heavily invested his personal funds; he therefore wasted little time in journeying to Mexico City.

Although Austin found himself “destitute of almost everything necessary to insure success. . . .”²⁰ he returned to Texas a year later with actual power greater than that exercised by any man in the province until 1836. During a long, busy year in the Mexican capital, Austin became familiar with the national language and character friendships with most of the important Mexicans the day, helped to write the Mexican Constitution, and finally obtained an *Empresario* contract which allowed to assume unique and decisive influence in colonial Texas.

In the interior of Mexico Austin observed the weaknesses which necessitated the admission of Anglo-Americans into Texas. There was scant hope, of immediate improvement, moreover, because turbulent political conditions in the capital promised little chance of national unity or organized economic development. “I found the City in an unsettled State, the whole people and Country still agitated by the revolutionary Convulsion which had just terminated in their emancipation, public opinion as to the form of Government which ought to be adopted.[.]”²¹

This complex and uncertain political situation really complicated Austin’s mission. At the time of his arrival in April, 1822, Agustin Iturbide was the leader of a “republic” which increasingly demonstrated despotic tendencies. But strong factions in Mexico desired, respectively, a national monarchy or a true republic. Early in May, Iturbide managed to have himself named emperor, thus satisfying one element, but, of course, leaving republicans

¹⁹ Record of Moses Austin and Family, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. I, p. 5.

²⁰ Austin to his colonists, June 5, 1824, *ibid.*, pp. 811-24.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p 815.

frustrated and working for reform. Their hopes seemed further thwarted when, in August Iturbide dismissed congress and replaced it with a hand-picked “Junta.”²²

Austin labored patiently for his colony during this turmoil but at first little could be accomplished. The government, when it had time to consider the matter, realized the necessity of strengthening northern areas of Mexico through colonization. But the settlement of Coahuila and California seemed to many Mexicans to be of greater importance than that of Texas, and, moreover, there were number of Texas Empresario applicants to consider along with Austin’s.²³ Early in January, 1823, however, Austin managed to obtain official endorsement through a general colonization law.²⁴ Austin now petitioned Iturbide for confirmation of his specific grant, but just as it seemed that his mission finally would be completed, Iturbide was forced to abdicate. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna had led a liberal revolt against Iturbide; the emperor was driven out of office in March, 1823; and Austin now had to obtain approval from a new government.²⁵

Observing these events during his year in the capital, Austin became well acquainted with the men whose support he needed. Through the months, Austin had associated on official and social levels with the leading soldiers, and businessmen of Mexico. Such men as Iturbide, Gomez Farias, Miguel Ramos Arizpe, Juan Bautista Arizpe, and Lorenzo de Zavala are but a few of influential leaders with whom Austin worked during this period. Many of these men came to admire and support Austin, praising him “for his personal qualities and for the desires which

22 Austin to the Settlers in Texas, November 1, 1829, Gammel, ed., *Laws of Texas*, pp. 8-9.

23 One concerned individual felt that “the Austin will have as much to fear from the encroachment of new guarantees as from any other cause.” Reilly to Hawkins, April 26 1822, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. 1, pp. 498-500.


24 For a complete translation of this law, see Gammel *Laws of Texas*, pp. 27-30.

25 Austin to the Settlers in Texas, November 1, *ibid.*, pp. 9-12.

animated him to be useful to Mexico.”²⁶ From these individuals, moreover, Austin acquired invaluable knowledge of how to accomplish things in the unstable Mexican republic.

²⁶ Anastacio Bustamente to Caspar Lopez, March 3, 1823, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. I, p. 581.

COLONIAL TEXAS, 1821 - 1835



Because of his close relationship with high-ranking Mexicans, Austin exerted a measure of influence upon the formal organization of the Republic of Mexico. After Agustín Iturbide was deposed from power in 1823, there was a general movement for the establishment of a republic. Austin, who had served six years in the Missouri Territorial Legislature,²⁷ and who was generally interested in political form and execution, willingly lent his talents and training to the formulation of a government. Of particular importance at this time was Austin's association with Ramos Arizpe, who became chairman of the committee which eventually produced the Constitution of 1824. Austin presented to Arizpe an adaptation of the United States constitution and made other suggestions designed to frame an effective federal government

Austin's influence upon the finished Constitution should not be over-emphasized, but to at least a modest degree he was responsible for the Anglo-American flavor of the Constitution.²⁸ Austin's influence may be seen, for example, in several of the twenty-nine articles which constitute a bill of rights, and in the transformation of Congress from a one-house body (like the old Spanish cortes to a two-house organization.²⁹ Arizpe and other intelligent, educated Mexicans, of course, were quite capable of consulting the United States Constitution without Austin's aid. But the fact remains that Austin was active in disseminating and expressing a native American's point of view many of his Mexican friends.³⁰

²⁷ Barker, *Life of Austin*, p. 23.

²⁸ For the complete text of the Constitution of 1824 see Gammel ed., *Laws of Texas*, pp. 61-99.

²⁹ Austin later stated that "the outlines of the constitution are copied from the United States, with the exception of an exclusive religion in favor of the Roman Catholics" Extract of a letter from Austin to the Reverend William Stevenson, May 30, 1824, cited in Niles' *Register*, October 16, 1824, p. 112. The Mexicans even saddled themselves with the original, awkward American method of selection a vice-president (by taking the second highest presidential candidate).

³⁰ For discussions of Austin's influence on these matters see Barker, *Life of Austin*, pp. 78-87; and Jacobs, *Tarnished Warrior*, p. 332.

It should be pointed out, however, that since the Mexican Constitution was modeled upon American institutions it did not effectively deal with peculiarly Mexican political needs. Mexican citizens were given broad political freedoms and the government—particularly Congress—was allotted powers and responsibilities which subsequent decades of civil war, foreign intervention, and frequent despotism demonstrated to be premature and misplaced. Mexico—unstable, economically weak, exposed in the past solely to the political rule of an ancient monarchy—proved unready for an American-style government; whatever influence Stephen F. Austin had on the temporary organization of that government was largely wasted effort. In fact, Austin himself felt that “these people will not do for a Republic.”³¹ His work toward designing such a government was motivated from a conviction that an inefficient republic was preferable to despotism,³² and perhaps from a desire to comply with the wishes of his influential friends.

Austin’s efforts in this field did facilitate the further improvement of his relationship with Mexican officials and legislators, and this close association enabled him to achieve the purpose of his mission in Mexico City. He received final confirmation of his contract in April, 1823,³³ and he left the capital for Texas a few days later.³⁴

The contract which Austin at last obtained was well worth his time and efforts, for it gave him an influence which was to be a decisive force in the events leading to the Texas Revolution. This contract, which allowed Austin to offer to individual colonists grants of land customarily amounting to 4,605 acres, encouraged settlement in his colony. Since little money was available

³¹ Austin to Edward Lovelace, November 22, 1822, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. I, pp. 554-55.

³² Austin to Amigos mios May 28, 1823, *ibid.*, pp. 653-56.

³³ Jose Ignacio Garcia Illenca, Minister of Relations, to Austin, April 14, 1823, Gammel, ed., *Laws of Texas*, p. 33.

³⁴ Austin to the Settlers in Texas, November 1, 1829, *ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

to the national government for the administration of Anglo-Americans in Texas, the respected Austin was entrusted with broad administrative powers, When settlers first began arriving in Texas in 1821, Antonio Martinez had informed Austin that his colonists “must be governed by, and be subordinate to you. . . .”³⁵ The Mexican government effected a similar arrangement with Austin by appointing him judicial head of the colony, commander of the colonial militia, and general administrative leader.³⁶ When Austin returned to Texas, therefore he possessed official authority and personal relationships that would make his colony the most secure and populous in the province. Moreover, as the head of that colony, Austin was to become in ensuing years the most powerful man in Texas.

The colony to which Austin returned was expanding and prospering rapidly. While Austin was away, the colonists had initially been discouraged over drought, Indian problems, uncertainty of land titles, and the absence of their leader. But conditions began to improve late in 1822, and when Austin arrived with official approval, the colony resumed its progress. Rude settlements began to form, Indians were pushed back, and Austin provided a greatly needed stabilizing influence, And, of course, with every new field that was cleared and every new cabin that was built, the process of Manifest Destiny in Texas was brought that much nearer to fulfillment.

The chief lure to Texas settlers was land. During the boom years in the United States following the War of 1812, millions of acres of government land was sold on credit terms to speculators and legitimate farmers. But a severe economic depression began in 1819, and the next year the government land policy was changed. The minimum amount of land available for

³⁵ Antonio Martinez to Austin, August 24, 1821, cited in Dudley G. Wooten, ed., *A Comprehensive History of Texas, 1685-1897*, vol. I (Dallas: W. G. Scarff, 1898), p. 472.

purchase was reduced from 160 acres to eighty, but the \$1.25 cost per acre was to be paid in cash. Cash sums were increasingly difficult for land speculators to raise as the depression deepened, and farmers found even \$100 nearly impossible to accumulate. Consequently, government land sales fell from more than five million acres in 1819 to just over one million acres the following year. Coming at a time—during a depression—when Americans traditionally hoped to migrate to new areas, this economic impediment to western settlement caused the 4,605-acre plots available in Austin’s colony to appear highly attractive.³⁷

The opening of fertile Texas lands, therefore, occurring at a period when westward movement was hindered elsewhere, caused Austin’s colony to grow rapidly.³⁸ Austin’s initial quota of three hundred families was quickly filled,³⁹ and he applied for additional grants. In 1825 he was given permission to settle five hundred families on adjacent lands to the east; in 1827 he was authorized to settle another hundred; the next year he contracted to settle three hundred more; and in 1831 Austin and Samuel M. Williams—Austin’s longtime friend and secretary—were allowed to colonize eight hundred Mexican and European families.⁴⁰

With these additional allotments, Austin’s colony became by far the most heavily-populated area in Texas. The attitude of the highly influential Austin was decisive in determining the character of the colony. Austin early had

³⁶ Andres Quintana and Miguel Riesgo to Austin, February 18, 1823, Gammel, ed., *Laws of Texas*, pp. 31-32.

³⁷ The United States Congress soon passed relief legislation which helped to alleviate the new policy, but American farmers still came to Texas in large numbers. Roy M. Robbins, *Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776-1936* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1962), pp. 28-34, 38-39, 402; and Payson Jackson Treat, *The National Land System, 1785-1820* (New York: E. B. Treat and Company, Publishers, 1910), pp. 101-43, 370-90, 406-11.

³⁸ A list of “The Old Three Hundred,” which includes land title information, may be found in Wallace, ed., *Documents of Texas History*, pp. 51-58.

³⁹ Despite earlier predictions that there would be little American movement into Texas (August 27, 1824, p. 416), Niles’ *Weekly Register* later admitted: “There is a considerable migration from the South-western states to Austin’s settlement in Texas.” (September 2, 1826, p. 3.)

. . . discovered that strong prejudices existed against the North Americans owing to the conduct of some were engaged in the revolutionary expeditions that had entered Texas at various times since 1811. I saw that all the efforts to get a foothold here by means of such expeditions had failed and ended in defeat and ruin and I believed they always would fall. These observations convinced me that the only means of redeeming this country from the wilderness was by peaceful, silent noiseless perseverance and industry, and that the axe, the plough and the hoe would do more than the rifle or the sword.⁴¹

Having come to these conclusions, which reflect the very heart of Anglo-American expansionism, Austin vigorously pursued the “peaceful, silent, noiseless” conquest of Texas. He decided that the persons who would attract the least official attention while utilizing the axe, plow, and hoe were “intelligent, honorable, and enterprising people.”⁴²

As we have seen, Austin possessed the power to enforce his will to a considerable extent. Accordingly, he encouraged only those settlers who met his standards, and rigorously excluded those of an undesirable nature. Austin demanded that applicants to his colony “produce satisfactory evidence, of having supported the character of a moral, sober, and industrious citizen.”⁴³ Furthermore, in the course of his judicial duties, Austin did not shirk from. “taking upon myself the responsibility of -inflicting corporal punishment.”⁴⁴

⁴⁰ See correspondence between Austin and various officials, Gammel, ed., *Laws of Texas*, pp. 47-55. concerning the enterprise with Williams see Barker, *Life of Austin*, pp. 345-73. It should be pointed out that Austin’s first grant was the only *empresario* contract issued by the national government; all the others were from Coahuila-Texas.

⁴¹ Austin to Thomas F. Leaming, June 14, 1830, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 413-17,

⁴² Austin to Leaming, July 23, 1831, *ibid.*, pp. 677-81

⁴³ General Regulations relative to the Colony, November 23 1821, *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 435-36,

⁴⁴ Austin to Lucas Alaman, January 20, 1824, *ibid.*, pp. 725-29.

But this exercise of authority did not deprive him of public respect or influence. A San Felipe⁴⁵ blacksmith stated that “Austin, the father of Texas, was of course the central figure” of the community.⁴⁶ A contemporary assured Austin “that you have much in your power and that you have the intire confidence of the people and that any measure you [approve] would meet their seport [sic].”⁴⁷ Austin also was told that “the substantial part of the community are not disposed to take any steps in public matters without your previous approbation.”⁴⁸ In 1830 the colonists demonstrated their esteem by electing Austin to the Coahuila-Texas legislature.⁴⁹

Austin conscientiously practiced his theory “that Texas must be settled silently or not at all,”⁵⁰ and he reflected:

Others who have attempted colonization here have wished to make a matter of great and speedy speculation of it. No one who starts on that plan will succeed in doing anything except to injure this country and throw it back many years.⁵¹

Throughout the years Austin remained true to his pledge “to fulfill rigidly all the duties and obligations of a Mexican citizen,”⁵² and he thrust this attitude upon many of his colonists.⁵³

45 San Felipe de Austin was the central settlement of Austin’s colony.

46 Noah Smithwick, *The Evolution of a State, or Recollections of Old Texas Days* (Austin: Gammel Book Company, 1900), p. 58.

47 J H. Bell to Austin, March 13, 1829, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 182-83.

48 Henry Austin to Austin, November 28, 1831, *ibid.*, pp. 713-14.

49 Barker, *Life of Austin*, p. 221.

50 Austin to Mary Austin Holley, November 17, 1831, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 704-6.

51 Austin to Thomas F. Leaming, July 23, 1831, *ibid.*, pp. 677-81.

52 Austin to Samuel M. Williams, February 19, 1831, *ibid.*, pp. 599-603.

53 The town government of San Felipe, for example, sternly upheld the moral character of the community. In one instance, “a certain Charles Smith,” who was “a general disturber of the public peace, and a gambler by profession was placed “in close confinement, in irons A few weeks later, it was decreed that “whereas the vice of habitual drunkardness is prejudicial to the good order, and tranquility of this municipality: Notice is hereby given that in

For the most part, consequently, early Texas settlement was orderly and gave little indication of future problems. Austin's colony was the first to be established in the province, and it remained the largest and most successful in ensuing years. Through this colony, Austin provided a bulwark of support for loyalty to Mexico, and—until 1835—a personal source of discouragement to anti-Mexican “firebrands.”⁵⁴

Also, despite the prosperous, expansion of Austin's colony, the population of Texas remained relatively sparse throughout the decade.⁵⁵ There were too many problems with raiding Indians⁵⁶ and the everyday demands of establishing frontier homes for any comparatively abstract political issues to receive significant attention. It would be years before the Anglo-American pioneers of Texas achieved a sufficient level of civilization and economic development to become seriously concerned about Mexican misrule and oppression.

Since the colonization of Texas seemed to be progressing satisfactorily, Mexican authorities decided to further advance their plans. On August 18, 1824, the national congress enacted a general colonization law which encouraged the several state governments to promote immigration.⁵⁷ At this point Texas and adjacent Coahuila formed a joint state, aspects of which will be considered shortly. Incompliance with the national decree, Coahuila-Texas passed a state colonization law on March 24, 1825.⁵⁸

future the laws on that subject will be rigidly enforced against all offenders. . . .” Eugene C. Barker, ed., “Minutes of the Ayuntamiento of San Felipe de Austin, 1828-1832,” *SWHQ*, XXII (July, 1918), 78-95.

⁵⁴ Austin to Samuel M. Williams, May 8, 1831, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 660-62.

⁵⁵ By 1830 there still were just over 4,000 settlers in Austin's colony. Barker, *Life of Austin*, p. 149.

⁵⁶ For example, see Green DeWitt to, Ramon (three letters), May 8, 1829. (“The threat of the Indians I fear will greatly retard the settling of the country. . . .”) Also see John P. Coles to Austin, August 22, 1832. Barker ed., *Austin in Papers*, vol. II , pp. 215-16.

⁵⁷ The text of this law may be found in Gammel ed., *Laws of Texas*, pp. 38-40.

⁵⁸ The text of this law, too, may be found in *ibid.* pp. 40-46.

Under this law, more than twenty *empresarios* received contracts to introduce colonists to Texas. Austin had met many of these *empresarios* during his first visit to Mexico City. As he realized,⁵⁹ most of these men were mere speculators who accomplished little or no actual settlement.⁶⁰ Empresarios could obtain personal title to 23,000 acres of land for each hundred families they introduced, and numerous speculators were attracted. But colonists had to settle before *empresario* premiums were awarded, and no one proved as willing or capable as Austin of actually colonizing Texas.⁶¹ Next to Austin the most important *empresario* was Green C. DeWitt, who issued 166 land titles.⁶² But even DeWitt's grant (located just southwest of Austin's) remained largely vacant, and no other *empresario* managed more than a handful of immigrants. Austin's industrious and orderly colonists⁶³ therefore remained predominant in Texas, and the Mexican experiment with Anglo-American settlers appeared to be working.

Mexican authorities, however, still could not entirely discard their suspicions of *norteamericanos*. These apprehensions had accumulated over long years of conflict with Anglo-Americans, and were reflected in several provisions of the colonization laws. For example, the government retained the precautionary right to erect buildings "for the defense and security of the nation,"⁶⁴ and, more pointedly, "to prohibit settlement within the twenty leagues [about sixty

59 Austin to Thomas F. Leaming, July 23, 1831, Barker ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 677-81.

60 James Wilkinson was typical of the Anglo-Americans who hoped to obtain a colonization grant. He spent last three years of his life (he died in 1825) in Mexico City, and during that time he engaged in a variety of enterprises. But, like most potential empresarios his most persistent hope was "to acquire a precious tract of land in the of Texas" "Wilkinson to Williams, December 1822, excerpt cited in Jacobs, *Tarnished Warrior*, p. 336.

61 See Mary Virginia Henderson, "Minor Empresario Contracts for the Colonization of Texas, 1825-1834," *SWHQ*, XXXI (April, 1928), 295-324, and XXXII (July, 1,029), 1-228.

62 Ethel Zivley Rather, "DeWitt's Colony," *QTSHA*, VIII (October, 1904), 95-192.

63 Austin proudly and rather paternally referred to his colonists as hardworking colonists as "Austinians." See Austin to Samuel N. Williams, February 5 and 19, 1831, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, PP. 594-95 and 599-603,

64 National Colonisation Law, August 18 1824, Gammel, ed., *Laws of Texas*, p. 39.

miles] bordering on the United States of the North and ten leagues . . . from the Gulf of Mexico.⁶⁵

Also indicative of lingering Mexican suspicions were provisions to encourage the counter-colonization of Mexicans and Europeans into Texas. It was clear that if present ratio of settlement were maintained, *norteamericanos* eventually would saturate the province. But if Mexicans and Europeans could be induced to colonize Texas in appreciable numbers, the Anglo-American influence would be counter-balanced and the province would become a conglomerate region.

Mexican apprehensions were further reflected in aspects of the Coahuila-Texas state government. Coahuila-Texas was established in 1824 until such time as was sufficiently populated to maintain itself as a separate state. This arrangement, however, provided for close control of American-dominated Texas. The state capital, for example, was located at Saltillo, seven hundred desolate, Indian-infested miles “from the inhabited parts of Texas.”⁶⁶

Coahuila was given dominance over Texas in other ways. For instance, the state legislature was composed to ten Coahuila representatives and only two from Texas; legislation therefore favored the mining interests of Coahuila. The court system, moreover, placed Anglo-American settlers at a disadvantage with Mexican fellow-citizens. Proceedings, quite naturally, were held in the Spanish tongue, and Anglo-American lawyers found it necessary to learn to speak and write the tongue fluently (which “but few” of them did).⁶⁷ Even if these

⁶⁵ Colonization law of the state of Coahuila and Texas, March 24 1825, *ibid.*, p. 41.

⁶⁶ Address of Central Committee to the Convention to the Convention [of 1833, written by Austin], April 1, 1833, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 934-40.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* The language requirements also caused outside the judicial branch. The local government of San Felipe, for example, found it extremely difficult to acquire “a secretary acquainted with the Castilian language . . .” to handle necessary transactions. Barker, ed., “Minutes of the Ayuntamiento of San Felipe de Austin, 1828-1832,” *SWHQ*, XXII (July and October, 1918), 78,93, and 193.

accomplishments were acquired, the court process itself—with trials-closed to the public, the defendant not allowed to face his accusers, and all verdicts decided by the judge—caused severe problems of adaptation to Anglo-American attorneys and citizens. Jurists, moreover, often proved “ignorant of the formulas of the laws,” and final decisions were rendered in distant Saltillo, where local Mexican lawyers possessed an obvious advantage. Eventually even Austin complained that, regarding lawsuits, “It has become proverbial in Texas that an appeal to Saltillo is a payment of the debt,” and that the manner of conducting “high criminal offenses . . . amounts to no tryal [sic] at all.” The result of this “total denial of justice” was “that reverence for laws or for those who administer them has almost intirely [sic] disappeared, and contempt is fast assuming its place[.]”⁶⁸

Because of such controls—irritating though they might be to Texans-Mexican officials felt a measure of reassurance that Anglo-American influence would not get out of hand. Other regulations added to that reassurance—and to irritation of *norteamericanos*. Such a measure was the requirement that all colonists become Roman Catholics. Many colonists were indifferent to religion,⁶⁹ and a few colonists were glad to be free from “ravings and indecent exhibitions under the cloak of a religious assemblage. . . .”⁷⁰ But the requirement did “discourage emigration to [Texas]”⁷¹ to some extent. Moreover, resentful Protestants and an increasing number of

⁶⁸ Address of Central Committee to the Convention of 1833, written by Austin, April 1, 1833, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 934-40.

⁶⁹ Samuel Harman Lowrie, *Culture Conflict in Texas, 1821-1835* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932). Throughout this book Mr. Lowrie develops the point that, partially because of religious restrictions, a large number of early Texas settlers had little interest in religion.

⁷⁰ Ira Ingram to Roswell Ingram, May 29, 1830, excerpt cited in William Tellis Parmer, *Seventy-Five Years in Nacogdoches* (Dallas: The Dorsey Company, 1959), p. 22.

⁷¹ Charles Douglas to Austin, February 26, 1824, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. I, pp. 743-46. An earlier query from the spokesman for a group of prospective emigrants stated: “The idea of an established church of any particular creed would forever banish from our minds the design of leaving our natal soil.” James T Dunbar to Austin, December 13, 1821, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. I, pp. 447-48.

separatist-minded Americans grumbled against the restriction, and the Declaration of Independence of 1836 would denounce “support of a National religion. . . .”⁷²

Similar discontent was aroused over restrictions on slavery, which was forbidden throughout Mexico by the Constitution of 1824. The Coahuila-Texas Colonization law of the following year emphasized that “the new settlers shall obey the laws already established. . . .” pertaining to slavery.⁷³ Since early laws stipulated that slaves would not “be introduced into the empire,” and that children of slaves already present would “be free at fourteen years of age,”⁷⁴ there was widespread concern over this matters.⁷⁵ A majority of Texas settlers were from the adjacent South and although slaveholders among them owned only one or a few slaves, there was understandable anxiety that this measure would ruin them “forever.”⁷⁶ But this requirement, like the national religion,⁷⁷ was laxly enforced. In practice, “all negroes brought into the country came not as slaves, but as indented servants,. . . .”⁷⁸ and even Jared E. Groce—whose plantation in Austin’s colony was worked by more than one hundred slaves⁷⁹—experienced little trouble

72 The Declaration of Independence made by the Delegates of the People of Texas, March 2, 1836, Gammel, ed., *Laws of Texas*, pp. 1063-67.

73 Law for Promoting Colonization in the State of Coahuila and Texas, March 24, 1824, *ibid.*, pp. 99-106.

74 Colonisation Law of 1823, *ibid.*, p. 30.

75 A United States newspaper reported: “This has produced the greatest dissatisfaction, and . . . it is rumored that the slave holders will make considerable opposition to any measure of the kind.” Niles’ *Weekly Register* (Baltimore), August 27, 1824, p. 416.

76 John Durst to Austin, October 29, 1829, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, p. 285.

77 Austin dutifully turned down the persistent requests of Protestant missionaries, informing one that “if a metlodist, or any other preacher, except a Catholic, was to go through this colony, preaching, I should be compelled to imprison him. . . . This is the law of the nation, and all those who move here, must obey it.” Nevertheless, Mexico did little to enforce Catholicism in Texas, and after 1830 a few ministers drifted into the province. Extract of a letter from Austin to the Rev. Wm. Stevenson, May 30, 1824, Niles’ *Weekly Register* (Baltimore), October 16, 1824. p. 112; Parmer, *Seventy-Five Years in Nacogdoches*, pp. 24-32; and William Stuart Red, *The Texas Colonists and Religion, 1821-1836* (Austin: E. L. Shettles, Publisher, 1924), pp. 70-84.

78 Hoseph E. Field, *Three Years in Texas* (Boston: Tornkins, 1836, a facsimile reproduction of the original by The Steck Company, Austin, 1935) p. 8.

79 Barker, *Life of Austin*, p. 120.

with Mexican officials. Nevertheless, anti-Mexican elements in Texas would later exploit this issue in their agitations.

All of these measures were moderate and well within the conventional powers of a government. When past events and attitudes are taken into account, however, it is not unfair to suggest that these provisions reflected to some degree dormant Mexican suspicions of Anglo-Americans. Indeed, these measures were utilized in future years to attempt to control aggressive *norteamericanos*. It must be pointed out, nevertheless, that numerous colonization grants were issued and, on the whole, settlers were welcomed and encouraged.⁸⁰

The colonization laws of the mid-1820s therefore mark the zenith of good relations between Mexico and the Anglo-Americans of Texas.

At this inopportune point, when the relationship between Mexico and Texas—despite slight resentment and suspicion on each side—was comparatively good, an event occurred which decisively excited Mexican apprehensions. One of the new *empresarios* was Haden Edwards, who in 1825 secured a grant just to the east of Austin's allotment. Edwards' grant embraced much of East Texas, including Nacogdoches and other areas where Anglo-Americans had unofficially settled through the years.⁸¹ Conflicting land claims soon arose between Edwards' colonists and the older settlers. Edwards arbitrarily threw his influence as *empresario* behind his

⁸⁰ For example, during their first six years in Texas "the colonists shall not pay tithes, duties on their produce nor any other contribution under whatever name it may called," and in the following six years they were to pay only half of such levies "that are paid by the other citizens of the empire." The Imperial Colonization Law, January 41 1823, Gammel ed., *Laws of Texas*, p. 30.

⁸¹ By 1829,"about one hundred and twenty-five houses have been erected, . . . and the country in the vicinity is settling very rapidly with inhabitants, principally from the United States of America." There were "about 630" civilian inhabitants of the town, and several mercantile establishments. Anonymous article from Nacogdoches, September 1, 1829, reproduced in the *St. Louis Beacon*, November 21, 1829, "Notes and Fragments," QTSHA, VIII January 1905), 272-275.

colonists,⁸² and the earlier settlers (many of whom based their claims on old Spanish grants) appealed to Mexican authorities. While these official charges were being filed, Edwards caused further trouble by becoming questionably involved in local elections. Observing these activities with an eye long accustomed to Anglo-American troublemakers, President Guadalupe Victoria revoked Edwards' contract and ordered him to leave the country.⁸³

Edwards' response probably aroused little surprise among veteran Mexican officials. On December 21, 1826, in Nacogdoches, the "Republic of Fredonia" was declared independent from Mexico by Edwards.⁸⁴ B. W. Edwards, brother of the newly elected president, then called upon his "fellow-citizens" in Austin's colony to aid the Fredonians against the "tyrannical monsters appointed to harass and to persecute in the name of the miscalled Mexican Republic."⁸⁵

Austin, of course, looked upon this action with as much disfavor as Mexican authorities. Determined to maintain the confidence and good will of the government, Austin from the first had importuned the Edwards brothers to moderate their activities. Early in 1826, Austin informed Haden Edwards that "it is my candid opinion that a continuance of the imprudent course you have commenced will totally ruin you, and materially injure all the new settlements."⁸⁶ As the situation worsened, Austin offered advice to B. W. Edwards on how to regain the favor of the government, and he urged "the utmost caution and prudence on your part

⁸² Edwards went so far as to threaten to throw the early settlers "in Irons." Edwards to Austin, January 9, 1826, E. W. Winkler, ed., *Manuscript Letters and Documents of Early Texians, 1821-1845* (Austin The Steck Company, 1937), pp. 43-44.

⁸³ These events are related in detail in Barker, *Life of Austin*, pp. 168-202. Also see Foote, *Texas and the Texans*, vol. I, pp. 218-92.

⁸⁴ The Fredonian Declaration of Independence, December 21, 1826, Gammel, ed., *Laws of Texas*, pp. 107-110.

⁸⁵ B. W. Edwards to the Inhabitants of Austin's Colony, January 16, 1827, cited in Foote, *Texas and the Texans*, vol. I, pp. 260-63.

⁸⁶ Austin to Haden Edwards, n.d., Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. I, p. 179.

and that of all your friends”⁸⁷ Austin also wrote to two friends who were involved with Edwards, advising them. “You must humble yourselves before the Government and that immediately.”⁸⁸ At last, early in 1827, Austin complied with government requests and called for volunteers to march with Mexican troops against the insurgents. Five hundred men responded to this call, and in the face of such formidable opposition Edwards’ handful of followers fled to the United States.

This ugly but small-scale episode should have assumed little significance, but recollections of similar incidents in the past served to inflame Mexican anger and suspicions. At a time when Austin’s colonists had resoundingly demonstrated their loyalty and when Mexican authorities seemed to be overcoming traditional apprehensions, the Fredonian Rebellion revived the old conceptions of aggressive, opportunistic *norteamericanos*.

Unfortunately, other events occurred at about the same time which seemed to justify distrust of Anglo-Americans. As previously seen, a major grievance of past conflicts was the official and unofficial involvement of the United States government and public in filibustering efforts. With Mexican officials becoming uneasy over the growing Anglo-American infiltration of Texas, It was only natural that any covetous gestures from the United States toward Texas would be regarded with great alarm—particularly after the Fredonian Rebellion.

Chief among these untimely gestures were persistent offers by the United States government to purchase Texas. We have previously noted the great displeasure aroused in the West and South over being “deprived”⁸⁹ of Texas through the Adams-Onís Treaty. The national

⁸⁷ Austin to B. W. Edwards, summer, 1826, excerpt cited in Foote, *Texas and the Texans*, vol. I, pp. 269-70.

⁸⁸ Austin to John A. Williams and B. J. Thompson, December 14, 1826, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. I, pp. 1532-34.

⁸⁹ Benton, *Thirty Years View*, p. 15.

press continually reported “rumours . . . as to a project entertained by [President Jackson] to acquire the Mexican province of Texas, by purchase or in exchange for other lands.”⁹⁰ Southern newspapers reflected the feelings of their section of the country in the following manner:

“The statesmen who are at the head of our affairs, are not the men we take them to be, if they have not already pursued the proper steps for obtaining the cession of Texas. . . .”⁹¹ By 1830 Austin was concerned over “the excessive noise that has been made in the U.S. papers about the purchase of Texas,”⁹² and he became convinced that “We have nothing to fear from [Mexico] nor from any other quarter except from the United States of the North.”⁹³ This acquisitive attitude prevailed throughout much of the United States until Texas finally was acquired.

Consequently, from 1825 until Texas gained her independence, the United States repeatedly offered to buy the province, even though Mexico never put it up for sale and firmly rejected these offers from the first.⁹⁴ But under Presidents John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson, the United States exhibited an increasingly strong and arrogant interest in Texas. Joel R. Poinsett, United States Minister to Mexico, was instructed by Adams and Secretary of State Henry Clay “to propose the purchase of Texas,” and when the unaccepted offer was repeated, the

⁹⁰ Niles' *Weekly Register* (Baltimore). September 19, 1829, p. 49.

⁹¹ Excerpt from the *Richmond Enquirer*, cited in *ibid.*

⁹² Austin to Thomas F. Leaming, June 14, 1830, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 417-19.

⁹³ Austin to James F. Perry, March 28, 1830, *ibid.* pp. 351-53. Later Austin would reflect: “Had all others followed my system and kept Texas out of the Newspapers the law of 6 April 1830 would not have been passed prohibiting emigration from the United States.” Austin to Leaming, July 23, 1831, *ibid.*, pp. 677-81.

⁹⁴ Andrew Jackson to Anthony Butler, October 19, 1829, Bassett, ed., *Correspondence of Jackson*, vol. IV, p. 82; Eugene C. Barker, *Mexico and Texas, 1821-1835* (Dallas: P. L. Turner Company, 1928), pp. 37-48; and Thomas

Mexican government “rejected it resentfully.”⁹⁵ But when Jackson succeeded Adams he urged Poinsett to renew his efforts, authorizing him to offer up to \$5,000,000 for whatever amount of Texas Mexico would sell.⁹⁶

Veteran Mexican officials could hardly have been surprised at Jackson’s actions. In the previous decade, of course, Jackson had played a prominent part in the acquisition of Spanish Florida, and the fact that he was now the political leader of the *norteamericanos* added still more tension to rising Mexican apprehensions.⁹⁷ Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna would later state “the conviction in which we have all lived. . . . that the Texas War was but a result of [Jackson’s] policy, or at least, of his tolerance in sympathy with the wishes of many of his citizens”⁹⁸ Another Mexican official expressed his opinion in the following fashion:

Throughout the course of [Texas events], the policy of General Jackson is easily discernible in his evident desire to acquire Texas. The old general has always felt a deep sympathy for the South, where he was born, where he holds his property, and where he enjoys the greatest popularity. It is in that section that the hateful traffic in slaves is still practiced, and it is that section that is interested in securing a new market where human beings may be sold. The greater part of the colonists of Texas came from the southern

Maitland Marshall, *A History of the Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 1819-1841* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1914), pp. 87-93.

⁹⁵ Nevins, ed., *The Diary of John Quincy Adams*, p. 548.

⁹⁶ Secretary of State Martin Van Buren to Poinsett, August 25, 1825, Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States-Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860*, vol. VIII, Mexico, 1831-1848 (Mid-Year) (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1937), pp. 3-4. A detailed account of the several American offers for Texas may be found in Marshall, *A History of the Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 1819-1841*.

⁹⁷ A somewhat neglected article which intelligently discusses Jackson’s Texas claims is: Richard R. Stenberg, “Jackson’s Neches Claim, 1829-1836,” *SWHQ* XXXIX (April, 1936), 255-74.

⁹⁸ Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, “Manifiesto Relative to His Operations in the Texas Campaign and His Capture,” Santa Anna, *et al.*, *The Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution*, p. 42.

states. Likewise, the land speculators, among whom General Jackson has many intimate friends such as . . . [Sam] Houston, came from there. By annexing Texas to the Union, the number of senators and representatives in Congress who support the maintenance and protection. of slavery would be increased.⁹⁹

These attitudes were further intensified after 1829, when President Jackson replaced the tactful Poinsett with Anthony Butler, who deeply antagonized Mexicans with his haughty, presumptuous bearing. Although officially Jackson claimed to be “deeply and painfully impressed with the unfriendly and undeserved conduct of Mexico toward us her neighbor and sister Republic,”¹⁰⁰ he nevertheless directed Butler to press the negotiations more resolutely. Butler eagerly did so, in his overbearing manner, with the result that a few months later, Secretary of State Martin Van Buren was forced to acknowledge “the present state of irritation and distrust which prevails in Mexico upon the subject of their northern frontiers.”¹⁰¹

Mexican apprehensions continued to grow under these pressures. It seemed increasingly apparent that the United States, undiscouraged by Mexico’s constant refusals of sales negotiations, was secretly scheming to secure Texas through revolt and subsequent annexation. Mexican authorities therefore determined upon a careful evaluation of conditions in Texas. General Manuel Mier y Teran, a highly respected officer and scientist, was selected to fulfill this assignment.

⁹⁹ Mendivil, “Relations between Texas, the United States of America, and. the Mexican Republic,” *ibid.*, p. 364.

¹⁰⁰ Martin Van Buren to Joel R. Poinsett, August 25, 1825, Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence*, vol. VIII, pp. 3-4.

¹⁰¹ Van Buren to Anthony Butler, October 16, 1829, *ibid.*, p. 8.

Arriving in February, 1828, Mier y Teran spent a year inspecting Texas and evaluating the state of affairs in the province. He appreciated, and acknowledged the settlers of Austin's colony, who "are for the most part industrious and honest, and appreciate this country." But even most of these persons owned "at least one or two slaves" in violation of national law. And all Anglo-Americans of the province seemed to hold a low opinion of Mexico, because "they know no other Mexicans than the inhabitants about here [who] are the most ignorant of negroes and Indians. *Norteamericanos*, moreover, outnumbered the Mexicans of Texas ten to one, and "the incoming stream of new settlers is increasing."¹⁰²

Appointed Commandant General of the Eastern Interior Provinces of Mexico, Mier y Teran found himself directly responsible for the defense of Texas. During his inspection tour in 1829, he noted "an antagonism between Mexicans and foreigners, which is not the least of the smoldering fires which I have discovered." Such observations and forebodings of "grave occurrences" led him to share the belief of many Mexicans that if "timely action" were not soon taken, Texas, through open revolt or gradual infiltration, would be lost to Mexico and would fall into the eager hands of the United States.¹⁰³ Mier y Teran therefore carefully formulated and recommended a policy to save Texas. The most important proposals of his fourteen-point plan included: the prohibition of further immigration of Anglo-Americans; the counter-colonization of Texas by Mexicans and Europeans; the strengthening of the weak economic ties between Texas

¹⁰² Mier y Teran to President Guadalupe Victoria, June 30, 1828, excerpt cited in Alleine Howren, "Causes and Origins of the Decree of April 6, 1830," *SWHQ*, XVI (April, 1913), 395-98.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* Also see Constantino de Tamava, aide to Mier y Teran, to His Excellency the Minister of War and Marine, January 6, 1830, *ibid.*, 407-13.

and the rest of Mexico by encouraging coastal trade; and the military occupation of Texas to enforce non-immigration regulations.¹⁰⁴

Influential friends in the government heeded Mier y Teran's advice. Most notable among these men was Lucas Alaman,¹⁰⁵ a mining engineer-historian-politician who at this time was devoting his considerable abilities to the office of Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Alaman's ominous predictions regarding the future of Texas have already been noted,¹⁰⁶ and his alarming views stimulated preventive legislation. The liberal colonization laws then in force were replaced by what the Anglo-Americans of Texas soon regarded as the "notorious and, more than all, odious "law of the 6th of April, 1830."¹⁰⁷

Mier y Teran, assigned the additional post of Federal Commissioner of Colonization, was called upon to carry out the new colonization law, which embodied all his proposals and provided the means for enforcing them. As it had in the past, however, the counter-colonization of Texas proved unsuccessful. Mexicans had never been able to settle Texas, and Europeans still could not be lured to the province in sufficient numbers to offset the Anglo-American influence. Furthermore, the desired "Coastwise trade"¹⁰⁸ could not be stimulated, because few Anglo-

¹⁰⁴ The complete plan is cited in Ohland Morton, *Teran and Texas* (Austin: The Texas State Historical Association, 1948), pp. 114-15.

¹⁰⁵ Indicative of the correspondence from Teran to Alaman is a letter written after the passage of the Law of 1830. "in my opinion there is a superfluous number of foreign colonists in the settled portion, and it would not be prudent to increase their numbers. . . ." Teran to Alaman, October 14, 1830, Edith Louise Kelly and Mattie Austin Hatcher, eds., "Tadeo Ortiz de Ayala and the Colonization of Texas, 1822-1833," *SWHQ*, XXXII (July, 1928), 85-86.

¹⁰⁶ See above, p. 56.

¹⁰⁷ Reverend Chester Newell, *History of the Revolution in Texas* (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1838; a facsimile reproduction of the original by The Steck Company, Austin, 1935), p. 20. The Law of 1830 is translated in Howren "Causes and Origins of the Decree of April 6, 1830," 415-417. One of the many "odious" provisions of this law authorized Mexican officials "to take such lands as are deemed suitable for fortifications or arsenals and for the new colonies, indemnifying the states for same. . . ." Previous laws had only called for "the construction of warehouses, arsenals, or other public edifices. . . ." (National Colonisation Law, August 18, 1824, Gammel, ed., *Laws of Texas*, p. 39.) The term "fortifications" had not been used before in connection with the colonies of Texas, and this was an ominous indication of the current Mexican temper.

¹⁰⁸ Law of April 6, 1830, Howren, "Causes and Origins of the Decree of April 6, 1830," 416.

American farmers were inclined to follow nautical pursuits. Instructions to “most strictly enforce the colonization laws and prevent the further introduction of slaves”¹⁰⁹ were generally ignored, because of the usual lax enforcement. For the same reason, provisions prohibiting further immigration by “foreigners across the northern frontier”¹¹⁰ were also a failure. In fact, just two months after the prohibitive requirements were enacted, a group of fifty-four Anglo-American families was permitted to enter Texas en masse and settle undisturbed in Green DeWitt’s colony.¹¹¹ Moreover, the plan to garrison Texas—a move certain to arouse resentment among the colonists—was effected. with “convict-soldiers”¹¹² who had chosen military service over imprisonment in the notorious Mexican penal system. The inefficiency of these presidarios was a basic reason for lax enforcement of immigration prohibitions and later smuggling activities.¹¹³ More important, the presidarios were loathed by Anglo-American settlers, who were convinced that “a more brutal and. . . cowardly set of men does not exist than the Mexican soldiery.”¹¹⁴

For all practical purposes, then, the Law of April 6, 1830 accomplished two things—both of which, from the Mexican standpoint, were unfavorable. Established colonists, most of whom had been passive and at least outwardly loyal to Mexico, now became disturbed and angered over the generally unjustified new measures. Also, conscientious, law-abiding immigrants were discouraged from moving to Texas, because the type of men who violated immigration laws proved to be far less submissive and orderly than earlier settlers.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Rather, “DeWitt’s Colony,” 140.

¹¹² Law of April 6, 1830, Howren “Causes and Origins of the Decree of April 6, 1830,” 415.

¹¹³ The almost ludicrous ineffectiveness of these men was involuntarily illustrated by an elderly ex-convict, killer of eleven persons, who fell into shallow water while filling a pail and drowned before he could struggle to his feet. Anonymous, *A Visit to Texas: Being the Journal of a Traveller* (New York; Goodrich and Wiley, 1834 a-facsimile reproduction of the original by The Steck Company, Austin, 1935), p. 96.

There was a more basic and significant effect from the Law of April 6, 1830 and the events and attitudes behind its passage. The Law of 1830 was a turning point in Mexican policy, because further policy prior to the Texas Revolution was merely reaction to Anglo-American activities and pressures. During the 1820s, Mexican officials enjoyed sufficient authority in Texas to enforce whatever policies they chose, and until 1830 the Mexican government held the power and initiative to decisively influence the future of Texas. [Stephen F. Austin led the early, sparsely-settled colonists in remaining loyal to the central government, and later events suggest the strong possibility that wise treatment by the government would have sustained this loyalty in a large number of them.] But Mexican officials allowed past suspicions and the rebellious activities of a minority of Texans¹¹⁵ to determine the course of their future policy. And once that policy was enacted into the Law of April 6, 1830, subsequent reaction to that law would shift the initiative for future events into the hands of the Anglo-American population. Furthermore, the Law of April 6, 1830, along with future Mexican reaction to Anglo-American activities would eventually allow that initiative to be seized and used not by the more moderate and submissive colonists, but by a rowdier element whose ranks were swelled steadily after 1830 by bold, illegal entrants.

During the 1820s therefore, Mexican authorities possessed the influence to decide the future policy and course of Texas. They made their decision regarding the future of the province in 1830, and for the half decade that Texas remained in their possession, they proved able to do

¹¹⁴ Mary Austin Holley, *Texas* (Lexington, Kentucky: J. Clarke and Co., 1836; a facsimile reproduction of the original by The Steck Company, Austin, 1935), p. 128.

little besides enact further measures in the spirit of 1830, and bitterly witness the culmination of the anglicization of Texas.

115 Even the steadfast Austin admitted: "The law of 6 April was founded in error and unjust suspicions." Austin to Samuel M. Williams, February 19, 1831, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 559-604

CHAPTER III

THE GROWTH OF SEPARATISM: 1830-1835

After Mexico passed and attempted to enforce the Law of April 6, 1830, dissatisfaction with Mexican control grew rapidly among the Anglo-Americans of Texas, as separatists among their ranks grew in influence and became sufficiently numerous to seize the initiative of future events from Mexican officials. Until the eve of the Revolution, however, these separatists were effectively countered by a large moderate element, led principally by Stephen F. Austin. We see, therefore, that the Texas colonists can be roughly defined into two groups: “moderates,” who lent little support to the growing separatist movement; and “activists,” who advocated separation and independence.¹

An analysis of the careers and backgrounds of some 465 Texas settlers,² conducted by the writer to determine distinctive tendencies of moderates and activists, suggests that the very presence of the *norteamericanos* contributed almost inevitably to the “anglicization” of Texas. Regardless of political loyalty or disloyalty to Mexico, all Anglo-American settlers—of whatever persuasion—sought to establish and perpetuate in Texas their cultural institutions. For a number of significant reasons, however, activists were more instrumental in pushing events to a revolutionary climax.

¹ The terms “moderate” and “activist” are utilized to clarify the succeeding discussion. Like all such labels (“conservative” and “liberal,” for example), they are accurate only to a limited degree. They have use for purposes of general identification, but it must be understood that, except for a relatively small number of extremists, there were few Texans to whom these terms could be rigidly applied. Nevertheless, “moderate” and “activist” patterns are sufficiently consistent to justify the use of these terms.

² For a list of the subjects selected for this study, see below, Appendix. Biographical information of these persons was obtained from: Walter Prescott Webb, ed., *The Handbook of Texas*, 2 vols. (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1957); Worth S. Ray, *Austin Colony Pioneers* (Austin: Published by the Author, 1949); and Louis Wiltz Kemp, *The Signers of the Texas Declaration of Independence* (Salado, Texas: The Anson Jones Press, 1959).

The first tendency which becomes apparent is that those who were more active in events leading to the Revolution arrived in Texas at a later date than less active participants. For the most part, activists arrived in the province during the late 1820s or early 1830s. Moderates emigrated mainly during the early or middle 1820s. Most of Austin's "Old Three Hundred" must be considered moderates; only a few—for example, John Austin, Brit Bailey, W. D. C. Hall, and Wily Martir,³—exhibited activist tendencies. During the 1830s new immigrants tended to be activists in a steadily increasing ratio. one reason for this tendency, of course, was the passage of the Law of April 6, 1830, which prohibited the entry of *norteamericanos*. The tide of Anglo-American immigration continued after 1830 but few prospective colonists of a submissive nature chose to risk the violation of Mexican law.⁴ Most Texas immigrants during the 1830s defied the Mexican government upon their entry into the province, and this disobedient attitude was often manifested in other activities. Indeed, with the exception of Henry Smith (who came to Texas in 1827), most leaders of separatist agitation arrived after the passage of the Law of 1830: William B. Travis (1831), Sam Houston (1832), Andrew Briscoe (1833), Branch T. Archer (1831), Mosely Baker (1832 or 1833), Edwin Waller (1831), Samuel T. Allen (after 1830), John A. Wharton (1833).⁵

³ John Austin was a distant cousin of Stephen. He was a member of James Long's expedition and was imprisoned by Mexican officials. After his release he settled in Texas and acquired large holdings. He led Anglo-Americans at the Battle of Velasco and attended the Convention of 1832. Bailey participated in the Battle of Velasco, and, like John Austin, died the following year. Hall was, a member of the Gutierrez-Magee expedition. He fought at Velasco and was second in command at Anahuac. He was a delegate to the Conventions of 1832 and 1833. Martin joined in the siege at Anahuac and signed the Turtle Bayou Resolutions He attended the Conventions of 1832 and 1833, and was a member of the San Felipe Committee of Vigilance and Safety.

⁴ See Austin to General Mier y Teran, September 7, 1830, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 483-86.

⁵ Travis was a lawyer who was twice imprisoned at Anahuac and who subsequently became the most active agitator for separation. Smith was second only to Travis as an agitator and, also like Travis, he was a member of the War Party. He became first provisional governor of Texas. Houston, hoping to rebuild a shattered political career, was also a member of the War Party in Texas. He attended the Convention of 1833 and, of course, led the Texas army during the Revolution. Briscoe was a vigorous anti-Mexican militant who was arrested in Anahuac and later instigated the disturbances there in 1835. Archer, too, was vehemently anti-Mexican, and attended the Convention

Activists not only came to Texas at a later date than most moderates; they were generally younger when they arrived. Most activists were about thirty upon their arrival, whereas the greater number of moderates had reached their mid-thirties. Since moderates tended to migrate to Texas at an earlier date than activists, they were considerably older and less contentious when the Revolution began. At the outbreak of the Revolution, activists had been in Texas an average of seven years, but moderates had been settled twelve or thirteen years. When separatist activities reached their climax in 1835 and 1836, therefore, most activists were in their late thirties (and many leaders, like Travis and Briscoe, were still in their mid-twenties), while increasing numbers of the moderates had reached at least their mid-forties. On the whole, therefore, activists tended to be younger and less settled—and consequently more animated and willing to risk change—than their moderate fellow-citizens.

The marital status of Texans may also have contributed to their political obtrusiveness. Almost eighty per cent of those studied who could be designated moderates were married, and most of these had children. On the other hand, as few as one in three of the activists seem to have been encumbered with such responsibilities.⁶ Of the comparatively small number of single moderates, Stephen F. Austin—a lifelong bachelor—was the most prominent. On the opposite side, a majority of the important activist agitators were single. Travis and Houston both were divorced. Patrick C. Jack, George M. Collinsworth, Thomas Jefferson Chambers, Ben Milam,

of 1833. Baker was a leading member of the War Party and was one of the seven Texans ordered arrested in 1835. Waller was present at Anahuac and Turtle Bayou, and he was wounded at Velasco. Thereafter he was a prominent member of the War Party. Allen was arrested with Travis and Jack at Anahuac, and later was active in organizing Texas resistance to Mexico. Wharton was also active in organizing resistance, and he was chairman of the first Declaration of Independence Committee.

⁶ Of the men studied, seventy-eight per cent of the moderates and thirty-three per cent of the activists may be declared married. But marital information was lacking for four per cent of the moderates—and a full twenty-five per cent of the activists. Since marriages are usually recorded, there is a good possibility that the majority of these men of unknown marital status were single.

John A. Wharton, Francis W. Johnson, and R. M. Williamson were all foot-loose bachelors.⁷ Even Henry Smith was a widower, although five daughters saddled him with greater family responsibilities than most activist leaders. Indeed, it should be pointed out that almost one out of five activists were widowers or divorced, while less than one in ten moderates had to face such unsettling experiences. Travis, Houston, and Smith each had his domestic life disrupted, and these circumstances may provide a partial explanation why these men—three central figures of separatist agitation—so freely channeled their energies into revolutionary activity.

The pattern that is unfolding suggests that most activists were young, vigorous, and unburdened by family obligations, while moderates tended to be older, more settled, and more encumbered by responsibilities. This pattern is further developed by other factors. For example, the willingness to change exhibited by so many activists was reflected in their propensity to move from place to place. Prior to emigrating to Texas, well over half of the activists revealed this restless tendency to seek fortune and a better way of life indifferent locations.⁸ Among those who moved on multiple occasions were Henry Smith, Francis W. Johnson, Charles B. Stewart, and John Byrom.⁹ Indeed, several activists had lived or traveled in foreign countries, which certainly was an indication of adventurousness in that period of difficult and often dangerous transportation conditions. A number of activists—John Austin, John Charles Beales, Thomas Jefferson Chambers, and Richard Exeter, to name a few—ventured into Mexico. Others—like

⁷ Jack was imprisoned at Anahuac in 1832 and attended the Conventions of 1832 and 1833. Collinsworth fought at Velasco and helped to seize the Mexican garrison at Goliad in 1835. Chambers was a large-scale speculator who was quite active in revolutionary agitation. Milam accompanied James Long, was involved in several speculative ventures, served three or four terms in Mexican prisons, and led the Texans' attack on San Antonio in 1835. Johnson, who assumed command at San Antonio after Milam was killed, was an officer during the Anahuac Disturbances. Williamson was an active agitator who was one of the first Texans to call for resistance to Mexican rule.

⁸ Revealingly, this transient trait was shared by filibusters like James Long and Samuel Kemper.

Exeter and Beales (native Englishmen), James Grant (Scotland), and David G. Burnet and Ben Milam (who had journeyed to Venezuela)—had seen more distant countries.¹⁰

On the other hand, a much smaller percentage of moderates displayed this transient tendency. Martin Allen (Ireland) and Charles Fordtran (Germany) were among the few moderates from foreign lands. Moderates who moved from place to place numbered about half as few as their activist counterparts; Stephen F. Austin, who lived in at least six different homes, was by far the most unsettled moderate.

This tendency prevailed to a certain extent after immigrants reached Texas. About thirty per cent of the moderates relocated after initially settling in Texas, while forty per cent of the activists moved again. And while nearly all of these moderates settled permanently after their first relocation, almost half of the activists moved yet another time. Included among these last restless individuals were Patrick C. Jack, James Grant, Ira Ingram, N. D. Labadie, Wily Martin, and Asa Mitchell.¹¹ Also worthy of note is the fact that activists frequently expressed their restlessness by living on the fringe areas of the Texas colonies, while most moderates remained near the central settlements.¹²

⁹ Stewart took part in the hostilities at Anahuac in 1832 and signed the Texas Declaration of Independence. Byrom was a divorcee who fought at Velasco, helped organize militia forces, and also signed the Declaration.

¹⁰ Beales was a speculator who once claimed title to more than 70,000,000 acres of Texas land. Exeter was also a large-scale speculator. (Such speculations contributed to the passage of the Law of April 6, 1830, and provided Santa Anna with a pretext to send troops to Coahuila and Texas in 1835.) Grant—still another speculator—was in Monclova in 1834-1835. He fled to Texas at the approach of Mexican troops and began organizing Texan resistance. Burnet was a prominent member of the Convention of 1833 and was elected President during the Revolution.

¹¹ Ingram attended the Conventions of 1832 and 1833, was secretary of the Matagorda Committee of Safety, and helped to draft the Goliad Declaration of Independence in 1835. Labadie was a Canadian doctor who participated in the Anahuac Disturbances in 1832 and served in the army during the Revolution. Mitchell was a speculator and business promoter who fought at Velasco and was always in agreement with separatist agitators.

¹² It should further be pointed out that a large percentage of activists came from the South. Of course, many moderates also were from the South. But a surprising number of moderates—for example, Stephen F. Austin (who attended school in Connecticut), Thomas J. Pilgrim (from Connecticut and New York), Daniel Decrow (a native of Maine), and James F. Perry (from Pennsylvania)—came from the northern and New England states. Activist leaders like Travis, Houston, and Smith were natives of the South, and the romanticism bred into them there was reflected to

On the whole, therefore, activists were not only younger and less rooted than moderates—they were also decidedly more willing to assume the problems and risks necessary to change existing conditions. Important conclusions may be drawn when these tendencies are considered along with two other factors: educational background and occupational activities.

Activists were far better educated than moderates. More than half of the activists had been exposed to formal education, while less than fifteen per cent of the moderates received any significant educational training. About one in four activists had attended some sort of “college,” although such institutions had often been mere academies, roughly comparable to secondary schools of a later period. Nevertheless, less than five per cent of the moderates had enjoyed the opportunity to obtain whatever education these colleges offered. The same low percentage of moderates received legal training, while almost one out of four activists had in one way or another studied law. Frequently, of course, this had consisted only of reading law in the office of a local attorney. But the fact remains that a much larger number of activists than moderates were qualified income way to practice law. The same general tendency can be seen in relation to the medical profession, although the difference in ratio is not so great. About seven per cent of the moderates had received medical training; slightly more than twice this percentage of activists had obtained similar instruction. These educational factors attain significance when combined with occupational tendencies.

at least some degree in their political liberalism. For a thorough study of Southern romanticism and political idealism see W. J. Cash, *The Mind of the South* (New York: Vintage Books, 1941).

ACTIVISTS AND MODERATES:

A COMPOSITE

Activists	Moderates		
Arrival in Texas		1829	1823
Age upon arrival		30	33
Age during the Revolution		37	45
Years in Texas before the Revolution		7.4	12.6

Marital status:

Unknown (and probably single)		25%	4%
Single		42%	18%
Married		33%	78%
Education		51%	13%
None mentioned		49%	87%
College		26%	4%
Legal training		23%	4%
Medical training		14%	7%
Legal and medical training		11%	.5%

Occupational activities:

Agriculture		39%	72%
Small businessmen (merchants, traders, smiths, etc.)		61%	38%
Speculators, promoters, bankers, large-scale merchants, etc		68%	13%

Professionals (doctors, lawyers, teachers, editors)	47%	19%
Military background	25%	5%

Geographical tendencies: Activists moved from place to place more readily before they came to Texas than did moderates (54%-28%). In Texas activists congregated in Anahuac, Brazoria, Nacogdoches, Columbia, Washington, Goliad, and Mina. Also, there were far more activists than moderates located on the fringe areas of the province.

A large majority of moderates (over seventy per cent) were farmers and stockmen, whereas less than forty per cent of the activists earned their livelihood from agriculture. Activists generally engaged in business, speculation, or “professional” activities. Moderates as well as activists were occupied as merchants, traders, blacksmiths, clerks, tavern keepers, and similar endeavors of an expanding frontier commerce. But moderates usually seem to have been satisfied with artisan enterprises or small-scale mercantile ventures—occupations which could be and frequently were conducted in conjunction with agricultural activities. Activists, on the other hand, tended to engage in more risky but also more promising enterprises. For example, a large number of activists—Thomas Jefferson Chambers, Francis W. Johnson, Asa Mitchell, Ben Milam, Dr. Robert W. Peebles, and James Bowie, to name a few—were speculators and promoters. Monroe Edwards, James Fannin, B. F. Smith, and William M. Logan were slave smugglers. Other activists were bankers, ship owners, large-scale merchants, surveyors, and some even outright criminals.¹³ Only a minute percentage of the moderates, on the other hand, followed such pursuits.

One of the most important occupational differences between activists and moderates could be predicted “by a knowledge of their educational backgrounds. Since only a few moderates received formal educations, only a small number could be expected to become “professionals”—lawyers, doctors, teachers, editors, and politicians. Less than ten per cent of the

¹³ Peebles was a speculator who was in Monclova when Mexican troops approached in 1835. He fled with the Texas land records to Nacogdoches, from where he continued to issue fraudulent land titles. Bowie was a legendary frontiersman who engaged in mammoth speculations and promotions in Texas. After the tragic death of his family in 1834, he joined the separatists. Edwards—slave smuggler, swindler, forger—stayed out of politics, but his activities added to Mexican disapproval of *norteamericanos*. He died in Sing-Sing prison. Fannin, whose chief means of livelihood—slave-trading—was outlawed by Mexico, was a consistent separatist. A cargo of slaves belonging to B. F. Smith built fortifications for the Texans, and Smith was an active participant in early revolutionary events. The impressment by Bradburn of Logan’s slaves was a major cause of the Anahuac Disturbances in 1832. Stephen Julian Wilson—a speculator and embezzler—was another Texan whose activities damaged the Anglo-American image.

moderates were doctors, and only half that number were lawyers. A handful were teachers and politicians. Conversely, a large number of activists engaged in endeavors of this nature. While less than fifteen per cent were doctors, one out of four activists were lawyers, and almost thirty per cent would hold public office. There were also several editors and teachers, and Mirabeau. B. Lamar was active as a poet and historian.¹⁴

All of these factors attain significance when considered. In light of tendencies common to violent revolutions,¹⁵ in order for revolutionary action to achieve success, a number of elements must be prevalent. For one thing, an articulate group of individuals must be present to formulate declarations of independence and constitutions, to serve as symbols around which discontented factions in society may rally. The group of men who expressed the desires and dissatisfactions of their less eloquent contemporaries were generally young, well-educated, and often occupied as “professionals.”

Not only were such men exposed through education to revolutionary and political ideas; they also found it economically necessary to profess and attempt to establish these principles. As we have seen, Anglo-American lawyers were placed at severe disadvantages in Mexican courts. Moreover, there is a frequent tendency for lawyers and other professional men to become politicians. But the seductive opportunities of political power were greatly limited for Anglo-Americans in a Mexican-dominated Texas. Teachers also wanted democratic political institutions, which would encourage widespread education and free the educational system from

¹⁴ Lamar abandoned a varied career in Georgia after numerous family tragedies. He arrived in Texas a few months before the Revolution, and was a vigorous separatist.

¹⁵ Many of the following thoughts concerning revolutions were suggested by L. C. B. Seaman, *From Vienna to Versailles* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1973), pp. 32-53. Within these pages is a thought-provoking analysis of revolutionary origins and patterns.

any possibility of control by the Roman Catholic Church. A democratic political system was also an economic necessity for journalists, who could enjoy little success without a free press.

The urban pioneers,¹⁶ therefore, who settled in increasing numbers in Texas during the 1830s, vigorously desired to replace Mexican control with a version of the United States political system. Businessmen and speculators exhorted their fellow-Texans to “keep your guns in good order,”¹⁷ and professionals were convinced that only “one sentiment can pervade every breast; which is the safety and protection of the country[]”¹⁸

But the moderates, to whom most of these entreaties were addressed, had to be receptive to such thoughts; they, too, had to be frustrated and thwarted in their ambitions before a revolution could attain success. Because of the more ambitious and dynamic nature of their economic enterprises, activists were the first to be thwarted by Mexican control; because of their higher level of education, activists were the first to articulate their frustration. But the “anglicization” of Texas—the fulfillment of Manifest Destiny—was culminated only when the interests of moderates also appeared to be threatened by Mexican policy. In short, activists and moderates both were moving toward the same end—the anglicization of Texas activists simply were quicker to recognize and openly advocate this goal.

Significant evidence of the growing activist frustration, of the increasing but largely inarticulate moderate discontent, and of the general anglicization of Texas, was first manifested

¹⁶ The American frontier was settled in a roughly consistent series of “zones,” or stages of civilization: fur traders came first, followed by cattlemen, miners, pioneer farmers, “equipped” farmers, and the economic specialists of the urban frontier. These specialists included “sellers of culture”—lawyers, teachers, editors, preachers, doctors. When such persons began arriving in significant numbers—as they did in Texas by the 1830s—the region in question had reached an advanced stage of anglicization. See Ray Allen Billington, *Westward Expansion*, 2d ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), pp. 3-7; and Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 12-22.

¹⁷ F. W. Johnson to Gall Borden, Jr., April 15, 1835, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. III, pp. 61-62.

¹⁸ Address by R. M. Williamson, San Felipe, June 22, 1835, Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, pp. 206-13.

early in the 1830s at Anahuac. Anahuac was inhabited by about fifty Anglo-Americans and a 150-man garrison, stationed in the hamlet to control the entrance to the interior settlements.¹⁹ The *norteamericanos* of Anahuac were greatly irritated at this martial application of the Law of 1830, and at the high tariff rates the soldiers attempted to levy upon imports. To the latter problem, however, residents of Anahuac and many other towns found a simple expedient: smuggling, which was widely practiced. One colonist, writing about conditions during this period, illustrated the casual attitude of Texans toward this illegal activity when he reflected: “life in the colonies becoming stale and not so profitable as I could wish, I set out for Mexico on a smuggling trip.” The only complication to this expedient “lay in the cupidity of the Mexican soldiery”; their greed for bribes reduced the profits to be made from smuggling.²⁰

Since the “lawless military”²¹ proved inept at customs enforcement, George Fisher was assigned to Anahuac as customs collector. Fisher was a Greek who obtained this appointment partially because “his knowledge of the English language will give more facilities in his intercourse with the people. . . .”²² But Fisher proved to be an officious individual, and late in 1831 his activities caused virtual riot in Anahuac.²³ By February, 1832, the ayuntamiento of San Felipe pleaded to Mexican authorities that “the removal of this officer is generally desired therefore the corporation most respectfully prays that he be removed.”²⁴ Mier y Teran judiciously decided to discharge Fisher and tension over this matter was alleviated.

¹⁹ Newell, *Revolution in Texas*, p. 23.

²⁰ Smithwick, *Evolution of a State*, p. 42.

²¹ Holley, *Texas*, p. 322.

²² Austin to the Ayuntamiento of Nacogdoches, May 30, 1833, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 975-77.

²³ Austin to General Mier y Teran, February 5, 1832, *ibid.*, pp. 747-48.

²⁴ Ayuntamiento of San Felipe to Mier y Teran, February 18, 1832, cited in Morton, *Teran and Texas*, pp. 153-54.

Unfortunately, Mier y Teran committed suicide on July 3, 1832,²⁵ and, therefore he could offer no solution to a more serious problem that had festered in Anahuac.

The commander of the Anahuac garrison was Colonel John (“Juan”) Davis Bradburn a native Kentuckian and former slave trader who had been in the Mexican service since 1817. Bradburn had distinguished himself on several assignments, and General Mier y Teran appointed him commandante of the prominent post at Anahuac late in 1830.²⁶ But Bradburn proved to be “a tyrant in office and of a domineering nature in private relations.”²⁷ He arbitrarily forced the slaves of local colonists to construct barracks without compensation, allowed his presidarios to carouse raucously about the town, and on one occasion fired upon a cargo vessel which failed to stop and pay a \$100 passage fee.²⁸ Evidence of rising Anglo-American resentment against Bradburn was manifested on May 1, 1832, when a public meeting in Anahuac resulted in the formation of a militia company. Bradburn immediately arrested Patrick C. Jack, who had been elected captain of the company, and Anglo-American resentment rose still higher.²⁹

One member of this militia company was William B. Travis, who was to establish himself as the most active and persistent agitator for Texas independence. The twenty-one-year old lawyer had arrived from Alabama in April 1831, and was “admitted by S. F. Austin as one of

25 Austin to Samuel M. Williams, July 19, 1834, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 821-22.

26 Edna Howe, “The Disturbances at Anahuac in 1832,” *QTSHA*, VI (April, 1903), 265-99; and Forrest E. Ward “Pre-Revolutionary Activity in Brazoria County,” *SWHQ*, (October, 1960), 212-31.

27 John J. Linn, *Reminiscences of Fifth Years in Texas* (New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co., 1833 a facsimile reproduction of the original by The Steck Company, Austin 1935), p. 16. Even the patient Stephen F. Austin came to feel that Bradburn “is incompetent to such a command and is half crazy part of his time.” Austin later termed him “that most consummate of all fools . . . he was too much of a jackass to be governed by reason or judgment, or anything else except brutal passion.” Austin to Samuel M. Williams, June 20 and July 20, 1832, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. I , pp. 791-92 and 822-23.

28 See Rowe, “Disturbances at Anahuac,” 26-99; and Morton, *Teran and Texas*, pp. 141-43.

29 See J. Lindsay to R. M. Williamson, May 18, 1832, Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, p. 90.

the the settlers under his contract with [the] government. . . . “³⁰ Travis felt no loyalty to that government, however. A fellow colonist, Creed Taylor, recognized this quality and described Travis as

a bold, frank, and courageous man, engaging and attractive in his manners, but perfectly fearless and outspoken, which trait he did not fail to exhibit in his comments upon the high-handed and arbitrary course of the Mexican military authorities. . . .³¹

Travis, in his “fearless and outspoken” manner, soon became embroiled with Juan Bradburn. The young attorney was employed by William M. Logan to effect the return of two fugitive slaves whom Bradburn had enlisted into his garrison. When Bradburn brusquely refused Travis’ petition, the young lawyer spread a rumor that a hundred armed men were en route to Anahuac to seize the Negroes. Bradburn arrested the attorney, and although Travis and Patrick Jack (who had been incarcerated earlier) were soon released, they rapidly expressed their resentment.³²

Bradburn exerted little discipline upon his convict-soldiers, who impressed the Anglo-Americans of Anahuac as “men of a most depraved character, while they were believed to be as cowardly as they were wicked and ignorant.”³³ Shortly after the release of Travis and Jack, four of these detested *presidarios* “attempted a heinous, but nameless crime.” one of these men was seized by an angry mob, led by “Bill Travis, . . . Patrick C. Jack, Sam T. A Allen and Monroe

³⁰ Travis to unknown party, May 23, 1831 excerpt cited in Walter F. McCaleb, *William Barret Travis* (San Antonio The Naylor Company 1957), pp. 19-20.

³¹ James T. DeShields, *Tall Men with Long Rifles* (San Antonio The Naylor Company, 1933), p. 5.

³² Monroe Edwards to R. M. Williamson, May 24, 1832, Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, pp. 91-92.

³³ Anonymous, *A Visit to Texas*, pp. 95-96. This same individual facetiously commented that “it may be presumed that their presence did not add to the enjoyments of the emigrants.”

Edwards—that was before Edwards had developed into a notorious celebrated forger.” The soldier was tarred and feathered, ridden through town on a rail “and finally turned loose near the fort with a message to the effect that should another outrage be committed or attempted by his convict gang, the Texans would rise to a man “³⁴

A short time later Bradburn again “calaboosed” Travis and Jack—the beginning of a fifty-day imprisonment.³⁵ William H. Jack appealed to Bradburn for the release of his brother and Travis. But Bradburn announced that his prisoners were to be tried for treason before a military court, and then ordered William Jack to leave Anahuac at once. From his home in San Felipe Jack appealed for aid, and relief parties formed throughout Texas. On June 10, 1832, Bradburn was confronted with “a large number”³⁶ of irate Anglo-Americans. Bradburn revealed a battery of mounted cannon, however, and ordered the colonists to leave “instantly.”³⁷

The frustrated Texans withdrew a few miles to Turtle Bayou and made plans to rescue Travis and Jack. More colonists soon arrived at Turtle Bayou, and it was decided that Bradburn’s position could be stormed with the aid of artillery. A large detachment of Texans, led by John Austin, marched to Brazoria to obtain a brace of cannon owned by a smuggler. They were to return by water, but they had to sail past Velasco. Velasco was garrisoned by a hundred *presidarios*, and the *commandante*, Colonel Domingo de Ugartechea, attempted to block Austin’s path. On June 26, 1832, Austin led an action against the Mexican position and the ensuing battle was the first clash of any size between Mexicans and Texas colonists. Frontier

³⁴ DeShields, *Tall Men with Long Rifles*, pp. 6-7.

³⁵ James Whiteside to Anthony Butler, August 2, 1832, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 829-31.

³⁶ Holley, *Texas*, p. 151.

³⁷ William B. Scates, “Early History of Anahuac,” *The Texas Almanac for 1873*; George W. Smythe, “The Autobiography of George W. Smythe,” SWHQ, XXXVI (January, 1933), 200-14; and Linn, *Reminiscences of Texas*, pp. 16-17. Also see numerous related documents in Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, pp. 92-131.

riflemen inflicted a deadly toll upon the *presidarios*,³⁸ and Ugartechea surrendered and agreed to leave Texas.³⁹

The triumphant Texans, now numbering over three hundred, proceeded on to Anahuac. Before an assault could be launched against Bradburn, however, Colonel Jose de las Piedras, *commandante* of Nacogdoches, arrived on the scene with a contingent of troops. Piedras had journeyed to Anahuac to investigate the disturbances there, and he was allowed to talk with Bradburn. Piedras persuaded the leaguered Bradburn to release Travis and Jack and to resign his command. Bradburn donned a disguise and, pursued by a party of Texans, managed to escape into Louisiana. His troops, like those of Ugartechea, were forced to return to Mexico.⁴⁰

The Texas colonists now scattered back to their homes, and the trouble at Anahuac seemed to be at an end. But repercussions of the incident would influence Texas affairs for years to come. The Anahuac uprising and the Battle of Velasco was the first large-scale defiance of Mexican control. Texans were proud of their success over the Mexicans.⁴¹ Anglo-Americans would exercise growing arrogance in their relations with Mexicans, and in the future it would become increasingly difficult for Stephen F. Austin to generate loyalty to the Mexican government.

While the Anahuac disturbances were developing, events were occurring in Mexico which would significantly influence future affairs in Texas. As previously noted, Antonio Lopez

38 "Many of them had received gun-shot wounds in the wrist, which were inflicted by the Americans while they were loading the cannon, which were mounted on a parapet above the walls of the fort." Linn, *Reminiscences of Texas*, p. 18.

39 For contrasting accounts of the Velasco incident see: Ugartechea to the Commanding General, July 1, 1832; Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, pp. 132-36; and Smythe., "The Autobiography of George W. Smythe," 209-10.

40 Rowe, "Disturbances at Anahuac," 292-97.

41 One exultant participant at Velasco declared that the action deserved "to be handed down to posterity as one of the most extraordinary feats of personal valor recorded in history." Smythe, "The Autobiography of George W. Smythe," 209.

de Santa Anna had been a central figure in revolutionary activity in Mexico. Santa Anna had campaigned with Arredondo in 1813 in Texas; he had chosen a timely moment to switch to the side of Iturbide against Spain; and then he had turned on Iturbide in 1822. After a victory over a Spanish re-invasion force in 1829, Santa Anna found himself powerful enough to place Anastacio Bustamente at the head of the national administration. But by 1832 Mexico, “that land of revolutions,”⁴² was restive under Bustamente’s policies. Utilizing public animosities toward the Bustamente administration, Santa Anna instigated still another revolt and led an army into the capital. He unseated the president he had installed three years earlier, then allowed himself to be elected to the presidency by the grateful populace.⁴³

Texans, restive under the Law of 1830 and the oppression of Juan Bradburn, gladly supported any party which promised to usurp the administration of the past few years.⁴⁴ Austin felt that “it was very important for us all to join. . . Santa Anna,” and, upon arriving in Brazoria a short time after the Anahuac disturbances,⁴⁵ he found “the whole people unanimous and enthusiastic in favor of . . . Santa Anna.”⁴⁶ When the Anglo-American force camped at Turtle Bayou prior to the Battle of Velasco, they penned a series of “spirited resolutions” which were “a declaration in favor of Santa Anna.”⁴⁷ The wave of support for Santa Anna swept rapidly over

⁴² Holley, *Texas*, p. 351.

⁴³ See Clarence R. Wharton, *El Presidente, A Sketch of the Life of General Santa Anna* (Austin: Gammel’s Book Store, 1926) pp. 13-41.

⁴⁴ The “Turtle Bayou Resolutions” (see footnote 47) sternly denounced “the numberless incroachments and infractions, which have been made by the present administration. . . .”

⁴⁵ It will be recalled that Austin had been elected to the Coahuila-Texas Legislature, and he was in faraway Saltillo throughout the Anahuac disturbances.

⁴⁶ Austin to Ramon Musquiz, July 28, 1832, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 825-28.

⁴⁷ Smythe, “The Autobiography of George 14. Smythe,” 209-11. The “Turtle Bayou Resolutions” may be found in Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. 1, pp. 142-43.

Texas, affecting Mexicans as well as Anglo-Americans.⁴⁸ Mexican soldiers marched to join Santa Anna, and soon the only Mexican force remaining in the Anglo-American communities of Texas was the 350-man garrison at Nacogdoches.

Colonel Piedras, the Nacogdoches *commandante*, remained loyal to the man who had appointed him to his post. But the citizens of Nacogdoches shared the current sentiment for Santa Anna, and they sent word to the other settlers to assemble an armed force to depose Piedras. The *norteamericanos*, who appeared to be acquiring a taste for martial assertion of their views, rapidly gathered and demanded that Piedras pledge his allegiance to Santa Anna. Piedras refused to comply, and on August 2, 1832, he was assaulted in his fortifications.⁴⁹

Piedras' convict-soldiers proved to be no match for three hundred sharpshooting colonists,⁵⁰ and the Mexicans withdrew from Nacogdoches under cover of darkness. The Texans overtook the *presidarios*, and the Mexican officers, excluding Piedras, held a conference. They prudently drew up a declaration endorsing Santa Anna, and invited Colonel Piedras to sign it. When Piedras refused, he was treacherously delivered to the Texans, along with the petition. The Mexican force then was allowed to march southward.⁵¹

The Anglo-Americans, determined to take advantage of their recent successes, called a convention to convene at San Felipe on October 1, 1832. Stephen F. Austin, who by now had

48 For example, in Goliad, which was largely populated by native Mexicans, the military *commandante* "continue[d] obstinately to oppose the Plan of Genl. Sta Anna" "The Anglo-American and Mexican citizens of the town, however, eventually forced him to yield his position. Thomas G. Western, *et al.*, to Austin, August 25, 1832, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, p. 850.

49 F. H. Turner, "The Mejia Expedition," *QTSHA*, VII (July, 1903), 23-26; and Smythe, "The Autobiography of George W. Smythe," 210.

50 The Mexicans suffered thirty-three fatalities "and about 17 or 18 wounded," while the "Santannistas" had only three dead and seven wounded. James Bowie to Austin, August 8, 1832, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 832-33.

51 Bowle to Austin, *ibid.*; Frost Thorn to Austin, August 28, 1832, *ibid.*, pp. 851-52 and Smythe, "The Autobiography of George W. Smythe," 211.

returned from the Legislature at Saltillo was elected president, and the Convention deliberated for six days. Support for Santa Anna was again professed, and a number of requests concerning customs duties, Indian problems, and similar matters were addressed to the national government. The greatest concerns, however, were that Anglo-American colonists be permitted once again to enter Texas legally, and that Texas be established as a separate state.⁵² The provision of the Law of April 6, 1830 prohibiting “emigrants from nations bordering on this Republic,”⁵³ had always been resented; furthermore, as we have seen, Texans had chafed restlessly under the Mexican-dominated government since it had been established. Nevertheless, through neglect and acceptance of the fact that there was little chance for passage, the various resolutions of the Convention of 1832 were never officially presented to Mexican authorities.⁵⁴

Three months later, however, another convention was called to meet on April 1, 1833. Many Texans were dissatisfied with the negative results of the comparatively moderate Convention of 1832. Consequently, the people returned just fourteen of the fifty-six October delegates to San Felipe, and most of the returnees—along with the majority of the forty new delegates—represented the activist element in Texas. Only a few delegates, such as Stephen F. Austin and James B. Miller (later a member of the “Peace Party”) could be considered consistent advocates of moderate action. Most of the returning delegates were such activists as Patrick C. Jack, W. D. C. Hall, Wily Martin, Ira Ingram, and William H. Wharton, who was elected president over the conservative Stephen F. Austin. New delegates included Henry Smith, Branch T. Archer, David G. Burnet, and Sam Houston.

⁵² The journal for the Convention of 1832 may be found in Gammel, ed., *Laws of Texas*, pp. 475-503.

⁵³ Law of April 6, 1830 cited in *The Texas Gazette* (San Felipe), July 3, 1830, p. 2.

Houston had recently arrived in Texas, hoping to rebuild a shattered political career.⁵⁵ His reputation as a forceful politician had preceded him, and he was immediately appointed by citizens of Nacogdoches as a representative to the Convention of 1833. Houston optimistically wrote to his friend and patron, Andrew Jacobson, that “the acquisition of Texas, by the Government of the United States,” was desired “by nineteen-twentieths of the population of the Province.”⁵⁶ Such thinking, while somewhat exaggerated, was characteristic of the members of the second Convention.

The activist-flavored Convention of 1833 met for two weeks, drawing up resolutions similar to those of the earlier Convention. Repeal of anti-immigration regulations and establishment of “a separate state government” received the greatest emphasis.⁵⁷ In fact, as Sam Houston had anticipated, the delegates even drafted a proposed constitution for separate Mexican statehood for Texas.⁵⁸

These documents and proposals offered solid evidence of the increasing anglicization of Texas. Sanctioned by a group of individuals who clearly were of a more militant temperament than the early colonists, the work of the Convention reflected Anglo-American traditions and

⁵⁴ Eugene C. Barker offers the opinion. that the colonists did not fully support the particulars of these measures, and since officials in Mexican-dominated San Antonio refused to endorse the requests. It was obvious that government approval was impossible. Barker, *Life of Austin*, pp. 408-9.

⁵⁵ One biographer has pointed out that although accumulating a fortune was not Houston’s primary motivation, a number of speculative prospects in Texas helped to lure him there. Also, although there seems to be no definite proof that Houston was an agent for rebellion against Mexico, he did recognize that there would soon be a “political change” in Texas. Being a consummate political opportunist, he wished to be in Texas when that change occurred. Llerena Friend, *Sam Houston, The Great Designer* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1954), PP- viii-ix, 37-55.

⁵⁶ This figure was not yet accurate, but Houston was a man who customarily thought in positive terms. Houston to Jackson, February 13, 1833, Amelia W. Williams and Eugene C. Barker, eds., *The Writings of Sam Houston, 1813-1863*, vol. I, *1813-1836* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1938) pp. 274-76.

⁵⁷ See Memorial to Congress Requesting Separate Statehood, April, 1833, cited in Yoakum, *History of Texas*, vol. I, pp. 469-82. Also of interest is Address of Central Committee to the Convention [written by Austin], April 1, 1833, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 934-40.

institutions and were in slight accordance with Mexican political customs. For example, the proposed constitution called for “trial by jury, and the privilege of the *Writ of Habeas Corpus*,” along with a general overhaul of the prevailing judicial system. Also, in requesting separate statehood, the designated committee issued the following proclamation:

The people of Texas consider it not only an absolute right, but a most sacred and imperative duty to themselves, to represent their wants in a respectful manner to the general government, and to solicit the best remedy. . . their grievances shall admit.⁵⁹

It is hardly surprising that Mexican authorities resented the assumption of “absolute rights” by the *norteamericanos*. When Stephen F. Austin appeared in Mexico City to present the colonists’ requests,⁶⁰ it was perhaps natural that much of this resentment was focused upon him. Incongruous as it may seem, in some Mexican quarters Austin was considered “the first of rebels.” “With the hypocrisy that characterized him,” one well-placed Mexican official wrote, “Austin presented himself and tried to put in motion all the influences which his audacity suggested. Inadvertently, certain expressions which amounted to threats escaped him and revealed his determination of supporting his petition by force if what he called his rights were not granted.”⁶¹ Austin still enjoyed support from many Mexicans,⁶² but this diatribe nevertheless

58 See “Constitution of Texas,” April. 13, 1833, Wallace, ed., *Documents of Texas History*, pp. 80-85. For Houston’s predictions regarding the proposed constitution, see Houston to Jackson, February 13, 1833, Williams and Barker, eds., *Writings of Houston*, pp. 274-76.

59 See Memorial to Congress Requesting Separate Statehood, April, 1833, cited in Yoakum, *History of Texas*, vol. I, pp. 469-82.

60 Erasmo Seguin of San Antonio and James B. Miller were appointed by the Convention to accompany Austin to Mexico City, but for personal reasons they did not go with him. Barker, *Life of Austin*, p. 421.

61 Mendivil, “Relations between Texas, the United States of America, and the Mexican Republic,” Santa Anna, *et al.*, *The Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution*, p. 333. Interestingly enough, Austin later pondered the subject of his

expressed a significant point of view. After all, Lucas Alaman's predictions of 1830 were being fulfilled:

Anglo-Americans had settled "with or without the assent of the Government"; the colonies had "grown, multiplied, become the prominent part in the population"; the *norteamericanos* had "excited movements which disturb the political state of the country"; and now they were "beginning to set up rights."⁶³ It should be of little wonder that Mexicans, futilely sensing the impending loss of Texas, would regard the *norteamericanos* with bitterness and consider Austin, who had worked so long to maintain "Fidelity to Mexico,"⁶⁴ a hypocrite and leader of traitors.

It must be suggested, however, that those Mexicans who maintained this attitude had grounds for justification. We have noted the increasing immigration of *norteamericanos* prone to agitate against Mexican control; subsequent events in Texas would prove the validity of Mexican apprehensions.

Even Austin was rapidly growing to share the belief that Texas should be independent. Austin was of such indispensable importance to Texan loyalty to Mexico that his change of

"hypocrisy" to Mexican officials. After discussing the things necessary to safeguard Texas on the eve of the Revolution, Austin cautioned that nothing should be done to openly alarm the Mexicans. "Prudence, and an observance of appearances must therefore be strictly attended to for the present. Here, I figure to myself, you start, and exclaim, 'Dios mio; my cousin Stephen has become a very Mexican politician in hypocrisy.' not so; there is no hypocrisy about it. It is well "known that my object has always been to fill up Texas with a north American population; and, besides, it may become a question of to be, or not to be. And in that event, the great law of nature--self preservation--operates, and supersedes all other laws." Austin to Mary Austin Holley, August 21, 1835, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. III, pp. 101-3.

⁶² For example, see Jose Antonio Mexia to Austin, March 27, 1833, *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 932-33.

⁶³ See Alaman, "Report of the Secretary of State to the Congress of Mexico," pp. 313-14.

⁶⁴ Austin to Thomas F. McKinney, October 18, 1834, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. III, pp. 10-13.

attitude should be traced. He long had felt that the Mexican “people will not do for a Republic.”⁶⁵ But he had strictly suppressed such thoughts in the interests of his colony, believing that “fidelity and gratitude to Mexico”⁶⁶ would best serve the colonists. This attitude began to waver, however, as his irritation with the Mexican government grew. For example, a short time after, the passage of the Law of April 6, 1830, he stated his opposition “to a union with the U.S. unless we first receive some guarantees. . . .” He went on to assure his correspondent that “the most perfect peace and harmony” would continue to reign over Texas, but he had already admitted the possibility that he might sanction the separation of Texas and attachment to the United States.⁶⁷ The next year, as the troubles at Anahuac were developing, Austin confided to a relative:

There must be a change of some kind, as we are now situated our commerce is annihilated [sic]; all emigration to the country is entirely stopped, and our hopes of prosperity totally overthrown. Do the people of my colony, or of Texas, or do I, merit this? No; we have been to this Government true as steel. And we have redeemed from a state of nature, and given value, and credit, and consequence to a large territory. . . which, comparatively, was valueless before Our fidelity and hard services, it seems, are to be rewarded by acts of arbitrary despotism, and a total disregard of the constitution and our just rights . . .

Never was a man more consciously scrupulous and faithful in the discharge of his duties to any government than I have been to the Mexican. I came here in good faith, have labored in

⁶⁵ Austin to Edward Lovelace, November 22, 1822, *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 554-55.

⁶⁶ Austin to Mexican Secretary of Relations, July 13, 1830, *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 449-51.

good faith, and now there is a struggle between my desire to adhere to them and the indignant feelings which their acts create. I will exhaust all honorable means of obtaining the redress of our grievances. Should these fail the last resort will be adopted.⁶⁸

This line of thought continued to develop through the following months. At last, following the Convention of 1832, Austin wrote to General William H. Ashley, an old friend who was now a United States Congressman from Missouri.

The situation of the Mexican republic at this time is such that in all human calculations the destiny of Texas will depend mainly upon itself Should the future drive us into an attitude of hostility in defense of what we have so dearly earned, the public opinion of good men, I think, will acquit us of all wrong— . . [and] will also cheer the humble watch fires of our undisciplined militia, and if necessary soon swell their ranks to a respectable army The sons of the North may be buried in Texas, but they cannot be driven from it--neither do I think such a thing, will be attempted. This country, as a state of Mexico, would prosper—. . . it is not our interest to separate if such a thing can be avoided, unless indeed we should float into the Northern Republic with the consent of all parties, ourselves included. . . . I think you must feel some interest for this country and for your countrymen who are in [it] and I am certain you will do us all the good you can. Write me on the subject. Has this out-of-the-way section ever occupied any place in the attention of the magnates of Washington?⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Austin to Henry Austin, June 1, 1830, *ibid.*, pp. 404-5.

⁶⁸ Austin to Mary Austin Holley, December 29, 1831, *ibid.*, pp. 727-30.

⁶⁹ Austin to Ashley, October 10, 1832, *ibid.*, pp. 871-74. There apparently was no further correspondence between Austin and Ashley.

It was in this frame of mind⁷⁰ that Austin journeyed to Mexico City to present the requests of the Convention of 1833. President Santa Anna was absent from the city, and Austin had a “long, and frank” conference with Vice President Gomez Farias and several other officials. After outlining the requested proposals, Austin “distinctly stated as my opinion that self-preservation would compel the people of Texas to organize a local government, with or without the approbation of the General Government”⁷¹ Although Austin was assured that “just requests” would be granted, months passed and “nothing” was accomplished. On October 2, 1833, an exasperated Austin wrote: “I am tired of this government I have had much more respect for them than they deserve. But I am done with all that.”⁷² On this same day, he addressed a letter to San Antonio, advising the *ayuntamiento* “to organize a local government independent of Coahuila. . . .”⁷³

A few days later Austin “told the vice President . . . that Texas must be made a state by the Govt. or she would make herself one.” (“I had told him and the ministers the same thing ever since I came here.”) Farias took this “as a threat and became very much enraged.” Although Austin “reconciled” the Vice President, it was obvious that the empresario was losing much of the government favor he had long enjoyed.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Just three days before Austin left on his mission, he wrote: “I have always been opposed to hasty and imprudent measure but If our application fails, I shall say we have exhausted the subject so far as it can be done by mild steps, and that a totally different course ought to be adopted” Austin to Henry Austin, April 19, 1833, *ibid.*, pp. 953-54.

⁷¹ Austin to the Central Committee, July 24, 1833, *ibid.*, pp. 988-91.

⁷² Austin to James F. Perry, October 2, 1833, *ibid.*, pp. 1006-7.

⁷³ Austin to the Ayuntamiento of Bexar, October 2, 1833, *ibid.*, pp. 1007-8.

⁷⁴ Austin to James F. Perry, October 23, 1833, *ibid.*, pp. 1008-9. A few weeks later Austin acknowledged that he now had “a goodly number of enemies here” Austin to Samuel M. Williams, November 26, 1833, *ibid.*, p. 1016.

Finally, however, Santa Anna arrived, and after two interviews Austin felt that the “appearance of things is much better than it was a month or even two weeks ago.⁷⁵ In fact, the law repealing immigration prohibitions was passed, the prospect of further reform seemed promising, and Austin planned to “be home soon.”⁷⁶ But when he reached Saltillo on his return to Texas, he was arrested and sent back to Mexico City. Disapproving authorities had intercepted his letter of October 2, 1833, which advised Texans to “consult among themselves for the purpose of organizing a local government for Texas. . . .”⁷⁷ But Austin was “very kindly treated” by the Mexicans, and since he felt guilty of no crime, he wrote to Texas stating: “I hope there will be no excitement about my arrest. . . .”⁷⁸

Austin’s request was widely publicized;⁷⁹ it was also widely honored. After Austin had departed for Mexico, a period of political tranquility began in Texas. For one thing, political activists (who had dominated the Convention of 1833) had sent their demands to the capital via Austin, and until he returned there seemed little else to do. Also, in the summer of 1833 a severe cholera epidemic swept over Texas, distracting most colonists from political concerns.⁸⁰ As we have seen, moreover, the anti-immigration law was finally repealed, and by the time news of Austin’s arrest reached Texas numerous other reforms had been granted.⁸¹ Austin had noticed

⁷⁵ Austin to Samuel M. Williams, November 5, 1833, *ibid.*, pp. 1013-15.

⁷⁶ Austin to Samuel M. Williams, November 26, 1833, *ibid.*, p. 1016.

⁷⁷ Austin to Ayuntamiento of Bexar, October 12, 1833, *ibid.*, p. 1007. Also see Austin to Samuel M. Williams, January 12, 1834, *ibid.*, pp. 1024-26.

⁷⁸ Austin to James F. Perry, January 14, 1834, *ibid.*, pp. 1033-36.

⁷⁹ See, for example, *Advocate of the People’s Rights—Extra* (Brazoria), March 27, 1834, pp. 1-2.

⁸⁰ “. . . 80 persons died at Brazoria in the course of the summer and Velasco was nearly depopulated by the cholera.” James F. Perry to Austin, October 26, 1833, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 1009-11. Also see J. Villasana Haggard, “Epidemic Cholera in Texas, 1833-1834,” *SWHQ*, XL (January, 1937), 216-30.

⁸¹ These reforms included: an additional representative in the state legislature, changing the ratio to 9-3; the use of English in official documents; religious toleration; and the promise of broad judicial reform. See Gammel, ed., *Laws of Texas*, vol. I, pp. 281, 318, 352, 355-56, 360, 364, and 384.

that there was little interest in his activities in the capital.⁸² This lack of interest continued in most quarters after he was arrested. Indeed, some persons felt that Austin had brought this misfortune upon himself and deserved the action taken against him. Sam Houston represented this point of view when he declared that Austin “broke into prison.”⁸³

One group of Texans, however, did not desert Austin. Most of the minority of diehard separatists had formed a “War Party,” which aimed for nothing less than complete independence. (Those of the opposite temper formed a “Peace Party” to counter the separatists.) Led by William B. Travis and Henry Smith, the vocal War Party members “believed, that though they had rid themselves of a galling military yoke, there was no security that the same would not be fastened on them again.”⁸⁴ Probably hoping to gain Austin’s support for their cause, Travis and other members of the War Party circulated a “Memorial” in a vain attempt to secure the *empresario*’s freedom.⁸⁵

Other efforts in Austin’s behalf were mainly perfunctory.⁸⁶ Lawyers Spencer H. Jack and Peter W. Grayson journeyed to Mexico City to work for Austin’s release; otherwise the *empresario* was largely ignored. The chief reason for this neglect, other than those previously mentioned, was the general prosperity enjoyed by the Anglo-American colonists. One settler left the following record:

⁸² There are numerous examples of this attitude. For instance, on one occasion Austin wrote: “I suppose that I am totally forgotten in Texas. I have only recd. one letter from there since I started. . . .” Austin to Samuel M. Williams, September 5, 1833, Barkert ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. II, pp. 1003-4.

⁸³ Houston to John A. Wharton, April 14, 1835, Williams and Barker, eds., *Writings of Houston*, p. 294.

⁸⁴ Newell, *Revolution in Texas*, p. 31.

⁸⁵ Amelia Williams, “A Critical Study of the Siege of the Alamo and of the Personnel of Its Defenders,” *SWHQ*, XXXVII (October, 1933), 82; and Homer S. Thrall, *A Pictorial History of Texas* (St. Louis: N. D. Thompson and Co., 1879), p. 699.

⁸⁶ For example, see the vacillating statement in *The Texas Republican* (Brazoria), July 5, 1834, p. 4.

It is only with the most pleasant reflections that I recur to the period in Texas history, that reposes like a cultivated garden in the wilds of nature, from the capitulation of Ugartechea to the year 1835. Texas was then a terrestrial paradise.

Health, plenty, and good-will teemed throughout the land. A live mastodon would not have been a greater curiosity than a tax-collector. . . Money sufficient for all purposes was in circulation.⁸⁷

Mexican troops and customs officials had not returned to Texas after 1832;⁸⁸ once the cholera epidemic had subsided, Texans were free to pursue economic prosperity. Rebellion against Mexico, if thought of at all, was an unpleasant consideration, because it would obviously disrupt this “terrestrial paradise.”

Early in 1834, Gomez Farias (who had excellent reason, through recent interviews with Stephen F. Austin, to be suspicious of the situation in Texas) dispatched Colonel Juan N. Almonte on a careful inspection of the province. Almonte’s report, however, indicated little alarm over political attitudes of the *norteamericanos*. Far more ominous was his information on the economic situation of Texas. While the predominantly Mexican areas (such as San Antonio and Goliad) were still economically weak, Anglo-American areas were prospering and

⁸⁷ Linn, *Reminiscences of Texas*, p. 23.

⁸⁸ Santa Anna was working to attain dictatorial powers over Mexico, and for a time he was able to spare little attention to Texas.

expanding rapidly. In Almonte's report, there are numerous statistics which attest to the booming growth of Anglo-American enterprises and communities—the steady anglicization of Texas.⁸⁹

It should be emphasized that peaceful development was of greater potential danger to Mexican control of Texas than rebellious agitation. The most vigorous agitators—the early filibusters—had vainly attempted to anglicize Texas for two decades. But after slightly more than half that time, Anglo-American institutions prevailed throughout much of Texas. (Almonte admitted, for example, that “almost nothing but English is spoken in (the Anglo-American) part of the republic”⁹⁰)

Even the War Party members were primarily concerned with economic pursuits. Travis was busily occupied with his law practice,⁹¹ and Henry Smith, who had been appointed the political head of Brazoria, was fully engaged with the everyday tasks of his office.⁹² But these two diehard agitators, along with a few other determined separatists continued to hope and work for Texas independence. Smith managed to obtain his appointment as political chief of the Department of Brazos, a Coahuila-Texas state political division, in July, 1834. He thereby became “the first American who [was] appointed to the office,”⁹³ as Travis enthusiastically congratulated him. From this position, Smith was able to control important influence for the interests of the War Party in their correspondence, Travis addressed his friend and political ally

⁸⁹ Juan N. Almonte, “Statistical Report on Texas,” translated by C. E. Castanedat *SWHQ*, XXVIII (January, 1925), 177-222.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 210.

⁹¹ See Robert E. Davis, ed., *The Diary of William Barret Travis* (Waco, Texas, The Texian Press, 1966). This diary, which runs from August 30, 1833, to June 26, 1834, is indispensable for a picture of the everyday activities of Anglo-Americans during this tranquil period.

⁹² John Henry Brown, *Life and Times of Henry Smith* (Dallas: A. D. Aldridge and Co., 1887; a facsimile reproduction of the original by The Steck Company, Austin, 1935), pp. 17-18.

⁹³ Travis to Smith, July 24, 1834, cited in *ibid.*, p. 25. Smith was appointed by Coahuila-Texas Governor Tgustin Viesca, whose deep involvement with Anglo-American land speculators perhaps explains the selection of a separatist to this office.

as “Citizen Smith”⁹⁴ intentionally reminiscent of the French Revolution. In a letter written in the fall of 1834, Travis vehemently declared:

I think that Texas is forever ruined unless the citizens make a manly, energetic effort to save themselves from anarchy and confusion. . . . (W]e are subject legally and constitutionally to no power on earth, save our sovereign selves. We are actually in a situation of revolution and discord, when it becomes the duty of every individual to protect himself. . . .

The fact is something must be done to save us from our inevitable fate, and the sooner the better. . . .⁹⁵

A few months later, however, Travis was forced to admit that public opinion runs so high against any change that I doubt whether anything can be done towards an organization of Texas at this time. . . .

The farmers, the bone and sinew of the country, are unanimous against it. They are all doing well, and as long as people are prosperous they do not desire a change.

⁹⁴ See Travis to Smith, July 24, October 11, 25, November 1. 14p 1834, *ibid.*, pp. 24, 27, 44, 50, 58.

⁹⁵ Travis to Smith, October 11, 1834 *ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

I still am more decided in opinion that nothing can be done for Texas. It is not a faction that are opposed to organizing. In this jurisdiction It is the people, and that almost unanimously. . . .⁹⁶

Despite the temper of public opinions, however, events during this peaceful period were inexorably moving toward the outbreak of hostilities. For one thing, Mexican officials continued to be antagonized by the persistent attempts of Anthony Butler to purchase Texas for the United States.⁹⁷ Butler's overbearing manner caused him to be "dispised [*sic*] by most of the Mexicans,"⁹⁸ and conduct could only have worsened Mexican relations with Anglo-Americans.

Land speculators also helped to arouse Mexican apprehensions during this "tranquil" period. Speculation in Texas lands long had been attempted by men calling themselves *empresarios*, but such activities reached an unprecedented level in 1834-1835. Officials of the Coahuila-Texas government were deeply involved, including two of the three Texas representatives, John Durst and J. M. Carbajal. A series of acts was passed by the legislature, allowing the governor "to dispose of the vacant lands" of Coahuila-Texas "on the basis and conditions he shall judge proper. . . ."⁹⁹ Speculators who obtained such "disposals" included James Grant, Robert Peebles, F. W. Johnson, and even Samuel M. Williams, Stephen F. Austin's

⁹⁶ Travis to Smith, November 1, 1834, *ibid.*, pp. 50-52. Travis still supported separation, despite adverse public opinion. Just two weeks later, for example, he became a member of a civil committee of seven San Felipe citizens to consider the present state of affairs. Travis was the only ardent separatist on this committee, and a conciliatory public statement was issued. "It could not be helped," complained Travis. "My voice in the committee was only one against six." But he was determined to "wait patiently for the moving of the waters." Travis to Smith, November 13, 1834, *ibid.*, p. 56.

⁹⁷ See John Forsyth to Joaquin M. de Castillo y Lanzas, December 11, 1834, and January 9, 1835; Asbury Dickins to Castillo y Lanzas, May 11 and June 4, 1835; and Forsyth to Anthony Butler, July 2, 1835, Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence*, vol. VIII, pp. 29-32.

⁹⁸ Austin to Samuel M. Williams, April 29, 1835, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. III, pp. 68-69. Butler owned property in Texas, which partially explains his vigorous efforts to purchase Texas. Barker, *Life of Austin*, p. 287.

longtime friend. Relatively few Texans engaged in these operations, however, and many colonists were indignant over “*the Mammouth Speculation.*”¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, the obvious fraud involved in these speculations provided Santa Anna with an excuse to send troops to Monclova (which had become the capital of Coahuila-Texas in 1834).

Santa Anna long had worked to attain dictatorial powers in Mexico. By 1835 he had largely succeeded in achieving this goal, and he eagerly seized the pretext to send troops to Coahuila to secure his influence there. At this time he also sought to strengthen his control over Texas. Early in 1835 he reopened the customs house at Anahuac and stationed a deputy revenue collector at Brazoria. He also sent government troops back to Texas, ostensibly to “prevent the ravages of Indians” but actually to reinstate government authority.¹⁰¹

The restoration of customs duties and the reinstatement of the hated *presidarios* was certain to cause resentment among the activists. As in 1832, animosity was first manifested at Anahuac, an activist hotbed. Smuggling was once again resorted to as a means of avoiding customs duties. Local merchants refused to sell supplies to the garrison, and building materials for a Mexican fort were burned late one night. Captain Antonio Tenorio, *commandante* of Anahuac, subsequently tightened his control of the area. Anglo-American vexation was reflected on June 12, 1835, when Andrew Briscoe, DeWitt Harris, and William Smith became involved in

99 See Gammel, ed., *Laws of Texas*: Decree no. 278, April 19, 1834, pp. 380-81; Decree no. 297, March 13, 1835, pp. 391-92; and Decree no. 297, April 7, 1835, pp. 394-95.

100 J. G. McNeel to James F. Perry, about June 22, 1835, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. III, p. 77. The full story of these speculations is related in Eugene C. Barker, “Land Speculation as a Cause of the Texas Revolution,” *QTSHA*, X (July, 1906), 76-95.

101 Holley, *Texas*, p. 333.

a scuffle with local troops. Smith was shot dead, and Briscoe and Harris were overpowered and thrown in jail.¹⁰²

Shortly after this disturbing news reached San Felipe, a mob of aroused citizens seized a passing Mexican courier and rifled his dispatch pouch. They found confidential messages which revealed that more troops were on the way to reinforce the Texas garrisons. A group of alarmed colonists immediately convened to discuss recent ominous events. William B. Travis, an inevitable member of this gathering,¹⁰³ reported the committee's decision that "the troops at Anahuac should be disarmed and ordered to leave Texas."¹⁰⁴

Travis, eagerly grasping the initiative for this task, raised a company of volunteers and departed for Anahuac. On June 29, 1835, Travis led thirty men in an assault on Tenorio's garrison, which was quickly forced to surrender.¹⁰⁵

Travis and his triumphant followers soon discovered that their action met widespread disapproval. Escorting their prisoners toward Mexico, they arrived in Harrisburg in time to attend a Fourth of July barbeque. The Mexicans also were invited to the fiesta, and they were treated with considerable hospitality.¹⁰⁶ Afterward, Tenorio and his men were allowed to retrieve

¹⁰² Eugene C. Barker, "Difficulties of a Mexican Revenue Officer," *QTSHA*, IV (January, 1903), 190-213. Briscoe and Harris, intending a practical joke, allowed the *presidarios* to discover that they were planning a smuggling trip. An ambush was set, but when the Mexicans confiscated a load of mere garbage, they arrested the two wags. Briscoe and Harris resisted, and Smith was attracted to the scene by the fight.

¹⁰³ Travis had moved to San Felipe in 1832.

¹⁰⁴ Travis to Henry Smith, July 6, 1835, cited in Brown, Henry Smith, p. 59.

¹⁰⁵ See N. D. Labadie, "Narrative of the Anahuac, or Opening Campaign, of the Texas Revolution" *The Texas Almanac for 1859*, 30-36; and Documents 201 263, and 204, Gulick, ed., *Lamar Papers*, vol. I, pp. 202-3, 205-6.

¹⁰⁶ One guest recalled that Captain Tenorio, "a fine-looking man," became the center of attention. He danced and "walked among the people shaking hands with the men and acting as if he was the hero of the occasion. The Mexican soldiers sat and smoked and played cards." Mrs. Dilue Harris, "Reminiscences of Mrs. Dilue Harris," *QTSH*, IV (October, 1900), 125-26.

their arms and resume their march unescorted. Following a leisurely journey, they joined the main body of Mexican troops in San Antonio, commanded by Domingo de Ugartechea.¹⁰⁷

The meaning of this lenient treatment soon was fully revealed. Travis found that, except for his extremist War Party friends, his attack on Anahuac was severely condemned. Most Texans resented the disruption of their prosperous activities by military clashes, and Travis was shown their feelings in no uncertain terms. Committees were formed to officially denounce “the second shameful attack and expulsion of the national troops. . . , the late outrage at Anahuac.”¹⁰⁸ Individuals also viciously censured Travis and his followers for “the unauthorized, wanton, and unprovoked attack on the town of Anahuac.”¹⁰⁹

After enduring two weeks of such bitter criticism, Travis lamely published the following announcement:

W. Barret Travis requests a suspension of public opinion in regard to the capture of the fort of Anahuac, until he can appear before the public with all the facts attending the capture of the Fort.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Barker, “Difficulties of a Mexican Revenue Officer,” 201.

¹⁰⁸ John A. Williams, President of the Ayuntamiento of Liberty, to the Political Chief of Nacogdoches, July 3, 1835, cited in C. Allen True, “John A. Williams, Champion of Mexico in the Early Days of the Texas Revolution,” *SWHQ*, XLVII (October, 1943), 109-10.

¹⁰⁹ William Duncan to the Political Chief of Nacogdoches, July 3, 1835, *ibid.*, 112-13. Also see James K. Greer, ed., “Journal Ammon Underwood, 1834-1838,” *SWHQ*, XXXII.(October, 1928), 133.

¹¹⁰ Card from Travis, July 18, 1835, cited in McCaleb, *William Barret Travis*, p. 57. Travis later did attempt to explain “all the facts” to the public. See Travis To the Public, September 1, 1835, cited in Barker, “Difficulties of a Mexican Revenue Officer,” 202.

Travis also wrote a letter of apology to Colonel Ugartechea.¹¹¹ Nevertheless, although he conceded that “offensive measures seem to be abandoned by the people,” he steadfastly continued to “believe that all are determined to defend the country. . . to the last extremity.”¹¹²

This opinion was soon verified, because the very activities that inspired this avalanche of reproval¹¹³ were to trigger a violent drive for independence. Colonel Ugartechea ordered the arrest of Travis and six other recent troublemakers.¹¹⁴ This step was a turning point; it was “too much for the people to bear.” Committees of Safety and Correspondence (clearly reminiscent of an earlier Anglo-American Revolution), were formed in several communities to protest this move, and Texans began to call for another, more decisive, convention. The *San Felipe Telegraph and Texas Register* denounced the arrest orders as “another artifice. . . to introduce troops into the country, and at the same time to cause divisions among ourselves.” Indeed, it was rumored that eight hundred Mexican troops were marching for Texas to establish four additional garrisons. But instead of causing “divisions” among the Texans, the *San Felipe* newspaper reported that “fortunately, the people have been aroused to a sense of their danger, and arise in their might to oppose any attempt to impose on them a government to which they as freemen cannot give their assent.”¹¹⁵

Indeed, the Anglo-Americans of Texas were rapidly being “aroused to a sense of their danger.” In light of political activities in the interior of Mexico, increasing troop movements to Texas, and Ugartechea’s recent orders to arrest, it now was obvious that military rule was

¹¹¹ Travis to Ugartechea, July 31, 1835, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. III, p. 95.

¹¹² Travis to Henry Smith, July 6, 1835, cited in Brown, *Henry Smith*, p. 60.

¹¹³ Travis thought that the Peace Party made “much the most noise” over this incident. Travis to James Bowie, July 30, 1835, cited in McCaleb, *William Barret Travis*, p. 61.

¹¹⁴ See Wily Martin to Ayuntamiento of Columbia, August 10, 1835, Barker, eds., *Austin Papers*, Vol. III, p. 97.

imminent.¹¹⁶ Martial control, of course, would greatly alter the economic situation in Texas. This fact was of vital significance, because the primary motivation of most Texas colonists was economics. They had come to Texas to better themselves economically and instead of being dissatisfied they were generally disinterested in the political situation harped upon by hardcore separatists. But now it began to appear that Mexican military activities would threaten the prosperous status quo, and Texans soon would feel compelled to defend their anglicized way of life.¹¹⁷

While Texans were contemplating these disturbing thoughts, Stephen F. Austin finally returned from his lengthy imprisonment in Mexico.¹¹⁸ The apprehensive colonists immediately looked to him for direction. Austin's return was considered by most Anglo-Americans an event "which would settle all their doubts as to what should be done. . . ."¹¹⁹ Austin was warmly congratulated on his release,¹²⁰ and even members of the War Party cultivated his clearly decisive influence.¹²¹

Austin's change of attitude toward the Mexican government has already been traced. After his arrest for the expression of those views, he frequently reverted to his previous position

115 See *Telegraph and Texas Register* (San Felipe), October 10, 1835, pp. 1-8; and Travis to Andrew Briscoe, August 31, 1835, cited in A. Garland Adair and M. H. Crockett, eds., *Heroes of the Alamo* (New York: Exposition Press, 1956), pp. 35-36.

116 For an expression of this temper, see Horatio Allsberry to the Public, August 28, 1835, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, vol. III, pp. 107-8.

117 See, for example, James Kerr to Ira R. Lewis, August 3, 1835, *ibid.*, pp. 96-97. "I believe it is the Desire of a Majority of all to keep Pease as long as (hands off) and when our rights and privileges are invaded to kick like mules all feet at once[.]"

118 Austin was given his final release in the summer of 1835, See Judicial Opinion, June 26, 1835, *ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

119 Notes by G. Borden, February 6, 1844, *ibid.*, pp. 113-14.

120 For example see Benjamin F. Smith, *et al.*, to Austin, September 4, 1835, Wyle Martin, et al. to Austin, September 5, 1835, and F. W. Johnson to Austin, September 5, 1835, *ibid.*, pp. 112, 114-15.

121 See W. B. Travis to Austin, September 22, 1835; and notes by G. Borden, February 6, 1844, *ibid.*, pp. 115 and 133.

and urged “*Fidelity to Mexico, opposition to violent men or measures.*”¹²² Nevertheless, his long incarceration and close observation of Mexican political developments ultimately forced him to return to the conclusion that Texas would soon separate from Mexico.¹²³ When he was invited to speak at a widely anticipated banquet,¹²⁴ therefore, recent occurrences in Texas made the tone of his address inevitable.

On September 8, 1835, Austin delivered his speech at “a Grand Dinner and Ball. . . .”¹²⁵ He flatly stated that Texas was “threatened by immediate hostilities.” After a review of Mexican political chaos and misdeeds, he suggested that war was “inevitable.” He called for “a general consultation of the people,” and urged that Texans prepare “to adopt such measures as the tranquility and salvation of the country may require.”¹²⁶

This address was broadly publicized, and Austin followed it up with vigorous correspondence. To numerous individuals he emphasized that “WAR is our only resource,” and that “There must now be no half way measures—War in full—The sword is drawn and the scabbard must be put on one side until the military are all driven out of Texas.”¹²⁷ Austin’s frank commitment unleashed a general movement toward open hostilities. Committees of Safety and Correspondence (or Vigilance) were now formed in every community. Steps were also taken to

122 Austin to James F. Perry, August 25, 1834, *ibid.*, Vol. II, PP. 1075-85.

123 Austin to Mary Austin Holley, August 21, 1835, *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 101-3.

124 Benjamin F. Smith, *et al.*, to Austin, September 4, 1835, *ibid.*, p. 112.

125 Henry Austin to Mary Austin Holley, September 10, 1835, *ibid.*, pp. 119-21. This letter contains a description of this rather impressive occasion.

126 Austin to the People of Texas, September 8, 1835, *ibid.*, pp. 116-19.

127 Austin to Columbia Committee, September 19 and 21, 1835, *ibid.*, pp. 128-31. Also see Austin to P. W. Grayson, and to W. D. C. Hall, September 19, 1835, *ibid.*, pp. 127-28, and 129-30.

organize armed resistance to Mexican troops (which were reinforced by a contingent under the command of General Martin Perfecto de Cos, brother-in-law of Santa Anna).¹²⁸

All that was needed to provoke hostilities was an aggressive gesture by Mexican forces, and such an incident occurred early in October. A Mexican detachment attempted to seize a “practically worthless” cannon used by the citizens of Gonzales to scare away “prowling redskins. A skirmish ensued, reinforcements gathered for both sides, and on October 2, 1835, the Mexicans were routed by a fierce Texan charge.¹²⁹

“Thus the Rubicon was passed; the war was begun.”¹³⁰ Texans flocked to Gonzales—the “Lexington of Texas”¹³¹—and, on October 11, elected Stephen F. Austin Commander-in-chief of their volunteer army. A provisional government was formed and independence was declared—all in the customary Anglo-American manner. By the next April, Texan military supremacy was proved on the battlefield of San Jacinto. The anglicization of Texas was completed.

As previously seen, the key to the ultimate Anglo-American victory was the process of Manifest Destiny, which had begun in Texas more than forty years earlier. The filibustering impulse, which first introduced *norteamericanos* into Texas, was largely replaced as the major Anglo-American influence during the 1820s by the more stable and methodical institutions of permanent colonists. By 1830 this influence, strengthened by misjudgments of Mexican policy was sufficiently strong to place the initiative for the future course of events into the hands of Anglo-Americans. From that decisive point, it was only a matter of time until *norteamericanos*

¹²⁸ For evidence of these warlike preparations see *The Texas Republican* (Brazoria), September 19, 1835. The paper is filled with news from the local Committee, subscriptions for the war effort, movements to organize militia companies, a vehement statement from Stephen F. Austin, and patriotic poems and declarations (“The free born sons of Texas—may they all unite in the common cause, and protect the country from military misrule”).

¹²⁹

¹³⁰ Newell, *Revolution in Texas*, p. 55.

¹³¹ Holley, *Texas*, p. 335.

formally seized political control of Texas. This process had been accelerated to a certain extent by the antagonistic activities of separatists, and now their revolutionary goals were permanently accomplished.

Although Stephen F. Austin died a decade before the phrase “Manifest Destiny” was coined, he completely understood this process as it applied to Texas. A letter written only weeks before the outbreak of the Revolution demonstrates this understanding and provides a definitive statement on Manifest Destiny in Texas. Austin pointed out “that my main object has always been to fill up Texas with a north American population. . . . Among other beneficial results of this Anglo-American infiltration, “the cause of philanthropy and liberty. . . will be promoted by *Americanizing* Texas. I am morally right, therefore, to do so by all possible, honorable means.” He recognized that once anglicization was in progress, regardless of the means, certain consequences would inevitably result. “Being fully *Americanized* under the Mexican flag, would be the same thing in effect, and ultimate result, as coming under the United States Flag.” Indeed, after becoming thoroughly “Americanized,” Texas “would be “settled by a population that will harmonize with their neighbors on the East, in language, political principles, common origin, sympathy, and even interest.”¹³² Texas fulfilled this description by 1835, and that fulfillment was as final and irrevocable as four decades of Manifest Destiny could make it.

Manifest Destiny, therefore, was the basic, essential cause of the Texas Revolution. As we have seen, the three decades from 1791 to 1821 was a period of aggressive Anglo-American filibustering activities. These activities aroused lasting distrust in Latin-American officials, and

¹³² Austin to Mary Austin Holley, August 21, 1835, Barker, ed., *Austin Papers*, Vol. III, pp. 101-3. ¹³² James Wilkinson to Diego de Gardoqui, Spanish Charge de Affairs to the United States, January 1, 1789, Alcee Fortier, *A History of Louisiana*, vol. II: *The Spanish Conquest and the Cession to the United States, 1769-1803* (New York: Manzi, Joyant, and Co., 1904), pp. 141-42.

that distrust was reflected in later Mexican policy. Furthermore, several of the early filibusters incited and led the separatist movement after 1821: John Austin directed American forces at the Battle of Velasco in 1832; W. D. C. Hall was at Velasco and served as second in command at the Battle of Anahuac; Ben Milam, led the assault on San Antonio in 1835. These men and other filibuster veterans were prominent as agitators and participants in events leading to the Texas Revolution, and thus helped to conclude the work they had prematurely begun years earlier. Moreover, even though many American settlers were peaceful and followed the orderly example of Stephen F. Austin, numerous other *norteamericanos* proved to be belligerent troublemakers. Men like William B. Travis, Henry Smith, Andrew Briscoe, and Sam Houston were openly hostile to Latin-American authority, just as the filibusters had been before them. But of even greater importance than these “activists” were the “moderate” colonists who made up the majority of the population. Not until they decided to follow the agitations of the separatists was a successful revolution possible. These peaceful settlers had methodically and firmly implanted Anglo-American institutions in Texas since 1821, and not until their economic enterprises and anglicized way of life seemed threatened would they rebel against Mexican control. When, in 1835, they finally followed the lead of Stephen F. Austin and joined the revolutionaries, their power proved irresistible and the process of Manifest Destiny in Texas reached its culmination.

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APPENDIX
LIST OF SETTLERS EVALUATED FOR
ACTIVIST AND MODERATE TENDENCIES

Allcorn, John H.	Berry, M.
Allcorn, Elijah	Best, Isaac
Allen, John M.	Betts, Jacob
Allen, Martin	Biggam, Fras.
Allen, Samuel T.	Bloodgood, William
Alley, Abraham	Blount, Stephen
Alley, John	Boatright, Thomas
Alley, Rawson	Bonham, James
Alley, Thomas	Borden, Gall, Jr.
Alley, William	Borden, Thomas
Alsbury, Charles	Bostwick, Caleb
Alsbury, Harvey	Bowman, John T.
Alsbury, Horace	Bower, John W.
Alsbury, Thomas	Bowie, James
Anderson, S. A.	Bradley, Edward
Andrews, John	Bradley, John
Andrews, William	Bradley, Thomas
Angler, Samuel	Breen, Charles
Archer, Branch T.	Brias, Patrick

Austin, John	Bridges, William
Austin, Stephen F.	Brigham, Asa
Austin, William T.	Bright, David
Bacon, Sumner	Brinson, Enoch
Badgett, Jesse	Briscoe, Andrew
Bailey, James B.	Brooks, Bluford
Baker, Joseph	Brooks, John Sowers
Baker, Mosely	Brotherington, Robert
Balis, Daniel	Brown, George
Baratt, William	Brown, John
Barnett, George	Brown, William
Barnett, Thomas	Buckner, Aylett,
Battle, Mills	Bunton, John W.
Beales, John C.	Burleson, Edward
Beard, James	Burnet, David G.
Beason, Benjani	Burnet, Pumphrey
Belknap, Charles	Burnam, Jesse
Bell, Josiah H.	Byrd, Micajah
Bell, Thomas	Byrom, John
Caldwell, Mathew	Duty, George
Callihan, Mosis	Duty, Joseph
Calvit, Alexander	Duval, John
Carpenter, David	Dyer, Clement

Carson, Samuel	Earle, Thomas
Carson, William	Edwards, B. W.
Carter, Samuel	Edwards, Gustavus
Cartwright, Jesse	Edwards, Haden
Cartwright, Thomas	Edwards, Monroe
Castleman, Sylvanus	Elder, Robert
Chambers, Thomas J.	Ellis, Richard
Chance, Samuel	Everitt, Stephen
Charles, Isaac	Exeter, Richard
Childress, George	Falenash, Charles
Chriesman, Horatio	Fannin, James W.
Clark, John C.	Fenton, David,
Clark, William, Jr.	Fields, John F.
Clarke, Anthony	Fisher, James
Coats, Merit	Fisher, John
Cochran, James	Fisher, Samuel
Coleman, Robert	Fitzgerald, David
Coles, John P.	Flanakin, Isaiah
Collinsworth, George	Flowers, Ellisha
Collinsworth, James	Fordtran, Charles
Cook, James	Foster, Isaac
Cooke, John	Foster, John
Cooper, William	Foster, Randolph

Conrad, Edward	Frazier, James
Crawford, William	Fulshear, Charles
Crier, John	Gaines, James
Crockett, David	Garret, Charles
Crownover, John	Gates, Samuel
Cummings, James	Gates, William
Cummings, John	Gazley, Thomas
Cummings, William	George, Freeman
Cummins, James	Gilbert, Preston
Cummins, Moses	Gilbert, Sarah
Cummins, Rebecca	Gilleland, Daniel
Curtis, Hinton	Goodrich, Benjamin
Curtis, James	Gorbet, Chester
Curtis, James, Jr.	Gouldrich, Michael
Daniels, Williamson	Grant, James
Davidson, Samuel	Gray, Thomas
Davis, Thomas	Grimes, Jesse
Decrow, Daniel	Groce, Jared E.
Demos, Charles	Guthrie, Robert
Demos, Peter	Gutierrez, Jose
Deweese, William	Haddan, John
Dickinson, John	Hady, Samuel
Dillard, Nicholas	Hall George B.

Dimmitt, Phillip	Hall, John W.
Duke, Thomas	Hall, William
Durst, John	Hall, W. D. C.
Hamilton,. David	Kerr, Peter
Hamilton, Robert	Kerr, William
Hardeman, Bailey	Kincheloe, William
Hardin, Augustine	Kingston, William
Harris, Abner	Knight, James
Harris, David	Kuykendall, Abner
Harris, William	Kuykendall, Brazilla
Harris, William J.	Kuykendall, Joseph
Harris, William P.	Kuykendall, Robert
Harrison, George	Labadie, Nicholas
Harvey' William	Lacy, William
Haynes: Thomas	Lamar, Mirabeau B.
Hensley, James	Latimer, Albert
Hodge, Alexander	League, Hosea
Holland, Francis	Leakey, Joel
Holland, William	LeGrand, Edwin
Holliman, Kinchen	Linsey, Benjamin
Hope, James	Little, John
Houston, Sam	Little, William
Hoxey, Asa	Logan, William M.

Hudson, C. S.	Long, James
Huff, George	Long, Jane
Huff, John	Lynch, James
Hughes, Isaac	Lynch, Nathanael
Hunter, Eli	Magee, Augustus
Hunter, Johnson	Marsh, Shybael
Iiams, John	Mathis, William
Ingram, Ira	Martin, Wily
Ingram, Seth	Maverick, Samuel
Irons, John	McClain, A. W.
Isaacks, Samuel	McCormick, Arthur
Jack, Patrick C.	McCormick, David
Jack, William H.	McCormick, John
Jackson, Alexander	McCoy, Thomas
Jackson, Humphrey	McCroskey, John
Jackson, Isaac	McFarlan, Aechilles
Jamison, Thomas	McFarlan, John
Johnson, Francis W.	McKenney, Thomas
Johnson, Henry	McKinney, Collin
Jones, Anson	McKinsey, Hugh
Jones, Henry	McNair, James
Jones, James W.	McNeel, David
Jones, John R.	McNeel, George

Jones, Oliver	McNeel, John
Jones, R.	McNeel, John G.
Keep, Imla	McNeel, Pleasant
Keller, John C.	McNeel, Sterling
Kelly, John	McNutt, Elizabeth
Kemper, Samuel	McWilliams, William
Kennedy, Samuel	Menard, Michael
Kennon, Alfred	Menefee, William
Kerr, James	Mercer, Eli
Milam, Ben	Prater, William
Milburn, David	Pruitt, Pleasant
Miller, James B.	Pryor, William
Miller, Samuel	Rabb, Andrew
Miller Samuel R.	Rabb, John
Miller, Simon	Rabb, Thomas
Millican, James D.	Rabb, William
Millican, Robert	Raleigh, William
Millican, William	Ramey, L.
Mills, Robert	Randon, David
Minus, Joseph	Randon, John
Mitchell, Asa	Rankin, Frederick
Monks, John	Rawls, Amos
Moore, John	Rawls, Benjamin

Moore, John W	Rawls, Daniel
Moore, Luke	Richardson, Stephen
Morgan, James	Roark, Elijah
Morrison, Moses	Roark, Leo
Morton, William	Robbins, Earle
Mottley, Junius	Robbins, William
Mouser, David	Roberts, Andrew
Navarro, Jose	Roberts, John S.
Nelson, James	Roberts, Noel
Newman, Joseph	Roberts, William
Norton, James	Robinson, Andrew
Nuckols, M. B.	Robinson, George
Orrick, James	Ross, James
Osborn, Nathan	Ruiz, J. Francisco
Padilla, Juan	Rusk, Thomas J.
Parks, William	San Pierre, Joseph
Parker, Joshua	Scates, William
Parker, William	Scobey, Robert
Parmer, Martin	Scott, James
Patrick, George	Scott, William
Patton, William	Selkirk, William
Peebles, Robert	Shelby, David
Pennington, Isaac	Shipman, Daniel

Pennington, Sydney	Shipman, Moses
Pentecost, George	Sims, Bartlett
Perry, James F.	Singleton, G. W.
Pettus, Buck	Singleton, Philip
Pettus, Freeman	Smeathers, William
Petty, John	Smith, Benjamin F.
Peyton, Jonathan	Smith, Christian
Phelps, James	Smith, Cornelius
Phillips, I. B.	Smith, Henry
Phillips, Zeno	Smith, John
Picket, Pamela	Smithwick, Noah
Pilgrim, Thomas J.	Smythe, George W.
Polley, J. H.	Snider, Gabriel
Potter, Robert	Sojourner, Albert
Powell, Peter	Spencer, Nancy
Power, James	Stafford, Adam,
Stafford, William	Ward, William
Stapp, Elijah	Wells, Francis
Stevens, Thomas	West, Claiborne
Stevens, C. B.	Westall, Thomas
Stout, Owen	Wharton, John A.
Strange, James	Wharton, William
Sutherland, Walter	White, Amy

Swisher, James	White, Joseph
Tally, David	White, Rueben
Taylor, Charles	White, Walter
Taylor, John I.	White, William C.
Teel, George	Whitesides, Boland
Thomas, David	Whitesides, Henry
Thomas, Ezekial	Whitesides, James
Thomas, Jacob	Whitesides, William
Thomas, Jesse	Whiting, Nathaniel
Tone, Thomas	Whiting, Samuel
Tong, James	Whitlock, William
Townsend, Nathaniel	Wightman, Elias
Toy, Samuel	Wilkins, Jane
Travis, William B.	Wilkinson, James.
Trobough, John	Williams, George
Tumlinson, Elizabeth	Williams, Henry
Tumlinson, James	Williams, John
Turner, John	Williams, John R.
Vendome Isaac	Williams, Robert
Varner, Martin	Williams, Samuel
Vince, Allen	Williams, Soloman
Vince, Richard	Williamson, R. M.
Vince, Robert	Wilson, Robert

Vince, William

Walker, James

Walker, Thomas

Waller, Edwin

Wallice, Caleb

Wilson, Stephen

Woods, James

Woods, Zadlock

Zavala, Lorenzo de

VITA

John William O'Neal was born in Corsicana, Texas, on April 8, 1942, the son of Jessie Standard O'Neal and William Causby O'Neal. After graduating from Corsicana High School in 1960, he enrolled at Navarro Junior College, Corsicana, Texas. He received an Associate of Arts degree in May, 1962, from Navarro Junior College. He enrolled at East Texas State College in 1962, majoring in history and English. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree with high honors and superior academic standing in May, 1964, from East Texas State College. Following his graduation from college, he taught English in Lampasas Junior High School, Lampasas, Texas, and in Roper High School, Anna, Texas. In January, 1968, he enrolled in Graduate School of East Texas State University and was employed as a graduate assistant in the history department. He received his Master of Arts degree in May, 1969, with a major in history.

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